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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Westem European Union 
for the financial years 1986 (re11ised) and 1987 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 
1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing 
the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expen-
diture on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from 
extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433; 
(b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these 
budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero 
growth criterion; 
(c) furthermore, the evolution of budgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate 
since the requirements of reactivating WEU - including the restructuring of the ministerial 
organs - have been taken into account in this budget; 
(d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in 
the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs; 
(e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a 
more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets; 
(f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expen-
diture; 
(g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I "Permanent 
staff" could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were 
combined to allow their now separate services to be merged; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) in its reply to Recommendation 433, the Council considered it difficult to follow up the 
Assembly's wish for greater budgetary independence; 
(b) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the 
Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly; 
(c) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores 
the wishes ofthe staffto achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority; 
(d) in spite of the Council's undertaking to consider the possible installation of new machines in 
the light of" requirements, the versatility of the equipment and the budgetary implications", 
the Assembly has again been refused a telex whereas the ministerial organs have been allowed 
to purchase telecopying equipment without any comparative study having been made, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Stipulate that in the framework of applying the procedure for approving Assembly budgets a 
global amount should be granted for Heads II to V of its budget for each financial year; 
2. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) abandoning the zero growth principle for preparing annual budgets and replacing it by a more 
rational criterion, taking as a reference the growth rate applied by the EEC for drawing up its 
budget; 
12 
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(b) studying the problem of drawing up a pensions budget separate from the operating budget and 
communicating the conclusions of this study to the Assembly; 
(c) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of estab-
lishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats; 
(d) authorising the Assembly without delay to create the three new posts included with priority in 
the draft 1987 budget; 
(e) studying the problem of dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staff's 
career possibilities. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur) 
I. Preliminary considerations 
1. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter 
of the Assembly, " the Assembly shall express its 
views in the form of an opinion or recommen-
dation on the annual budget of Western 
European Union as soon as it has been commu-
nicated". 
2. The present report has been prepared in 
application of this provision and relates to the 
budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the 
financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987. 
3. In accordance with the criteria governing 
the preparation of reports on previous financial 
years, the present report does not cover the activ-
ities of the Council and the security agencies 
since the Presidential Committee refers these 
parts to the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee 
and the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions. 
4. Moreover, it seems impossible to examine 
these budgets as an expression ofthe activities of 
the various WEU organs because the studies con-
ducted by the security agencies since they were 
set up have not yet been completed. As the 
Council said in the first part of its thirty-second 
annual report: 
" In the first half of 1986 the agencies 
began their work, the results of which will 
constitute internal working documents 
intended to contribute to the Council's 
reflection on the subjects addressed. " 1 
5. Furthermore, the organisation of the 
agencies is subject to a complete review after the 
two-year transitional period lasting until the end 
of 1987. 
6. This being so, your Rapporteur considers 
that the last two budgets of the ministerial organs 
of WEU cannot be examined from the stand-
point of cost-effectiveness. Conversely, general 
views might be expressed which could be taken 
into account when the organisation of these 
organs is revised, as mentioned in paragraph 5 
above. 
11. Aspects of the 1986 budget (revised) 
and the 1987 budget 
7. As is customary, the budgets for 1986 
(revised) and for 1987, after consideration by the 
Budget and Organisation Committee, were set 
l. Document 1074, Section 11.2, paragraph l. 
14 
out in documents C-B (86) 16 and C-B (86) 17, 
which incorporated the changes recommended to 
the Council by that committee. But as these doc-
uments contained only one set of tables showing 
amounts under the various heads and sub-heads 
of the two budgets, it was necessary to refer to 
the basic documents submitted to the Budget 
and Organisation Committee under references 
B (86) 16 and B (86) 18. 
8. The abovementioned documents are not 
appended to the present report. Your Rapporteur 
considered that as the summary tables at Appen-
dices I and II set out all the main budgetary facts, 
there was no need to overburden his report, thus 
allowing substantial savings to be made in the 
cost of printing. 
9. As in previous years, the two budgets in 
Documents B (86) 16 and B (86) 18 were pre-
sented in three parts: the first gave summary 
tables, the second contained the explanatory 
memorandum and the third dealt with pensions. 
Each part had two sections: Section A related to 
the Secretariat-General and Section B grouped 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments and 
the three new agencies for security questions. 
10. Your Rapporteur notes that the presen-
tation of the budget takes account of certain 
changes decided upon largely as a result of 
remarks by the WEU auditors. He can but 
welcome the reduction in the number of sub-
heads in the operating budget from 58 to 32 and 
in the pensions budget from 14 to 8. He con-
siders that these reductions and the grouping of 
all social charges under one sub-head and all 
expenditure on staff under one head have made 
the WEU budgets clearer and, as was desirable, 
more like the Assembly's budgets which have 
already been drawn up in this manner. 
11. Conversely, your Rapporteur regrets that 
the Council has not followed the Assembly's rec-
ommendation to show two categories of expen-
diture: ordinary expenditure and extraordinary 
expenditure 2• 
12. The need for this distinction has already 
been explained in the report submitted last year 
by Mr. Sinesio 3• The two new budgets merely 
confirm this necessity: for the Secretariat-
General, for instance, taking Head Ill " Other 
operating costs", it seems that there was an 
increase of F 45 325 in the revised budget for 
1986 whereas in reality this was not a true 
increase in the amounts initially allocated but a 
2. Recommendaton 433, paragraph 1 (b). 
3. Document 1054, paragraphs 21 to 24. 
transfer, from the financial year 1985 to the 
financial year 1986, of amounts relating to the 
financing of certain exceptional security work 
carried out later than planned. For the opposite 
reason, i.e. the completion in 1986 of exceptional 
maintenance work on the premises, amounts 
under the same Head Ill allocated to the 
Secretariat-General for 1987 are 30% lower than 
those for 1986. 
13. Again for the Paris agencies, Head Ill 
reveals an abnormal evolution, i.e. an increase of 
F 125 600 in the revised budget for 1986 and a 
decrease ofF 31 300 compared with 1987. This 
can be justified only by the exceptional implica-
tions of extraordinary expenditure which, in any 
event, distort statistical data on the evolution of 
the budgets as a whole. 
14. The same is true for pensions budgets. The 
payment in 1986 of leaving allowances for three 
London officials and of three supplements to 
leaving allowances for three Paris officials, one 
leaving allowance and an indemnity for loss of 
job quite obviously represent considerable 
extraordinary expenditure. 
15. It has to be concluded that the nominal 
growth rate of a net grand total budget compared 
with the previous one can in no way be com-
pared with the zero growth rate fixed for France 
or the United Kingdom. It would therefore seem 
expedient to give more thought to the zero 
growth criterion. 
Ill. The z.ero growth criterion 
16. In its reply to Assembly Recommendation 
426, the Council said: 
" The strict application of the zero growth 
criterion is the objective of member states 
for both their national budgets and those 
international budgets to which they con-
tribute. In principle, this objective applies 
to the overall total of the budget. As far as 
pension costs are concerned, it is 
recognised that these will continue to 
increase until the pension scheme has been 
in operation long enough for the 
levelling-off stage to be reached. It is also 
recognised that, by the very nature of the 
scheme and its impact on the relatively 
small budget of WEU, erratic variations in 
expenditure from year to year will result. 
The Council will continue to monitor how 
far these costs have an adverse effect on 
operating expenditure. " 
17. Yet the evolution in WEU budgets (minis-
terial organs and Assembly) with effect from 
1985, as set out in the table below, shows that in 
the last two years the favourable economic situ-
ation of the industrialised countries allowed the 
15 
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United Kingdom and France to reduce their 
respective inflation rates considerably, while 
these budgets benefited from a definitely higher 
growth rate. 
Trend 
Secretariat- of prices Paris Trend Budgets General in the agencies Assembly of prices United in France 
Kingdom 
1985 100 100 100 100 100 
1985 
revised 
111.74 97.50 
1986 127.54 103 99.32 108.65 102.2 
1986 
revised 
141.47 103.96 110.65 
1987 143.25 105.5. 108.94 113.73 104.2. 
• Estimate. 
18. But the figures must be read correctly 
because, on the one hand, up to 1985 the WEU 
organs supported the cumulative effects of what 
was clearly negative growth in their budgets in 
real terms and, on the other, inevitably, in 1985, 
1986 and 1987 these budgets had to be increased 
by a rate higher than the inflation rate. 
19. The restructuring of the ministerial organs 
(in particular the Secretariat-General), the 
increase in the salaries of permanent staff as a 
result of the increase - with retroactive effect -
of the level of purchasing pow~r in France and 
the United Kingdom on the one hand and 
Belgium on the other 4, the inctease in the pen-
sions budget due to the payment of new pensions 
which has considerably increased the growth rate 
in this budget and, finally, an adjustment in the 
purchasing power lost in earlier years are all fully 
justifiable reasons for the abovementioned evo-
lution in the growth rate. 
20. For these reasons, your Rapporteur con-
cludes that the zero growth criterion has now had 
its day: while it was an appropriate instrument 
for controlling the evolution of budgets when 
countries were facing annual inflation rates of 
more than 14%, it now simply encourages the 
WEU organs to underestimate their require-
ments. The need for an end-oftyear revision of 
these estimates is the inevitable consequence: the 
statistical data given in the table at the end of 
paragraph 17 merely endorses this point. 
21. Your Rapporteur considers it high time to 
restore normal conditions in procedure for pre-
paring and approving the budgets of the various 
WEU organs so that a true and beneficial dia-
logue may be established between them and the 
WEU Budget and Organisation Committee. No 
4. According to procedure in force in the co-ordinated 
organisations (159th report of the Co-o~nating Committee), 
salary scales are calculated for Belgium. :These scales are then 
multiplied by comparative economic ~oefficients for other 
countries in order to ensure that all staff of the same grade 
and step have the same purchasing power. 
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one can say this dialogue now exists. What is 
true is that, as matters now stand, at meetings 
with this committee the main task of representa-
tives of the organs concerned is to defend their 
budgetary proposals as well as they can against a 
priori cuts requested by governments. 
22. Those who have the upper hand in this 
game are inevitably those who have the closest 
contact with national delegations, i.e. the 
Secretariat-General compared with the Paris 
organs and the ministerial organs compared with 
the Assembly. In his explanatory memorandum 
last year, Mr. Sinesio stressed this situation 
which affects the Assembly in particular. Your 
Rapporteur will revert to this point later. But, for 
the moment, considering the dissonance between 
the often petty reasoning of the Budget and 
Organisation Committee, particularly in regard 
to the Assembly, and what the ministers say, 
your Rapporteur wonders whether the necessary 
consultations are held between national financial 
experts and representatives of the foreign minis-
tries. 
23. A last consideration seems appropriate: 
strict application of the zero growth criterion 
could not be compatible with assertions about 
reactivating WEU. This criterion was therefore 
abandoned in practice in 1986 and 1987. It is 
now for the Council to lay down more realistic 
criteria to govern the preparation of budgets and 
their discussion by the WEU Budget and 
Organisation Committee and the Council. 
24. Your Rapporteur learned with the keenest 
interest that at the meeting with the Presidential 
Committee in Luxembourg Mr. Poos, Chairman-
in-Office of the Council, explained the proposal 
he had made to his colleagues in a restricted 
framework that, for increases in the adminis-
trative expenditure of WEU, procedure should 
be established in parallel with practice in the 
Community bodies, i.e. to limit the growth rate 
of provisional estimates of expenditure of all 
organisations to the maximum growth rate of 
expenditure calculated each year by the Com-
mission of the European Communities. Such a 
parallel would have the merit of avoiding 
fruitless discussion and laying down a precise, 
objective guideline for the preparation of WEU 
budgets while leaving the organs concerned 
responsibility for determining the priority to be 
given to various items of expenditure. As far as 
the Assembly in particular is concerned, it 
should be ensured that, for the preparation of its 
administrative budget, it has discretionary 
powers within the limits of the maximum growth 
rate fixed, similar to the gentleman's agreement 
governing relations between the Council of the 
European Communities and the European Par-
liament in such matters. Your Rapporteur feels 
the present presidency would welcome such an 
approach. ' 
16 
25. As for pensions, which continue to 
increase both in number and in cost (cf. 
Appendix Ill), it would appear that the need to 
separate them from the operating budget is being 
perceived more clearly by the Council, although 
there is not yet unanimity on this point. 
Referring again to Community practice, the 
Chairman-in-Office suggested considering pen-
sions as inevitable expenditure. The sum nec-
essary to meet such expenditure should therefore 
be excluded from the general growth rate of 
administrative expenditure. Mr. Poos also said 
the Secretary-General had been asked to produce 
for the Council a study ofthe foreseeable trend of 
expenditure on pensions in the next few years. 
Three solutions now seem possible: 
- the governments might assume full 
responsibility for financing pensions, 
outside the operating budget; 
- an independently-managed pension 
fund might be set up in WEU into 
which the contributions of staff and the 
organisation would be paid; 
- the management of this fund might be 
handed over to a private insurance 
company. 
26. Your Rapporteur can but welcome this 
initiative, which concords with relevant recom-
mendations the Assembly has addressed to the 
Council for some years 5• He trusts the results of 
this study will be communicated to the Assembly 
without delay. 
IV. Various categories of expenditure 
in the operating budget 
27. The expenditure of the ministerial organs 
of WEU is divided into five budget heads. It is 
interesting to note that of these Head I " Salaries, 
wages and other remuneration to personnel, 
provident fund, social and supplementary 
services " alone represents 88.6% of total oper-
ating expenditure of the Secretariat-General and 
92.8% of that of the Paris agencies. 
28. The high cost of expenditure for staff com-
pared with the total available makes WEU 
budgets extremely rigid. With the present 
structure of the various WEU organs (see 
Appendix IV), those responsible for budgetary 
management have very little leeway for estab-
lishing priorities in their programmes of work. In 
fact, the proportion over which they have any 
power of decision is hardly more than 10% of the 
budget. Hence the zero growth criterion should 
appropriately have been applied, if necessary, 
5. Recommendations 409 adopted by the Assembly on 
21st June 1984, 429 adopted on 4th December 1985 and 433 
adopted on 4th June 1986. 
only to this proportion. This argument too shows 
how unrational is current practice, which extends 
application of this criterion to the total budget, 
including pensions. 
29. Your Rapporteur believes this situation 
could be considerably improved if all the WEU 
ministerial organs were grouped in one seat. The 
advantages of such an operation - which might 
be conducted when the planned review of the 
WEU structure takes place at the end of the tran-
sitional period (31st December 1987) - are clear 
from the standpoint of the efficiency of the 
various services. From a budget point of view, it 
would make available large sums which would 
represent a considerable saving or might be used 
for study and research activities which are the 
basic institutional tasks of the WEU organs. A 
decision on possible unification is moreover 
often implicit in the committee's considerations 
regarding certain proposals for savings or 
rationalisation, although the single seat has not 
been decided upon. 
30. The Assembly had already asked the 
Council in Recommendation 409, adopted on 
21st June 1984, to consider the possibility of 
uniting the London and Paris seats. Replying to 
this recommendation, the Council said: 
" Discussions on the reactivation of WEU 
have not yet reached the stage at which the 
new tasks of the organisation, the Council 
and its subsidiary bodies can be clearly 
defined. Conclusions on these matters 
must first be reached before the future 
structure, size, location and other adminis-
trative requirements can be foreseen. " 
31. The question of uniting the two seats was 
also referred to in Recommendation 426 adopted 
by the Assembly on 4th December 1985. In its 
reply, the Council said: 
" The question of establishing a single seat 
should in any case be examined in the light 
of the advantages and disadvantages of 
such an option. " 
32. Your Rapporteur considers that since the 
tasks of the WEU organs have now been defined 
and all factors for or against uniting the seats 
analysed, the Council is in a position to take a 
decision on the matter. Moreover, a decision is 
necessary in order to remove the uncertainty 
which is now detrimental to the activities of the 
WEU organs and impedes medium- and 
long-term planning of their activities in the 
context of the reactivation of the organisation. 
33. With this in mind, your Rapporteur con-
siders particular attention should be paid to the 
tables of establishment of the Secretariat-General 
and the Paris agencies. Last year, the report on 
the budgets of the ministerial organs for 1985 
(revised) and 1986 mentioned that two grade B 
posts were shown as vacant in the budget of the 
17 
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Paris agencies. When studying the new budgets, 
your Rapporteur saw that in addition to these 
two posts three further posts (1 grade A4, 1 grade 
B3 and 1 grade B2) remained vacant in the 
Secretariat-General in 1986. 
34. It may therefore rightfully be concluded 
that the staff of the ministerial organs, as 
foreseen in the tables of establishment approved 
by the Council, exceed true requirements. Fur-
thermore, the fact that the Council has once 
again refused to allow the Assembly to introduce 
the three new posts proposed in the 1987 budget 
as a matter of priority reveals a degree of 
inequity that should be cleared up without delay. 
35. It should also be noted that amounts in the 
budget for vacant posts form a reserve which can 
be used for other purposes not :specified when the 
budgets were prepared. In a~plying the overall 
budget, this creates a privilege for some organs to 
the detriment of those which, Hke the Assembly, 
have no reserves. In this context, your 
Rapporteur points out that: certain national 
budgetary legislation or regulations forbid 
unexpended salary appropriations to be used for 
other purposes and he wonders whether a ban on 
the transfer of salary appropriations to other 
heads should not be introduced into budgetary 
practice in all the WEU organs. 
36. These considerations make it desirable for 
the Council, when the WEU structure is 
reviewed (as referred to above), to study the 
anomalies which seem evident when the tables of 
establishment of all the WEU organs are com-
pared and to remedy them by effecting, where 
appropriate, transfers of posts from one organ to 
another. 
37. It should be noted that the WEU Budget 
and Organisation Committee reduced the esti-
mates under the other budget heads, i. e. Head II 
"Travel" , Head Ill "Other .operating costs" , 
Head IV "Purchase of furniture and 
equipment" and Head V "Bluildings ". For the 
Secretariat-General, the trend of expenditure on 
travel (Head II) showed a considerable increase 
in 1986 (financed by the supplementary budget) 
and a sharp reduction in 1987, bringing it down 
to a level lower than initial estimates for 1986. A 
considerable reduction in appropriations for 
1987 was also made under the same head for the 
Paris agencies. 
V. Action taken 
on Assembly Recommendation 433 
38. The Council's reply to Assembly Recom-
mendation 433 (cf. Appendix V) has been 
referred to frequently in the present explanatory 
memorandum in connection with specific 
matters such as the presentation of WEU 
budgets, vacancies for certain posts in the minis-
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terial organs when the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly was refused the right to introduce new 
posts financing the pensions budget and appli-catio~ of the zero growth criterion. Reference 
should also be made to other points in this reply, 
including paragraphs 3 (modifying procedure. for 
approving Assembly budgets), 6 (dual gradmg) 
and 7 (installation of a telex). 
39. On procedure for approving Assembly 
budgets the Council considers it difficult to 
grant ~eater autonomy " because of different 
budget control procedures in member coun-
tries". Your Rapporteur finds it hard to grasp 
the meaning of this justification, particularly as 
the Council at the same time urged the Assembly 
to simplify certain aspects of the presentation of 
its budgets as approved for the budgets of the 
ministerial organs as from 1987, whereas the 
Assembly - as specified in paragraph 10 above -
started applying these simplifications in its 
budget for the financial year 1985. 
40. It should be emphasised that the question 
of budgetary independence raised by the 
Assembly is basically political. It is not a matter 
of extending this independence but of 
recognising it, by acknowledging that Assembly 
budgets, once approved by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs ~nd Administra~ic;m and. the 
Presidential Committee, express pohtical optiOns 
which, by their very nature, could not normally 
be submitted to technical consultative organs. 
Moreover, the latter do not always seem to have 
an accurate knowledge of the requirements and 
methods of work of a parliamentary assembly. 
41. Your Rapporteur feels that a less 
restrictive interpretation of procedure in force as 
now applied would allow the Council to respect 
both the governments' prerogatives in this field 
and the Assembly's budgetary autonomy. For 
this purpose, it would suffice for it to allocate to 
the Assembly, before the preparation of each 
budget, an overall amount for Heads .11~ ~11, IV 
and V and to leave it the responsibihty for 
dividing this sum between these heads - a~d 
within the limits of the overall amount - m 
accordance with its own order of priority. 
42. Head I " Permanent staff" and the pen-
sions budget would be excluded from this overall 
amount since salaries and pensions vary 
according to scales worked out by the Co-ordi-
nating Committee for all the co-ordinated 
organisations and approved by the Council of 
each organisation. 
43. On dual grading, the Council's reply is 
contrary to what has so far been the root of the 
problem. One can but note that dual grading, 
introduced by the Council for the staff of the 
ministerial organs, " is not intended to create 
promotion possibilities over and beyond the 
approved establishment table, but to facilitate 
recruitment". Yet the basic problem, to which 
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the Assembly has been drawing the Council's 
attention for years 6, remains as serious as ever. 
The staff associations have not failed to convey 
the staff's feelings and wishes in this connection. 
The fact is that the small number of staff and the 
specialised knowledge _required for m~ny posts 
do not generally allow mtemal promotiOns: staff 
in general - and grade B staff in particular - thus 
have to remain at the same grade throughout 
their working lives. Some of them who have 
reached the top of their grade cannot even hope 
for a progression in their salaries. The . Cou~cil 
cannot remain indifferent to this situatiOn. 
Replying to Recommendation 340 adopted by 
the Assembly on 4th December 1979, it said that 
"with regard to the grading system and the intro-
duction of a dual grading system the problems 
are still under consideration at the adminis-
trative level". More than seven years have 
passed since this reply during which the problem 
has merely become worse. The Assembly can but 
underline the urgency of giving the staff a pos-
itive answer. 
44. Finally, in regard to the installation of a 
telex as recommended by the Assembly, your 
Rapporteur has noted the refusal of this request 
made in the Assembly's budget for 1987 and rep-
resenting an all-inclusive cost ofF 20 000 (initial 
expenditure, licence fee, subscription, hire, main-
tenance), it being understood that the cost of 
using it - which it was virtually impossible to 
estimate - would be charged to Sub-Head 18 
" Postage, telephone, telex and transport of docu-
ments". He has also noted that, conversely, the 
Council approved an estimate in the 1987 budget 
of the ministerial organs for the purchase of 
telecopying equipment for use by the Secretariat-
General and the Paris agencies. 
45. It is regrettable that in spite of the Coun-
cil's undertaking to consider the possible instal-
lation of new equipment in the light of" require-
ments, the versatility of the equipment and the 
budgetary implications " and " in the context of 
budgetary considerations on the whole", no 
comparative study was made before the 
telecopying equipment was selected. As for the 
telex it should be recalled that already in 1980 
( doc~ment B (80) 5) a study on the ~nancial 
implications of its possible installatiOn was 
started by the Secretariat-General but never 
completed due to the hostility of certain national 
delegations. The Assembly must insist on its 
request since the telex - according to a study 
conducted in 1982 following Assembly Order 57 
- is a working instrument likely to facilitate 
communications considerably, particularly with 
the parliaments of the WEU member countries 
and of other countries and with press agencies. 
6. Recommendations 240 adopted by the Assembly on 
20th November 1973, 250 adopted on 19th June 1974, 340 
adopted on 4th December 1979, 357 adopted on 2nd 
December 1980 and 433 adopted on 4th June 1986. 
A. Operating budget 
I. Staff 
11. Travel 
Ill. Other operating costs 
IV. Purchase of furniture 
and equipment 
V. Buildings 
Total expenditure 
Receipts 
Net total 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and allowances 
Pensions receipts 
Net total 
NET GRAND TOTAL 
(A + B) 
APPENDIX I 
Trend of budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU between 1986 and 1987 
Secretariat-General (£) Paris agencies (French francs) 
1986 1986 revised 1987 1986 1986 revised 
1 549 357 1 609 177 1 809 323 34 723 600 34 988 200 
54 620 72900 49 545 690 000 641 200 
251 890 297 215 165 030 2 160 700 2 286 300 
5 215 6 125 8 234 65 000 67 400 
- - 10 000 70000 70000 
1 861 082 1985417 2 042 132 37 709 300 38 053 100 
612 485 638 840 686 702 12 608 100 12 467 600 
1 248 597 1 346 577 1 355 430 25 101 200 25 585 500 
225 930 284 820 299 065 5 787 500 6 707 600 
57 285 59 285 62 669 1 037 000 1 047 000 
168 645 225 535 236 396 4 750 500 5 660 600 
1417242 1 572112 1 591 826 29 851 700 31 246 100 
1987 
36 936 300 
500000 
2 255 000 
30000 
78 400 
39 799 700 
12 970 100 
26 829 600 
6 999 000 
1 085 000 
5 914 000 
32 743 600 
-0 
00 
00 
N 
0 
A. Operating budget 
I. Staff 
11. Travel 
Ill. Other operating 
costs 
IV. Purchase of 
furniture and 
equipment 
V. Buildings 
Total expenditure 
Receipts 
Net total 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and 
allowances 
Pensions receipts 
Net total 
NET GRAND TOTAL 
(A + B) 
1986 
1 549 357 
54 620 
251 890 
5 215 
-
1 861 082 
612 485 
1 248 597 
225 930 
57 285 
168 645 
1417242 
APPENDIX 11 
Variations in the budgets of the ministerial organs 
for 1986 (revised) and 1987 compared with previous budgets 
Secretariat-General (£) Paris agencies (French francs) 
1986 revised 1987 1986 revised 1987 
1986 
(+ or -) % (+ or -) % (+ or-) % (+ or-) 
+ 59 820 + 200 146 34 723 600 + 264 600 + 1 948 100 
+ 18 280 - 23 355 690 000 - 48 800 - 141 200 
+ 45 325 - 132 185 2 160 700 + 125 600 - 31 300 
-
+ 910 + 2 109 65 000 + 2 400 - 37 400 
- + 10 000 70000 - + 8 400 
+ 124 335 6.68 + 56 715 2.85 37 709 300 + 343 800 0.91 + 1 746 600 
+ 26 355 + 47 862 12 608 lOO - 140 500 + 502 500 
+ 97 980 7.84 + 8 853 0.66 25 101 200 + 484 300 1.92 + 1 244 lOO 
+ 58 890 26.07 + 14 245 4.99 5 787 500 + 920 100 15.90 + 291 400 
+ 2000 + 3 384 1 037 000 + 10000 + 38 000 
+ 56 890 33.73 + 10 861 4.82 4 750 500 + 910 lOO 19.16 + 253 400 
+ 154 870 10.92 + 19 714 1.25 29 851 700 + 1 394 400 4.67 + 1 497 500 
% 
4.58 
4.86 
4.34 
4.48 
4.79 
-0 
00 
00 
-
N 
-
APPENDIX Ill 
Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1983 
(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEU (1983-1987) taking receipts into account 
1983 
Appro- Pension/ 
Budget priations budget 
total for ratio 
pensions 
£ £ 
Secretariat-
General .................. I 096 345 67 830 
F F 
Standing 
Armaments 
Committee ............... 8 445 340 1131450 
Agency for 
the Control of 
Armaments ............... 16 914 550 2004 500 
Office of 
the Clerk ................. 13 893 000 - 97000 -
1983 
Pensions SG ACA SAC 0 ofC 
Retirement ............. 7 20 14 3 
Survivors' .............. I 9 3 I 
Orphans' ............... - ,, - I 
Invalidity ............... I - - -
TOTALS ............... 9 30 17 5 
Total establishment 2 45 51 27 27 
SG - Secretariat General. 
ACA - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
SAC - Standing Armaments Committee. 
ASQ - Agencies for Security Questions. 
0 of C - Office of the Clerk. 
I. Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension. 
2. Excluding hors cadre officials. 
(%) 
6.18 
13.39 
11.85 
0.70 
Total 
44 
14 
2 
I 
61 
!50 
1984 1985 1986 
Appro- Pension/ Appro- Pension/ Appro- Pension/ 
Budget priations budget Budget priations budget Budget priations budget Budget 
total for ratio total for ratio total for ratio total 
pensions (%) pensions (%) pensions (%) 
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
I 069 190 65 265 6.10 1241669 122910 9.89 1572112 225 535 14.34 I 591 826 
F F F F F F F 
8 839 380 I 206130 13.65 9 379 190 I 593 700 "~! 31246100 5660600 18.11 32 743 600 
19 126 150 3 106 300 16.24 19 924 940 4 129 200 20.72 
14 762 200 336 000 2.28 15470900 300500 1.94 17118 700 546 700 3.19 17 596 375 
(b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1983-1987) 
1984 1985 1986 
SG ACA SAC 0 ofC Total SG ACA SAC 0 ofC Total SG ASQ 0 ofC Total SG 
7 23 13 2 45 9 23 13 2 47 12 36 4 52 14 
2 9 4 I 16 3 9 4 I 17 4 13 I 18 4 
3 I - - 4 3 I - - 4 4 I - 5 4 
I - - I 2 I - - I 2 I - I 2 I 
13 33 17 4 67 16 33 17 4 70 21 50 6 77 23 
45 51 27 26 149 45 51 27 26 149 49 70 26 145 49 
1987 
Appro- Pension/ 
priations budget 
for ratio 
pensions (%) 
£ 
236 396 14.85 
F 
5 914000 18.06 
942000 5.35 
1987 
ASQ OofC Total 
38 4 56 
13 I 18 
I - 5 
- I 2 
52 6 81 
70 26 145 
-
-
-0 
00 
00 
DOCUMENT 1088 APPENDIX IV 
APPENDIX IV 
Organisation and staff 
of the ministerial organs of WEU in 1987 
Secretariat-General 
No. Grade Function No. Grade Function 
1. HG Secretary-General Section - Registry and 
2. HG Deputy Secretary-General Library 
3. B4 Personal Assistant to SG 24. Head of Section 4. B4 Personal Assistant to DSG A2 25. B4 Documentation Clerk 
Political Affairs Division 26. B2 Roneo Operator 27. B2 Roneo Operator 
5. A6 Head of Division 
6. B3 Secretary to Head of 
Division Section - Secretarial Pool 
Section - Council Sec re- 28. B4 Head of Section 
tariat 29. B2/3/4 Assistant (B4) 
7. A4/5 Head of Section (A4) 30. B2/3/4 Assistant (B4) 
8. A2/3 Committee Secretary (A2) 31. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B3) 
9. A2/3 Committee Secretary (A2) 32. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B3) 
33. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B3) 
Section - Policy and 34. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B3) 
Research 35. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B2) 
10. A3/4 Head of Section (A4) 36. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B2) 
11. A2/3 Researcher (A3) 37. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B2) 38. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B2) 
Public Relations 39. B2/3/4 Shorthand Typist (B2) 
12. A4 Public Relations Officer 
Section - General Services 
Linguists 
40. B1 Telephonist 
13. LT5 Head (Reviser F /E) 41. B1 Telephonist 
14. LT4 Reviser E/F 42. C3 Messenger 
15. LT3 Translator F /E 43. C2 Messenger 
16. LT3 Translator E/F 44. C3 Chauffeur 
17. LT2 Translator E/F 45. C3 Chauffeur 
46. C4 Head Security Guard 
Administration Division 47. C3 Security Guard 
18. AS Head of Division 48. C3 Security Guard 
19. B3 Secretary to Head of 49. C3 Security Guard 
Division 50. C3 Security Guard 
20. B4 · Administrative Assistant 51. C3 Security Guard 
Section - Finance and 
Budget 
21. A3/4 Controller (A4) 
22. A2 Accountant (B5) 
23. B4 Financial Assistant (B2) 
22 
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Agencies for security questions 
Agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I) 
Post No. Grade of post Function 
AS I - 1 HG Director of Agency I 1 
AS I- 2 A5/6 Expert 
AS I- 3 A4/5 Expert 
AS I- 4 A2/3/4 Expert 
AS I- 5 A2/3/4 Expert 
AS I- 6 A4/5 Expert 2 
AS I- 7 B4 Personal Assistant to the Director 
AS I- 8 B4 Assistant 
AS I- 9 B3 Shorthand typist 
AS I - 10 B3 Shorthand typist 
AS I - 11 B2 Shorthand typist 
l. Dual function: Director of Agency I and Director of the ACA. 
2. Dual function: Expert of Agency I and Deputy Director of the ACA. 
Agency for the study of security and defence questions (Agency //) 
Post No. Grade of post Function 
AS 11 - 1 HG Director of Agency 11 
AS 11 - 2 A5/6 Expert 
AS 11 - 3 A4/5 Expert 
AS 11 - 4 A2/3/4 Expert 
ASII-5 A2/3/4 Expert 
AS 11 - 6 B4 Personal Assistant to the Director 
AS 11 - 7 B4 Assistant 
AS 11 - 8 B3 Shorthand typist 
AS 11 - 9 B3 Shorthand typist 
Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments (Agency Ill) 
Post No. 
AS Ill - 1 
AS Ill - 2 
AS Ill - 3 
AS Ill - 4 
AS Ill - 5 
AS Ill - 6 
AS Ill - 7 
AS Ill - 8 
AS Ill - 9 
AS Ill - 10 
Grade of post 
HG 
A5/6 
A4/5 
A2/3/4 
A2/3/4 
B4 
B4 
B3 
B3 
B2 
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Function 
Director of Agency Ill 
Expert 
Expert 
Expert 
Expert 
Personal assistant to the Director 
Assistant 
Shorthand typist 
Shorthand typist 
Shorthand typist 
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Joint services 
Post No. Grade of post 
(a) Administration and Legal Affairs Division 
se Adm- 1 
se Adm- 2 
se Adm- 3 
A6 
B3 
A3/4 
Finance and Administration Section 
se Adm- 4 
se Adm- 5 
se Adm- 6 
se Adm- 7 
se Adm- 8 
se Adm- 9 
se Adm- 10 
se Adm - 11 
se Adm- 12 
se Adm- 13 
se Adm- 14 
se Adm- 15 
se Adm- 16 
(b) Linguist Service 
se L- 17 
se L - 18 
se L- 19 
se v- 20 
(c) Documentation Office 
SC Doe - 21 
SC Doe - 22 
SC Doe- 23 
SC Doe - 24 
SC Doe- 25 
1. Present grade L3 - Upgrading requested. 
A4/5 
A3/4 
B4 
B4 
B4 
B4 
B4 
B2 
C4 
B3 
B3 
C5 
C4 
L4 
L3 
L3 
L4 
A3/4 
A2/3 
B4 
B3 
B3 
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Function 
Head of Division 
Legal Adviser of WEU 
Chairman of Budget Committee 
Secretary to Head of Division 
Assistant Legal Adviser 
Head of Section 
Deputy Head of Section 
APPENDIX IV 
Head of Finance and Accounts Office 
Assistant for the Building and General 
Services 
Accountant 
Accountant 
Administrative Assistant and Secretary of the 
Section 
Administrative Assistant and Shorthand 
typist 
Administrative Clerk 
Under Assistant for General Services 
Storekeeper 
Telephonist 
Telephonist 
Chief roneo operator 
Roneo operator 
Translator-Reviser 
Interpreter-Translator 
Interpreter-Translator 
Translator-Reviser 
Head of Office 
Documentalist 
Assistant documentalist 
Clerk-Shorthand typist 
Documentation Clerk-Typist 
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Post No. Grade of post Function 
(d) Security/Archives Office 
SC Sec/ Ar. - 26 
SC Sec/Ar.- 27 
SC Sec/ Ar. - 28 
SC Sec/ Ar. - 29 
SC Sec/Ar.- 30 
SC Sec/Ar - 31 
SC Sec/Ar - 32 
SC SecjAr - 33 
SC Sec/ Ar - 34 
SC SecjAr - 35 
SC Sec/ Ar - 36 
SC Sec/Ar - 37 
SC SecjAr - 38 
SC SecjAr - 39 
SC Sec/ Ar - 40 
SC SecjAr - 41 
AS-VS- 42 
AS-VS - 43 2 
2. Present grade C3 - Upgrading requested. 
A3/4 
B4 
B3 
B3 
C4 
C3 
C3 
C3 
C3 
C3 
C3 
C3 
C3 
C3 
C3 
C3 
Head of Office 
Assistant for Archives and Registry 
Clerk responsible for Security 
Clerk-Shorthand typist 
Head Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
C4 
C4 
Service vehicles 
Driver-mechanic 
Driver-mechanic 
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APPENDIX V 
RECOMMENDATION 433 1 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986 2 
The Assembly, 
APPENDIX V 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 
1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial 
organs ofWEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration; 
(b) each of these budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explana-
tory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a 
document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and trans-
mitted to the Council; 
(c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned docu-
ments and of the others produced during the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a 
regular basis; 
(d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extraor-
dinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the evo-
lution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero growth 
criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments; 
(e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the 
sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of 
the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in 
October 1984 to have the Assembly .. play a growing role "; 
(f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial 
organs increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to 
provide a better guarantee of its autonomy and independence; 
(g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body 
should be given responsibility for this task; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget of the Paris agencies whereas the Assem-
bly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been rejected; 
(b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a 
telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services ofWEU as well as by parliamentarians; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has adop-
ted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL: 
1. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different 
documents; 
(b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories 
of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolu-
tion of these budgets; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration (Document 1054). 
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2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its budge-
tary decisions; 
3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure for approving Assembly 
budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and independence; 
4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3 posts which are given 
top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986; 
5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an independent body for the 
administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with the other co-ordinated organisa-
tions; 
6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay down a general rule on 
the subject applicable to all WEU staff; 
7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it being understood that the 
telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and 
cost-sharing to be agreed among them; 
8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs of WEU to achieve future cost-
saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private industry to investi-
gate this matter and make recommendations. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 433 
1. (a) The form in which the budget of the ministerial organs is presented is the outcome of careful 
study by the Budget and Organisation Committee. It has been reviewed and amended during the past 
two years. The intention is to submit to governments in one document all the information necessary to 
form a judgment. This same document, once approved by the Council, is made available to the 
Assembly. 
Because ofthe evolving process of reform, the documentary aspect has been, exceptionally, more 
complex. A number of documents were necessary as adjustments were made to take account in parti-
cular of staff changes. Equally, certain aspects of the budgets involved classified material which could 
not be made generally available. 
(b) A subdivision into ordinary and extraordinary expenditure and income has been considered 
in previous years several times by the Budget and Organisation Committee. It was concluded however 
that such a presentation would not be satisfactory in the case of the WEU budget where so clear a dis-
tinction between these categories of expenditure cannot be made. Governments have preferred to 
maintain the present system on the assumption that a substantial and detailed explanation for each item 
of expenditure is given in Part 11 of the budget. 
2. The Council will ensure that documents relating to budgetary decisions affecting all parts of the 
organisation or matters of budgetary policy will be transmitted to the Office of the Clerk where no pro-
blems of confidentiality or security classification are involved. 
3. The Council at present applies the procedures established under the Financial Regulations and 
the agreements reached previously between the Council and the Assembly, by which the Council is 
required to examine and express an opinion on the Assembly's budget before it can be finally adop-
ted. The question of amending this procedure has been raised in the past. There has frequently been 
formal and informal consultation at joint meetings and in the course of contacts between representatives 
of the Presidential Committee, the President of the Council and the Secretary-General. 
As the Council stated in paragraph 6 of its reply to Recommendation 429, it has noted the Assem-
bly's wish for greater autonomy. However, it would be difficult to meet this wish because of different 
budget control procedures in member countries. Nevertheless, the Council has approved some simpli-
fications - along the lines desired by the Assembly - in the way the ministerial organs' budget is presen-
ted, which the Assembly might find appropriate for its own budget. 
4. The creation of two new B3 grade posts must be seen in the light of detailed job requirements, not 
only in the context of the Assembly itself, but als9 in the wider context ofWEU as a whole and the over-
all budgetary limits required by governments. 
5. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions would involve the co-
operation of other international organisations and would have to take account of complex legal and 
managerial considerations. It is a matter which the Council will pursue having due regard to the 
evolving situation regarding pensions. 
6. The general principle of dual grading is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved 
position in the establishment table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to 
recruit staff who are judged to possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous 
experience. 
Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and beyond the 
approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment. 
7. Recognising the importance of effective communication between the various organs ofWEU, the 
Council is currently studying the possibilities for improving the present practices; a number of sugges-
tions may be contemplated, including that put forward by the Assembly for the installation of a telex, or 
the use of facsimile equipment or even the installation of a system which could be based on the ones 
used by other bodies such as European political co-operation. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th October 1986. 
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The final choice would of course depend on requirements, the versatility of the equipment and 
the budgetary implications. The installation of new equipment should therefore be examined by the 
appropriate bodies in this light, and in the context of budgetary considerations on the whole. 
8. The approach to the use of a private consultant should not be piecemeal, particularly in view of 
the cost of consultancy. In the Council's opinion, a management consultant would be cost-effective 
only in the context of a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of the whole institutional structure 
of WEU and in view of the budgetary constraints arising from the application of the principle of zero 
growth. 
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Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session 
Paris, 1st-4th June 1987 
MONDAY, 1st JUNE 
Meetings of political groups. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
14th May 1987 
1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session by the provisional president. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
6. Adoption of the draft order ofbusiness of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session. 
7. Action by the Presidential Committee: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly. 
Debate. 
8. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
9. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: Political activities of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. 
Debate. 
TUESDAY, 2nd JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: Political activities of the Council: 
Resumed debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council to the Assembly of Western 
European Union: 
presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council. 
2. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: Political activities of the Council: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation and draft order. 
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WEDNESDAY, 3rd JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial 
years 1986 (revised) and 1987: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. European space policy until 2000: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
12 noon 
3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
European space policy until 2000: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
THURSDAY, 4th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
The voice of Europe after Reykjavik - debates in national parliaments: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION 
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Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
to the Assembly of Western European Union 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
24th April 1987 
I. Activities of the Council and its Secretariat-General in London (Period covered: 
second half of 1986) 
A. Organisation 
1. Meetings of the Council 
2. Press and information 
B. Questions relating to defence and European security interests 
1. East-West relations 
2. SDI 
3. Enlargement 
4. Security in the Mediterranean 
5. International terrorism 
6. Co-operation between European security and defence research institutes 
7. European seminar on defence matters 
11. Activities of the ministerial organs in Paris 
A. Tasks given by the Council (Period covered: second half of 1986) 
B. Institutional tasks (Period covered: 1986) 
1. Implementation of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty on forces of 
Western European Union 
2. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
3. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
Ill. Relations between the Council and the Assembly (Period covered: second half of 
1986) 
A. Formal procedure for exchanges 
B. Meetings 
C. Documents sent to the Assembly 
IV. Activities of the Public Administration Committee (Period covered: 1986) 
A. Meetings of the committee 
B. Seminars for government officials 
C. Study visits 
V. Budgetary and administrative questions (Period covered: 1986) 
ANNEX 
Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly dated 17th March 
1986. 
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I. Activities of the Council and its Secretariat-General in London 
(Period covered: second half of 1986) 
A. Organisation 
I. Meetings of the Council 
During this six-month period the Council 
held eleven meetings, including the Luxembourg 
ministerial meeting on 13th-14th November, in 
which it gave further thought to the tasks and 
future structures of the organisation against the 
background of international developments which 
imparted added urgency to improved European 
consultation on security matters. During this 
time it has borne in mind that institutional deci-
sions should be taken on completion of the tran-
sitional period for WEU reorganisation. 
There were two meetings of the enlarged 
Council, at which the political directors and 
representatives of the ministries of defence were 
present in London on 24th October. This 
reflected the desire of member governments to 
involve the defence side more closely in the 
Council's work. 
Ministers decided in Luxembourg on a 
number of practical mesures to improve WEU's 
handling of the substantive issues relating to 
European security interests. The Permanent 
Council will continue to co-ordinate all the 
organisation's activities. The practice of holding 
regular meetings of political directors will signifi-
cantly strengthen the process of consultation 
within WEU, as will the participation of repre-
sentatives of defence ministries. A special 
working group, comprising representatives of 
both foreign affairs and defence ministries, was 
also set up in Luxembourg to provide a body of 
expertise to study questions relating to European 
security interests. 
The aim of these new initiatives is to 
ensure that representatives of the member coun-
tries can hold regular and frequent consultations 
in the framework of WEU on a broad range of 
security issues affecting Europe. This should 
further improve the pace and development of 
reactivation, ensuring that WEU provides a true 
forum for European consultation on security 
issues with the aim of strengthening Europe's 
contribution to the alliance. 
2. Press and information 
In their Bonn communique, ministers 
recalled the contribution that WEU could make 
to achieve a wider consensus among public 
opinion on the defence effort being made by the 
European countries. 
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Accordingly, a first step has been taken 
with the setting up in September 1986 of a unit 
within the Political Division of the Secretariat-
General to be responsible for relations with the 
press and for providing information. 
In addition, this unit provides information 
and documentation for the benefit of the per-
manent representations in London. 
The press and information unit is also 
responsible for answering the many requests by 
the public for information about the activities of 
WEU. The number of such requests has 
increased appreciably in recent months. 
The Secretary-General continues to 
perform the important task of providing infor-
mation on WEU by participating in public semi-
nars, by undertaking speaking engagements and 
by publishing articles. 
B. Questions relating to defence and European 
security interests 
I. East-West rellltions 
During the period under review, the 
Council has regularly discussed East-West rela-
tions. 
This question, especially when viewed in 
the context of the implications for Europe of the 
Reykjavik meeting on 11th and 12th October 
1986, was one of the principal topics of dis-
cussion at the ministerial meeting in Luxem-
bourg. 
Maintaining peace in freedom is the prime 
objective of the security and defence policies of 
WEU member states within the alliance: their 
aim is to prevent any type of war - nuclear and 
conventional. 
The maintenance of deterrence, based on 
adequate conventional and nuclear defences, is 
an essential element of these policies. It also 
guarantees the common security of the alliance 
members. 
The effort to achieve arms control and dis-
armament is an integral component of western 
security policy. Verifiable and equitable agree-
ments aimed at enhancing overall stability at 
lower levels of forces and armaments must 
therefore be pursued. 
As regards chemical weapons, the member 
countries of WEU have on many occasions 
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stated their desire for a general, complete and 
verifiable prohibition of such weapons and the 
destruction of all existing stockpiles. On 12th 
December 1986 in Brussels, the foreign affairs 
ministers of the Atlantic Alliance again expressed 
their willingness to seek at the Geneva Con-
ference on Disarmament a convention which 
meets this objective. 
As far as INF are concerned, the member 
states of WEU maintained their view, during the 
second half of 1986, that any agreement on this 
subject must not neglect the existing imbalances 
in shorter-range United States and Soviet INF 
missiles and that it must provide for a com-
mitment to follow-on negotiations on these mis-
siles. In this connection, it is emphasised that 
reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the 
importance of removing conventional disparities 
and eliminating chemical weapons. 
2.SDI 
The SDI special working group continued 
its work in the six months in question, along the 
lines indicated by ministers in Venice on 
29th-30th April 1986. It convened five times and 
continued the exchange of information on ques-
tions relating to participation in SDI research. 
While being aware of the work being done 
in the appropriate alliance framework regarding 
questions covering air defence in Europe and 
A TBM, the group has had some useful exchanges 
of views on these issues. It agreed that the 
question of SDI and the enhancement of air 
defence in Europe should be addressed as two 
separate issues. 
Moreover, the group began to develop a 
possible framework for a long-term analysis of 
the politico-strategic implications of conceivable 
developments in ballistic missile defence on the 
basis of hypotheses which were outlined in the 
progress report to ministers presented in Venice. 
Although it is impractical to draw conclusions at 
present, due to the fact that the analysis depends 
on many variable hypotheses and that many 
essential questions remain unanswered, parti-
cularly at this early stage of BMD research, 
some common perceptions have nevertheless 
emerged. 
The group received technical contribu-
tions from the Paris agencies to help it in its 
work. 
Ministers in Luxembourg took note of the 
progress report and instructed the group to carry 
on its study of this issue and to present, at their 
next ministerial meeting in the spring of 1987, 
the report on the group's activities since its 
inception at the Bonn meeting in April 1985. It 
was decided that the group should be subsumed 
within the new high-level special working group, 
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which would look at a broader range of issues 
relating to European security interests. 
The final meeting of the group in its old 
form was on 15th December, when it discussed 
priorities for the new phase in WEU's work. 
3. Enlllrgement 
During the second half of 1986, the Coun-
cil's position remained as stated in its reply to 
Written Question 265 and in the first part of its 
thirty-second annual report. 
4. Security in the Mediterranean 
Events in the Mediterranean area are a 
continual reminder of the great importance of 
this region for the common security of Europe. 
In Luxembourg, ministers decided to pursue, in 
WEU, their reflections on security in the Medi-
terranean. 
To this end, the French and Italian Dele-
gations have agreed to undertake an examination 
of this subject, leading to the possible convening 
of a working group. 
5. International te"orism 
Ministers in Luxembourg confirmed the 
importance which member states attach to the 
fight against international terrorism. Many col-
lective efforts are being made by WEU member 
countries in other international, and in particular 
European, bodies to combat terrorism. 
6. Co-operation between European security and 
defence research institutes 
During the last six months, there have 
been contacts between these institutes to discuss 
forms of co-operation that might be relevant to 
WEU's activities. To date, no collaborative 
programes have yet been drawn up. 
7. European seminar on defence matters 
At the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, 
the French Government offered to organise in 
1988 an initial session of a European seminar on 
defence matters, lasting approximately one week, 
at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense 
Nationale (IHEDN). The purpose of this seminar 
would be to bring together some sixty partici-
pants drawn from various backgrounds in the 
WEU member states for conferences and joint 
activities on general topics relating to European 
security interests. 
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II. Activities of the ministerial organs in Paris 
A. Tasks given by the Council 
(Period covered: second half of 1986) 
The Assembly was informed in March 
1986, in a letter from the Secretary-General to 
President Caro 1, of the activities of the agencies 
for security questions. During the latter half of 
1986, the Council undertook a new examination 
of their mandates and reached the following 
decisions: 
- Agency I will focus its activities on two 
main areas: 
- the first relates to the proposals con-
cerning verification put forward in 
the context of current arms control 
negotiations; 
- the second relates to Soviet tactics 
towards Western European countries 
concerning arms control and disar-
mament issues. 
The Permanent Council has also 
requested that the agency follow 
changes in the Soviet positions on dis-
armament and arms control. 
- Agency II has been tasked to continue 
its reflections on resource management 
- by analysing national defence budgets 
-and on the non-military aspects of the 
threat, as well as to examine how public 
opinion in the member countries of 
WEU perceives the strategic balance. 
With particular regard to resource man-
agement, the agency is studying 
methods of achieving genuine compara-
bility of criteria between the western 
countries, and the rational management 
of defence budgets. The analysis of these 
budgets is under way. 
- Agency Ill has been tasked to study 
defence technology from specific view-
points such as the impact of SDI and 
the influence of various factors on 
transfers of technology involving the 
Seven. 
Furthermore, Agency Ill will draw up 
inventories of the various policies on 
co-operative equipment programmes 
and defence technology. 
A process of reflection is also under way 
on the role and future tasks of the Standing 
Armaments Committee. 
The mandates given to the agencies may 
be revised once the governments have reached 
an agreement on their final structure. 
1. See annex attached hereto. 
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B. Institutional tasks 
(Period covered: 1986) 
1. Implementation of Protocol No. li of the modified 
Brussels Treaty on forces of Westem European Union 
(i) Level of forces of member states 
For the year under review, the Council has 
continued with its customary tasks of forces 
control in implementation of Protocol No. 11. 
In accordance with the Rome declaration 
of 27th October 1984, the control of conven-
tional weapons listed in Annex IV to Protocol 
No. Ill of the modified Brussel$ Treaty has been 
abolished as from 1st January 1986. The effect of 
this decision is that the control procedure for 
conventional armaments, previously carried out 
in application of the agreement of 14th 
December 1957 implementing Article V of Pro-
tocol No. 11, is no longer relevant. 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU place 
under NATO command are fixed in Articles I 
and 11 of Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels 
Treaty. Article Ill of the protocol provides for a 
special procedure, if necessary, to enable these 
levels to be increased above the limits specified 
in Articles I and 11. 
So that it may satisfy itself that the limits 
laid down in Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11 
are not exceeded, the Council receives infor-
mation every year concerniqg the levels in 
question, in accordance with Article IV of that 
protocol. This information is · obtained in the 
course of inspection carried out by the Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe, amd is transmitted 
to the Council by a high-ranking officer desig-
nated by him to that end. The information, as at 
the end of 1985, was conveyed at the appropriate 
time. 
The same procedure is under way for 
1986. 
Furthermore, the Council takes the nec-
essary steps to implement the procedure laid 
down in its resolution of 15th September 1956, 
whereby the levels of forces under NATO 
command are examined in the light of the 
annual report. 
For the year 1985, the permanent repre-
sentatives to the North Atlantic Council of 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
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United Kingdom examined the level of forces of 
WEU member states and reported to the 
Council. 
The Council noted that the level of forces 
of the member states of WEU, as set out in the 
NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified 
in Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11, as at 
present in force. It also took note of a declaration 
on French forces made by the representative of 
France. 
The same procedure is under way for the 
year 1986. 
(b) Forces under national command 
As stated above, the Council has con-
tinued with its control of forces of member states 
maintained on the mainland of Europe and 
remaining under national command - internal 
defence and police forces, forces for the defence 
of overseas territories, and common defence 
forces - specified in the agreement of 14th 
December 1957. 
(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed 
on the mainland of Europe 
The Government of the United Kingdom 
has informed the Council that the average 
number of British land forces stationed on the 
mainland of Europe in 1986 in accordance with 
the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. 11 
ofthe modified Brussels Treaty was 54 371. The 
continued need for the presence of troops in 
Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of 
the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed 
for short tours of duty there. In 1986 there were 
on average 836 men redeployed in this way to 
Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, 
these units would be speedily returned to their 
duty station in an emergency affecting NATO. 
Furthermore, the Government of the 
United Kingdom has informed the Council that 
the strength of the United Kingdom's contri-
bution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 
1986 was: 
Role Aircraft/Equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack Tornado 6 
Offensive support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguar I 
Air defence Phantom 2 
Rapier 
surface-to-air 
missiles 4 
Air transport Puma I 
Chinook I 
Ground defence RAF regiment I 
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2. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(i) Conventional weapons 
For the reasons already given, the 
Agency's controls on conventional weapons have 
been abolished. 
(ii) Situation concerning the control of atomic, 
chemical and biological weapons 
(a) Atomic weapons 
Since the situation has remained the same 
as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise 
any control in the field of atomic weapons. 
(b) Biological weapons 
All the member countries again gave their 
agreement, for 1986, on the renewal of the list of 
biological weapons subject to control as accepted 
by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the 
fact. 
As in previous years, however, the Agency 
did not exercise any control in the field of bio-
logical weapons. 
(c) Chemical weapons 
The Agency asked member countries for 
their agreement to renew in 1986 the list of 
chemical weapons subject to control. This 
agreement was given and the Council noted the 
fact. The Agency therefore continued to use this 
list for its control activities in 1986. 
In implementation of Article Ill of Pro-
tocol No. Ill, which lays down conditions to 
enable the Council to fix levels of chemical 
weapons that may be held on the mainland of 
Europe by those countries which have not given 
up the right to produce them, and in accordance 
with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency 
asked the countries concerned, in its question-
naire, whether production of chemical weapons 
on their mainland territory had passed the exper-
imental stage and entered the effective pro-
duction stage. As in the past, all these states 
replied in the negative. 
In addition, the Agency asked all the 
member states to declare any chemical weapons 
that they might hold. Since all the member states 
replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no 
quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 
1986. 
The competent authorities of the country 
concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, 
precise and complete reply to the request for 
information - aimed at facilitating the control of 
non-production of chemical weapons - which 
was sent to them by the Agency in accordance 
with the resolution adopted by the Council in 
1959 and with the directive received from the 
Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure 
applied with these authorities since 1973 was 
again used. 
3. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
The Standing Armaments Committee did 
not meet in the period covered by this report. 
The SAC's future role in the reactivated WEU 
will be determined by the outcome of the Coun-
cil's deliberations on how WEU could provide 
political impetus in the field of armaments 
co-operation, in accordance with the Rome 
declaration and the Bonn communique. 
Furthermore, Agency Ill, which was 
instructed to take over the international secre-
tariat of the SAC by the ministers at their Bonn 
meeting, has continued the routine activities of 
the SAC and its subsidiary working groups as 
follows: 
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1. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods 
for wheeled vehicles. 
The group of experts, which met twice at 
the Paris offices ofWEU, has continued its work. 
2. Activities of Working Group No. 8 on 
operational research. 
The group held two meetings in 1986, one 
of which was coupled with a visit to the labo-
ratory of the European Space Research and 
Technology Centre (ESTEC) in the Nether-
lands. 
The two meetings were partly devoted to 
the revision of the five-language glossary. 
3. Activities of Agency Ill in its function as 
international secretariat of the. SAC. 
In addition to helping the above-
mentioned working groups ap.d attending the 
annual meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating 
Committee, the secretariat w~s represented at 
meetings of the Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors at NATO headquarters in 
Brussels in February, April and October. 
Ill. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
(Period covered: second half of 1986) 
The significance which the Council 
attaches to its relations with the Assembly is 
clear from the many discussions it has devoted 
to this subject and from the meetings it has had 
with Assembly representatives. 
The Council believes that the Assembly 
has an important role to play since it is the only 
European parliamentary body specifically 
empowered by treaty to discuss questions of 
European security interests. 
A. Formal procedure for exchanges 
The Council has pursued its efforts to 
improve the formal procedure for exchanges 
with the Assembly, notably to expedite the 
replies to recommendations and written ques-
tions; it has also split the annual report into two 
six-monthly parts in order to provide the 
Assembly with the most up-to-date and complete 
information. 
B. Meetings 
The number of ministers attending the 
second part of the thirty-second ordinary session 
of the Assembly should be seen as evidence of 
the importance which governments attach to 
WEU and its parliamentary body. 
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Presidency mtmsters have sought to 
maintain close personal contact with the 
Assembly, especially in the run-up to, and fol-
lowing, the Luxembourg ministerial meeting on 
13th and 14th November. 
The Secretary-General participated in a 
meeting of the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations held in London on 17th 
November 1986. 
Timetable of meetings 
17th July 1986, Luxembourg: meeting 
between Mr. Jacques Poos, Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council and Luxembourg Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Marc Fischbach, Luxem-
bourg Minister for the Armed Forces, and Mr. 
Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly. 
16th October 1986, Luxembourg: meeting 
between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
and the Assembly committee on relations with 
the Council. 
14th November 1986, Luxembourg: (fol-
lowing the ministerial Council) meeting between 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the 
Presidential Committee of the Assembly. 
17th November 1986, London: meeting 
between the Secretary-General and the Assembly 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions. 
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1. 
2. 
C. Documents sent to the Assembly 
First part of the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council on its activities; 
Council replies to Recommendations 432 
3. 
to 437 adopted by the Assembly during the 
first part of its thirty-second ordinary 
session; 
Replies to Written Questions 265 and 267 
to 272 put by members of the Assembly. 
IV. Activities of the Public Administration Committee 
(Period covered: 1986) 
A. Meetings of the committee 
The Public Administration Committee, 
which meets once every six months, held its two 
meetings of 1986 in Colmar, from 28th to 30th 
May, and in Luxembourg, from 1st to 3rd 
October. 
These meetings were as usual devoted to 
exchanges of information on significant adminj.s-
trative developments in the member countries 
during the preceding months and to the prepa-
ration of the annual seminar for government 
officials which, in 1986, was to take place in the 
United Kingdom. 
The Secretary-General of WEU, in talks 
with the chairman of the committee, said that he 
would like the future PAC programme to be 
drawn up in such a way that its work would be 
useful to the WEU Council; the delegates had 
discussed this possibility during the two 
meetings of 1986; one of the proposals put 
forward was that the seminar topics chosen 
should, with effect from 1987, reflect the current 
preoccupations of the ministerial organs of 
WEU. 
B. Seminars for government officials 
The thirty-fifth seminar for government 
officials was held at Wiston House, Steyning, 
Sussex, United Kingdom, from 23rd to 29th 
November 1986 and was organised by the Civil 
Service College on the following subject: 
" Improving the management of the pro-
curement of goods and services". 
The 1987 seminar is to be held in Italy on 
the subject " Public administration and security 
problems". 
C. Study visits 
The aim of these visits, which are made by 
officials from one WEU country to another 
member country, is to enable the visitor to spend 
one or two weeks in the administration of the 
host country studying in his own specialist 
field. 
In 1986, four such visits were made. 
V. Budgetary and administrative questions 
(Period covered: 1986) 
(a) The new establishment tables applicable to 
the Secretariat-General were approved by the 
Council of Ministers at their meeting in Rome 
on 14th November 1985. Newly-recruited staff 
will be offered contracts of fixed duration. 
(b) The Council of Ministers also decided in 
1985 on the reorganisation of the WEU sub-
sidiary bodies and the establishment of the new 
agencies for security questions in Paris. 
The Council will again consider the 
organisation and staffing of the agencies at the 
end of 1987. 
The establishment tables applicable to the 
agencies are therefore in force only for the 
duration of this transitional period, and newly-
recruited staff have been offered contracts up to 
the end of this transitional period. 
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(c) The establishment tables comprise a 
number of dual gradings, the principle of which 
is that the higher of the two grades represents the 
approved position in the establishment table. 
The lower of the two grades is added to enable 
the organisation to recruit staff who are judged to 
possess the basic qualifications called for but 
may not have had previous experience. 
Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to 
create promotion possibilities over and beyond 
the approved establishment table, but to faci-
litate recruitment. 
(d) Vacancies in the A-grade functions have 
been filled mainly by officials seconded by their 
national governments. 
(e) When the new temporary establishment 
tables of the agencies were put in operation, it 
was possible for all ex1stmg staff, with the 
exception of one A grade who had to be paid a 
loss of job indemnity, to fill the posts. 
(j) After drafting and subsequent approval of 
the budget for 1986, the annual salary adjust-
ments with effect from 1st July 1985 proved 
to be considerably higher than anticipated; 
moreover, a correction to the economic parity 
index for France proved to be +5.6%, also 
effective from 1st July 1985, whilst an even 
greater correction for the United Kingdom is 
expected (provisionally budgeted as + 10%). 
Unforeseen early retirements and depar-
tures by staff from the Secretariat-General gave 
rise to a considerable increase in the pension 
budget (pensions and leaving allowances), whilst 
the departure, with loss of job indemnity, of one 
A grade in the agencies caused appreciable extra 
expenditure. 
As a result, it was necessary to draw up a 
revised budget for 1986 for the ministerial 
organs. 
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(g) The Co-ordinating Committee of Gov-
ernment Budget Experts held seven meetings in 
1986. In addition, there were thirteen meetings 
of the Committee of Heads of Administration, 
nine joint meetings of the Sta,nding Committee 
of Secretaries-General with the Standing Com-
mittee of Staff Associations, as well as two 
meetings of the secretaries-general. 
(h) The main subjects dealt with in the 
framework of co-ordination, some of which are 
still under review, were as follows: 
- the improvement of staff participation 
in the framework of co-ordination; 
- the periodic adjustment of salaries and 
allowances; 
- the triennial review of salaries incorpo-
rating a review of the salary adjustment 
procedure and the allowances; 
- the wage restraints on salaries of A/L 
and of B/C grades. 
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Dear President, 
ANNEX 
Letter from the Secretary-General 
to the President of the Assembly 
17th March 1986 
I am instructed by the Council to give you the following information about the staff and activities 
of the new agencies for security questions: 
- As from 1st January, each agency has had a Director: General Rambaldi heads the agency for 
the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I) as well as the restructured 
A CA. The former head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. Hintermann, heads 
the agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments (Agency Ill). A senior 
United Kingdom civil servant, Mr. I. Dawson, appointed by the ministers at their meeting on 
14th November 1985 in Rome, has taken charge of the agency for the study of security and 
defence questions (Agency 11). 
Full details of the establishment table will be forwarded as soon as all the posts have been filled. 
- As indicated in the Bonn communique, the role of these new agencies will be to carry out 
studies requested by the Council. 
A number of studies have already been envisaged, all or some of which will give rise to interim 
reports which could be presented to the ministers at their meeting in Venice: 
- Agency I is to study Soviet tactics towards Western European countries concerning arms 
control and disarmament issues. It will also be expected to turn its attention to the future of 
conventional arms control and the essential problem of verification. 
- In close relation and co-ordination with the tasks of Agency I, Agency 11 is to study threat 
assessment, the contribution of the WEU member countries to the response to the threat and 
the question of resource management. 
- Agency Ill is to study aspects of the competitiveness of the European armaments industry and 
the implications of developments in the world armaments market, together with the problems 
of technology transfer among European allies. 
Other tasks have been envisaged and are to be undertaken during the transition period up to the 
end of 1987. 
All these studies will constitute internal working documents for the Council and contribute to its 
reflection on the subjects addressed. 
In order to ensure the availability of the information they require, the agencies are establishing 
links with the relevant international bodies and national administrations. In this connection, it is 
important to note that it is ensured that any classified information they release to the WEU ministerial 
organs will be handled in accordance with their security regulations and will be restricted to the 
exclusive use of these organs. 
As to the suggestion of providing the ministerial organs with a computerised documentation 
centre, this will have to be evaluated having regard to the budgetary priorities and will have to be further 
examined by the Council. 
I realise that this ~s only a partial reply to the many questions raised at our recent meeting in 
Paris. These questions are currently being examined by the Council. As Mr. Andreotti stated in his letter 
of 8th February, you will be informed of its reactions in the near future. 
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The voice of Europe after Reykjavik -
debates in national parliaments 
DRAFT REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 2 
by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur 
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11. Reykjavik and its repercussions on debates in the parliaments of WEU 
member countries 
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(iii) France 
(iv) Italy 
(v) Luxembourg 
(vi) Netherlands 
(vii) United Kingdom 
Ill. The impact of the work of the WEU Assembly on debates in member coun-
tries 
(i) New impetus to the reactivation of WEU 
(Recommendations 432 and 438) 
(ii) Informing public opinion 
(Recommendations 432 and 438) 
(iii) Institutional reforms and enlargement 
(Recommendations 432 and 438) 
(iv) Joint production of armaments 
(Recommendations 437, 438 and 440) 
(v) Scientific, technological and aerospace questions 
(Recommendations 436 and 437) 
(vi) Financial questions 
(Recommendation 433) 
IV. Conclusions 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Lady Jilt Knight (Chairman); Mr. Frasca (Vice-Chairman); MM. Buchner, Cavaliere, de 
Chambrun, De Bondt, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Buhler), Mr. Goerens, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Dr. Miller (Alternate: Coleman), 
Mr. Noerens (Alternate: Mrs. Staels-Dompas), MM. Seitlinger, Tummers, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra. 
N.B. The names of those taking part m the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Resolution 
on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that many proposals and ideas have been put forward in the parliaments of member 
countries for achieving closer European co-operation in security matters; 
(ii) Gratified that the governments of most member countries have shown their determination to 
hold closer consultations in WEU, which they consider to be the appropriate framework for strength-
ening co-operation; 
(iii) Gratified that, thanks to many initiatives taken by members in certain national parliaments, a 
true dialogue on the various aspects ofWEU's activities has been developed with the respective govern-
ments, whiCh led one delegation to conclude its information report by noting that the reactivation of 
WEU had stopped being a subject of discussion and had become a fact; 
(iv) Regretting nevertheless that the answers given by governments on their activities in keeping the 
public informed are not yet satisfactory, 
INVITES parliaments and governments 
To maintain and deepen a fruitful, continuing dialogue on the basis of recommendations adopted 
in order to: 
1. Contribute to the success of jointly-prepared concepts of European security matters; 
2. Make a joint European position on security matters carry greater weight in the Atlantic concert 
and in the East-West dialogue; 
3. Give useful impetus to the successful reorganisation of WEU; 
4. Ensure that the public is clearly and more meaningfully informed. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Rarely has a world-scale political event 
aro~~ed so much attention among European 
political leaders as the rapprochement on dis-
armament achieved at the Soviet-United States 
summit meeting in Reykjavik and, particularly, 
the prospect of agreement on eliminating INF 
missiles in Europe. Further impetus was given to 
government thinking about European security by 
Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 28th February 
1987 in which he proposed that " the problem of 
medium-range missiles in Europe be singled out 
from the package of issues, and that a separate 
agreement on it be concluded, and without 
delay". 
2. How is the public reacting to events? Is the 
population of a continent where defence and 
security matters are still a matter of national sov-
ereignty in the various countries aware of the 
European dimension of the problem? Your 
Rapporteur will give two examples illustrating 
the problem of European awareness: 
3. On 9th January 1987, a few days before 
t~e _resumption of the Soviet-United States nego-
tiatiOns on nuclear and space weapons in 
Geneva, the United States negotiator, Mr. 
Kampelman, gave a televised press conference 
with participants from Bonn London The 
Hague, Paris, Rome and Oslo.' During the dis-
cussion, the United States ambassador had to 
answer twenty-three questions put on every 
aspect of the negotiations. Six of these questions 
related to European security matters but only 
one person present asked whether Europe should 
not play a more active role in this connection. 
4. During another televised press conference 
on lOth March 1987, and therefore two weeks 
after Mr. Gorbachev's new proposals, Mr. 
Ka~pelman had a further discussion with jour-
nalists and others from London, Paris, Bonn, 
Rome, Brussels and The Hague. Nationals of all 
WEU member countries except Luxembourg 
were thus able to put questions. Sixteen of the 
twenty-five questions put related to the conse-
quence~ . of an agr_eement on eliminating 
~uromisslles and Soviet supremacy in conven-
tiOnal forces. But once again only one person 
presen~ raised the problem of the European 
countnes concerned playing a more active role in 
negotiations. No questions were put on whether 
the United States would now be interested or not 
in b~ing informed of a joint European position 
on disarmament. 
5. Your Rapporteur is not giving these brief 
examples in order to draw premature conclu-
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sions but to stimulate interest in a more detailed 
analysis of the state of European awareness of 
Europe's security. Apart from the media, parlia-
ments are the most appropriate forum for public 
opinion to be expressed. 
6. The WEU Assembly has constantly made 
every effort to help to develop European 
a~areness of ~efence and security matters, and 
disarmament m particular. All the recommenda-
tions on disarmament so far adopted by the 
Assembly (Recommendations 382, 383, 408, 415 
a~d 425) were ~elected at the time by the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
for debate in national parliaments. Where devel-
op~ents in 1986 were concerned, parliamen-
tan~ns. could not use an Assembly position as a 
basis smce the two draft recommendations pre-
sented by the committee concerned could not be 
adopted, which was one of the reasons for con-
vening an extraordinary session of the Assembly 
in Luxembourg at the end of April 1987. 
Although this situation has not facilitated the 
work of members of the Assembly in their 
~at~onal p~rliaments, the results of the Reyk-
Javik meetmg and the evolution of East-West 
relations were assessed in other reports and rec-
ommendations that were adopted, for instance 
Recommendations 438 and 441. Your 
Rapporteur has therefore concentrated on 
finding interventions advocating the definition 
of joint European positions in accordance with 
the abovementioned recommendations. 
7. So as not to go beyond the framework of 
the present report, it should be mentioned that 
there can be no question of analysing in depth 
the . development of all the debates on specific 
subJects discussed after ReylGjavik such as the 
zero option for Euromissiles, reductions in stra-
tegic nuclear weapons, SDI problems and the 
interpretation of the ABM treaty, short-range 
nuclear weapons and chemical and conventional 
weapons. 
8. It should be made clear that the analysis 
covers only ~even European countries, and your 
Rapporteur IS aware of the fact that to discern 
the voice of Europe as a whole would require a 
far broader report covering all European coun-
tries. Secondly, your Rapporteur has not had 
access to full documentation. As usual it is not 
possible to take account of confidenti~l discus-
sions in national committees. Only a few 
summary records of meetings are published in 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. 
Your Rapporteur nevertheless considers his 
study gives sufficient information to allow 
certain conclusions to be drawn, which are set 
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out in Chapter IV. To make his task easier, your 
Rapporteur considered debates in the WEU 
member parliaments in alphabetical order 
(Chapter 11) insofar as they were directly con-
cerned with the Reykjavik meeting. Chapter Ill 
analyses action taken by parliamentarians to 
follow the work of the Assembly in particular, 
this being one of the main tasks of the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
11. Reykjavik and its repercussions on debates 
in the parliaments of WEU member countries 
(i) Federal Republic of Germany 
Summary 
9. There has been increasing endorsement of 
greater efforts to unite European interests in 
security policy and it was primarily the gov-
ernment that linked this aim publicly with the 
revival of WEU. Mr. Chirac's proposal to draw 
up a charter of the principles of European 
security was approved by the Chancellor. 
10. One of the specific ideas put forward was 
the intensification of co-operation between 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United Kingdom (Chancellor Kohl in the 
Bundestag on 6th November 1986). There was 
also the idea of European security policy being 
represented at the negotiations between the 
superpowers by one of the European heads of 
state or of government (Mr. Dregger in the Bun-
destag on 20th March). 
Chronology 
11. On 16th October 1986, the Bundestag 
debated the results of the Reykjavik meeting. 
12. Mr. Voigt deplored the fact that Europeans 
had not consulted each other before or after the 
Reykjavik meeting in the European Community, 
in European political co-operation or in NATO 
so as to work out a joint position. Europeans 
should not remain on the sidelines but submit 
their own proposals. 
13. Mr. Soell also deplored Europe's lack of 
influence on decisions taken by world powers. 
He pointed out that European summit meetings 
had so far been held merely to discuss the price 
of milk, the wine market or the quality ofbeer. 
14. In a debate in the Bundestag on 6th 
November 1986, Chancellor Kohl considered 
Europeans should not be surprised by the his-
torical dimension of the rapprochement 
achieved in Reykjavik and by the new prospects 
which would have serious repercussions on rela-
tions within the alliance and on western strategy. 
The problem of parity in conventional weapons 
was of growing importance. A new framework 
had to be found to discuss the control of conven-
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tional weapons with the participation of France 
and Spain. 
15. The Chancellor informed the Bundestag 
about the agreement reached at the last Franco-
German summit meeting on enhancing consulta-
tions between the Federal Republic, France and 
the United Kingdom on disarmament and 
security matters. On the same occasion, Mr. 
Dregger said inter alia: 
" In Reykjavik, we were absent from nego-
tiations of which we were the subject. We 
Europeans will not sit at the table with the 
world powers as long as we allow ourselves 
the luxury of national divisions and retain 
contradictory strategic concepts such as 
those which, for instance, oppose France 
and the other European NATO partners. 
All this was overtaken a long time ago by 
technical developments and world 
policy. 
It would be logical for the heads of state 
and government of France, the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany to work out a European position 
for disarmament talks now being held 
between the superpowers and to consult 
the other NATO allies so as to express this 
position jointly. 
The main point of a European disarm-
ament concept would be to associate 
nuclear and conventional disarmament so 
as to preserve the totality not only of the 
superpowers' security interests but also 
those of Europeans. " 
16. On 26th November 1986, during the 
debate on the 1987 budget, Chancellor Kohl 
called on Europeans to work out a joint defi-
nition of their security interests and to have it 
included in the dialogue between the world 
powers. Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, stressed the importance of WEU in this 
connection: 
"Unite European interests and protect 
European interests: this is what we have 
managed to do in Western European 
Union. All I can say is this: if you had 
attended this debate between the seven 
members of Western European Union on 
the need to negotiate not only on medium-
range missiles but also on short-range mis-
siles and to achieve a balance of conven-
tional forces at the lowest level, you would 
have been surprised to see how far the 
views of the Federal Government con-
verged with those of its principal 
European partners on security policy 
matters. 
Conversely, it was thanks to a Franco-
German initiative that we took the 
decision at NATO's spring meeting in 
Halifax to invite the Soviet Union to nego-
tiations on the balance of conventional 
forces so that we could be sure, precisely in 
the event of a reduction in nuclear 
weapons, to be able to maintain, by con-
ventional means, our aim of preventing 
war." 
He continued by expressing his conviction that 
the meeting of the WEU Council in Luxembourg 
had clearly confirmed that there was greater 
European awareness and also a greater conver-
gence of European views. 
17. In a press conference on the government's 
foreign policy aims, held on 13th January 1987, 
Chancellor Kohl approved Mr. Chirac's pro-
posals for drawing up a charter of European 
security principles. He said inter alia that: 
" Close agreement and a common 
approach by Europeans in various areas of 
security policy are becoming increasingly 
urgent. We have laid the foundations 
together with our French friends. Truly 
European interests, which are called in 
question by the dialogue between the great 
powers, also require co-ordination 
anchored in an institution. 
The Federal Government is convinced 
that WEU might be an appropriate 
instrument for this purpose. In this con-
nection, I formally approve the conclu-
sions and proposals of Mr. Chirac, the 
Prime Minister of France. 
- We must give WEU the means to carry 
out this task from an organisational 
point of views. The first steps have been 
taken in this direction. 
- We must also give WEU political 
impetus so that it can also put over with 
authority the facts of Europe's security 
policy interests. 
Such a development in WEU would 
strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance. It is directed against no 
one." 
18. In his government statement in the Bun-
destag on 18th March 1987, Chancellor Kohl 
said: 
"We must consolidate the European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO needs a 
strong and united Europe, capable of 
defining and expressing a collegiate view 
of its security interests in a manner that is 
clearer and more visible from without. 
This is in our interests and in those of the 
United States; to defend the freeedom of 
Europe is also to defend the United 
States. 
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We wish to continue to develop Western 
European Union, which is the appropriate 
forum for this purpose. Together with 
France, Britain, Italy and the Benelux 
countries, we shall energetically continue 
our efforts to reactivate Western European 
Union." 
19. During the debate on the government 
statement on 20th March 1987, Mr. Dregger 
expressed the following views: 
" Addressing the WEU Assembly on 2nd 
December, Mr. Chirac, the French Prime 
Minister, advocated drawing up a 
European security charter and made a 
remarkable statement on the subject. We 
should endorse these ideas, and I know 
this is what we are doing, but also develop 
them. Why should a European security 
policy worked out jointly by Europeans 
not be presented at the superpowers' nego-
tiating table by a European head of state or 
government? " 
20. On the same subject, Mr. Ehmke said: 
" If there are to be European security con-
sultations, European political co-operation 
must be extended and new life injected 
into WEU. This is what we have been 
demanding for a long time, but nothing 
has yet happened. 
We must not go on wondering whether we 
must act now in WEU or in European 
political co-operation; we must make up 
our minds. " 
(ii) Belgium 
Summary 
21. Debates in Belgium have continued to 
turn, on the one hand, on problems relating to 
the installation of cruise missiles at Florennes 
and, on the other hand, many questions were put 
by parliamentarians on the threat of Soviet 
nuclear missiles and European, security problems 
in the context of the negotiations between the 
world powers with the active participation of 
members of the Belgian Delegfltion to the WEU 
Assembly, who often based themselves on the 
work of this Assembly and its recommendations 
(441, for instance). The government adopted a 
positive approach to Mr. Chirac's proposals and 
confirmed that after Reykjavik many countries 
turned spontaneously towards WEU. Specifi-
cally, Mr. De Decker proposed convening a 
special meeting of heads of state or of gov-
ernment of the seven WEU countries to examine 
present developments in the control of arma-
ments. 
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Chronology 
22. In the Senate, Mr. Close put the following 
six questions on 5th November 1986 on " the 
vital need to ensure European security": 
" During the discussions between Pre-
sident Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in 
Reykjavik, consideration was given to eli-
minating intermediate-range missiles 
(cruise and Pershing 11 missiles on one 
side and SS-20s on the other) with the 
exception of a hundred SS-20s based in the 
Asian part of the Soviet Union and a 
hundred missiles of an equivalent type 
based in the United States. 
This pre-agreement said nothing about the 
SS-21, 22 and 23 missiles deployed by the 
Soviet Union in the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia. 
Would the Minister give me his views on 
the following points: 
1. Since the SS-21s, 22s and 23s 
remaining in place and the hundred SS-20s 
based in Asia are mobile and can be 
brought back to Europe at very short 
notice, what remains of deterrence at 
European level and the link between the 
United States and Europe widely quoted 
as undeniable justification for the 
deployment of Euromissiles in five coun-
tries? 
2. Even if these agreements do not 
materialise because of the impossibility of 
reaching agreement on the strategic 
defence initiative, it can be seen that the 
Soviets are conducting a vast psycho-
logical offensive to bring European and 
American points of view into opposition, 
which is their major strategic objective. 
What is Europe's answer on this subject in 
the framework of NATO and more partic-
ularly of Western European Union? 
3. How is it conceivable that it was not 
possible to define a joint European 
position taking account of the require-
ments of a strategy based on nuclear deter-
rence and the security of Europe before the 
Reykjavik talks began? 
4. In what I consider to be the unlikely 
event of a five- and ten-year timetable 
leading to the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons, can it reasonably be assumed 
that the United States' space system would 
be in place and operational in such a short 
lapse of time? 
If not, does the Minister not consider that 
Europe would be in the position of a 
hostage in view of the considerable Soviet 
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superiority in conventional forces and 
chemical weapons? 
5. In the light of the lessons learned 
from a truncated summit meeting, does 
the Minister not consider that strength-
ening the European pillar of the alliance in 
the framework of WEU should be effected 
urgently in a spirit of political and military 
co-operation which I consider to be sadly 
lacking? 
6. Is it not therefore essential to 
conduct a vast campaign to inform public 
opinion and to make it aware of the nec-
essary conditions for guaranteeing 
Europe's security and averting the risks of 
a third world war? " 
23. On 2nd December 1986, Mr. Tindemans 
answered as follows: 
"The Reykjavik pre-agreement did refer 
to Soviet short-term missiles. 
Following the line of the American negoti-
ating position in Geneva, the pre-
agreement stipulated that there must be a 
ceiling on such missiles, even if only under 
the collateral measures. 
It is true that the geographical location of 
these systems was not discussed in Reyk-
javik but the withdrawal of the SS-22s and 
23s deployed in the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia was for-
mally linked by the Soviet Union with the 
zero option. 
In this connection, the communique 
issued by the Warsaw Pact in Budapest on 
11th June said that, in the event of com-
plete dismantlement of American 
medium-range missiles in Europe, Soviet 
longer-range tactical missiles would be 
eliminated in turn on the territory of the 
German Democratic Republic and the 
Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia. 
Admittedly, how this undertaking was to 
be formalised was not specified. 
I answer the specific questions put by the 
honourable senator as follows: 
1. The LRINF agreement provides for 
a ceiling on the SRINF (short-range mis-
siles) threat. 
Numerically, therefore, it remains more or 
less as it was prior to 1978, i.e. about 700 
systems within the 150 to 1 000 km range. 
Since 1979, one has to add Soviet SS-20s 
to this threat (now, in addition to the 112 
remaining SS-4s, there are 441 SS-20s with 
a total of 1 323 nuclear warheads of which 
994 targeted on Europe). 
The West has deployed 252 nuclear war-
heads on 108 Pershing Ils and 144 cruise 
missiles. 
While it is true that the withdrawal of INF 
means some loss of linkage, which is 
moreover difficult to assess in view of the 
subjective element which plays a part in 
this area, this loss must be seen in relation 
to the gain obtained by the elimination, 
apart from the last SS-4s, of 1 223 Soviet 
nuclear warheads in exchange for the with-
drawal of the 252 American warheads. 
It should be noted that 152 of these would 
be destroyed but that the remaining 100 
would be maintained on American ter-
ritory to match the 100 warheads (33 
SS-20s) that the Soviet Union would keep 
in Asia. 
2. In answer to the Soviet Union's psy-
chological offensive, Europe will assert 
western cohesion in NATO and at 
European level, particularly in WEU. 
3. The United States' negot1atmg 
position in Reykjavik followed the line 
agreed upon by its allies. Only the 
long-term prospects for the elimination of 
all ballistic weapons had not been the 
subject of detailed discussions with the 
allies, but President Reagan's general ideas 
were known. 
4. A ten-year timetable for the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons is not part 
of the American position. The United 
States has proposed the total elimination 
ofballistic weapons and the Soviet Union 
the total elimination of strategic 
weapons. 
From the American standpoint, deterrence 
with a nuclear component (bombers, 
cruise missiles) would thus be maintained 
after the ten-year period. 
However, it is clear that the problem ofthe 
conventional imbalance in Europe will 
arise still more as progress is made 
towards nuclear reductions. 
Hence the importance ofNATO's decision 
in Halifax on 30th May 1986 to prepare 
for negotiations on establishing a stable 
conventional balance in Europe at a lower 
level. The question of the conventional 
imbalance is now part of the general nego-
tiating process. 
5. On the initiative of Belgium, the 
WEU Council decided at its ministerial 
meeting in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th 
November 1986 to give the process of 
reactivating the organisation the necessary 
bases for its continuity and development, 
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including the establishment of a system 
following the model of European political 
co-operation to cover politico-strategic 
areas not discussed by the Twelve. 
6. It is clear that the zero option will 
necessitate an overall re-examination of 
appropriate means of ensuring implemen-
tation of both nuclear and conventional 
deterrent strategy. 
It is also clear that Belgium, like its allies, 
is still in favour of a flexible, credible and 
balanced strategy. " 
24. The proposal by Mr. Chirac, Prime Min-
ister of France, to draw up a European security 
charter was the main subject of a question put by 
Mr. Beysen in the Chamber of Representatives 
on 4th December 1986, when he also asked what 
steps the government intended to take to reac-
tivate WEU. On this last point, Mr. Tindemans, 
Minister for External Relations, said inter alia 
that since 1983 Belgium had been doing its 
utmost to give new life to WEU: 
" The meeting on 12th and 13th 
November 1986 was a success. This was 
largely due to events in Reykjavik. When 
the proposals made in Reykjavik were 
analysed, there was a sudden reaction 
among a number of countries which have 
since then turned spontaneously towards 
WEU. They consider more should be done 
in WEU if we are to have an idea of what 
is necessary for European security and 
what strategy is needed to safeguard our 
security. 
At the same time, the Europeans also 
realised their security problem, in a way 
because of events in Reykjavik, and WEU 
was again considered to be a forum in 
which there could be discussions among 
Europeans. " 
On Mr. Chirac's proposal, Mr. Tindemans said 
he had learned of it from press reports: 
" If the French - since they are present 
there as full members - make proposals on 
discussing security and drawing up a 
European charter we must - and from the 
outset - adopt a very positive attitude. " 
25. On the basis of Assembly Recommen-
dation 441 on developments in the Soviet Union 
and East-West relations, Mr. De Bondt and Mr. 
Noerens put the following questions in the 
Senate on 13th February 1987: 
"With reference to the results of the Reyk-
javik meeting and the resumed Soviet-
American negotiations on the limitation of 
armaments, important parts of which 
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concern the security of Europe, does the 
government share the view that there is an 
urgent need to define European positions 
on disarmament and the limitation of 
armaments in order to convey these posi-
tions in time to the United States? 
What conclusions does the government 
believe should be drawn so far from 
WEU's work on the limitation of arma-
ments and disarmament and does the gov-
ernment believe that this organisation 
should play a greater role in defining a 
joint European approach in these 
matters? 
What is the government's position in 
regard to the proposal by the French Prime 
Minister, Mr. Chirac, for a charter of 
European security principles and does the 
government support the idea that WEU is 
the correct framework for implementing 
this proposal? " 
26. On 17th March 1987, Mr. Tindemans, 
Minister for External Relations, answered as 
follows: 
" 1. Most of the work of the WEU 
Council at its meeting in Luxembourg on 
13th and 14th November 1986 consisted 
of an in-depth assessment of the results of 
the Reykjavik meeting. 
2. There was a wide consensus of 
views. Europeans support the efforts being 
made by the American negotiators in 
Geneva to conclude a separate agreement 
on the elimination of INF. Such an 
agreement, which may lead to a zero 
option in Europe, should be accompanied 
by adequate constraining provisions in 
respect of shorter-range weapons systems. 
The European allies also support the 
United States' position on a 50% reduction 
in strategic arsenals and the maintenance 
of the ABM treaty for a period of ten years 
so as to allow the process of arms 
reduction to start. 
3. In developing their joint delibera-
tions and endeavouring to harmonise their 
positions in WEU, member states are not 
necessarily seeking to agree upon a single 
point of view specific to them, but rather 
to stimulate consultations with the other 
members of the alliance, whether 
American or European. This is in fact the 
level at which western positions should be 
agreed upon. 
4. Belgium has indicated its interest in 
the proposals made by the French Prime 
Minister, Mr. Chirac, at the last meeting of 
the WEU Assembly. They make an active 
contribution to work in WEU on defining 
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the true requirements of Europe's security 
in the changing context of East-West stra-
tegic relations. " 
27. At the end of March 1987, Mr. De Decker 
asked the Prime Minister to invite heads of state 
and government of the seven WEU member 
countries to hold a special meeting in Brussels on 
present developments in regard to arms 
control. 
(iii) France 
Summary 
28. The debate on European security problems 
and the consequences of the dialogue between 
the world powers is so intense in the National 
Assembly and Senate that it is very difficult to 
select from the many interventions those which 
express the main trends of the discussion which 
developed last year. However, it is clear that 
serious concerns were expressed in the debates 
by parliamentarians and by members of gov-
ernment on the risks that would be incurred by 
eliminating Euromissiles. 
29. Many speakers deplored that Europe had 
not been present in Reykjavik and that Europe 
did not speak with one voice. Here the strength-
ening of WEU was mentioned several times and 
particularly in a detailed speech by Mr. Caro in 
the National Assembly. Various ideas were put 
forward including the creation of a European 
secretariat-general for defence (Mr. Bouvard) or 
a European security council (Mr. Pelletier). 
Chronology 
30. On the disarmament plan tabled by Mr. 
Gorbachev at the beginning of the year, Mr. 
Genton, then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
and Armed Forces Committee, adopted the fol-
lowing position in the Senate on 27th May 1986: 
" The intended elimination over a three-
or five-year period of SS-20, Pershing 11 
and cruise missiles deployed in Europe 
would procure for Western Europeans 
only fallacious, blind peace of mind, 
neglecting the destructive capability -
which cannot be called residual - of mis-
siles such as the SS-21, 22 and 23. 
Nor should we forget the conventional and 
chemical forces present in Europe. 
Security is indivisible and must be viewed 
from every point of view. What would 
happen to Europe's independence if we 
had to give up offsetting, by nuclear deter-
rence, the Red Army's superiority in troop 
levels and conventional weapons? " 
31. On behalf of the government, Mr. 
Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said: 
" Within the wider limits of disarmament 
in general, France considers the question 
of conventional weapons should be 
handled on the same basis as that of 
nuclear weapons. Because of the conven-
tional imbalance in Europe, it must not be 
underestimated. This is why France insti-
gated the conference on disarmament in 
Europe held in Stockholm and considers it 
to be the most appropriate forum for con-
sidering the new Soviet proposals made in 
Potsdam by the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
This is an area in which it is essential for 
us to consult our allies - particularly the 
United States -and concert our positions 
with them. We are conducting such con-
sultations not only on a bilateral level and 
in the Atlantic Alliance but also in 
Western European Union, where we can 
tackle among Europeans all East-West 
matters and co-operation in armaments 
matters." 
32. On 24th October 1986, during the debate 
on the 1987 budget in the National Assembly, 
several deputies spoke of the consequences for 
Europe of the Reykjavik meeting, including Mr. 
Bouvard, who advocated the creation of a 
European defence secretariat-general and encour-
aging attempts to revitalise WEU. 
33. During the debate on the defence budget 
in the Senate on 27th November 1986, Mr. 
Giraud, Minister of Defence, referred to his 
concern about the consequences of the Reykjavik 
rapprochement. 
34. While sharing these concerns, on the same 
occasion Mr. Lecanuet, Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, described the consequences 
he considered should be drawn for French 
policy: 
" I have always asserted the need to asso-
ciate the strongest possible French military 
force with the network of joint European 
defence through active co-operation 
between member states of the European 
Economic Community, be it a matter of 
armaments or of strategy. 
I have also always asserted that France 
and its European partners should include 
their military strength frankly in the 
Atlantic Alliance and that the Atlantic 
Alliance can be real, i.e. deterrent, only if 
it includes the presence in Europe of 
American military deterrent forces. " 
35. During the debate on the 1987 budget on 
1st December 1986, Mr. Raimond, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, took the opportunity of 
summing up the government's position: 
" The total elimination of American and 
Soviet intermediate-range missiles in 
Europe, followed by complementary nego-
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tiations on shorter-range nuclear weapons 
deployed by those two countries on our 
continent, would obviously not be without 
consequences for Europe's security while 
conventional and chemical imbalances 
remained and naturally Europe could still 
be reached with longer-range strategic 
systems. 
With these prospects in mind, we started 
consultations with our closest European 
partners. The matter was raised jointly by 
the ministers of defence and foreign affairs 
of the seven WEU member countries at 
their recent meeting in Luxembourg. " 
36. Mr. Lecanuet and Mr. Genton deplored 
Europe's absence from the Soviet-American dia-
logue on a matter of immediate interest to it, and 
the former expressed grave concern at the pros-
pects for European security: 
"We must be careful that relations 
between Europe and the United States do 
not deteriorate and progressively lose their 
meaning. It would be a real historical 
tragedy to allow such a process to be 
pursued without doing everything in our 
power to reverse it. 
Europe will exist as a political reality 
present in the world only once it has 
decided to ensure its own defence and 
security. This political aim is a prior con-
dition to the solution of all the other 
problems which often stir our minds and 
which arise in the European Economic 
Community. 
We shall be unable to assert our com-
munity of destiny with the other nations of 
the European Economic Community 
without guaranteeing that our military 
intervention, in the event of danger, would 
be assured, significant and co-ordinated 
with that of NATO integrated forces. Such 
a guarantee would lead not to the reinte-
gration ofFrench forces in the NATO inte-
grated command in peacetime but to prior 
harmonisation of defence plans to ensure 
optimum use of the resources of the entire 
alliance." 
37. The debate on the bill authorising ratifi-
cation of the single European act afforded other 
opportunities of considering new concepts for 
European security in the post-Reykjavik situ-
ation. A report submitted by Mr. de Lipkowski 
on 18th November 1986 on behalf of the 
National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee 
on the abovementioned bill concluded that: 
" The concept of European defence is reg-
istering no progress. 
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It is inconceivable that a group of 320 
million men continues to rely for its 
security on an ally outside Europe, i.e. the 
United States. France has done its full 
duty for its security and also for that of 
Europe. Its deterrent force, like that of 
Britain, makes a significant contribution 
to that defence. The French and British 
efforts are not enough. 
Europeans are not entitled to continue to 
feel they are exempt from thinking about 
European defence which, without denying 
any of our loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, 
must be a complement to it. In the 
meantime, while the two great powers 
almost reached an agreement that would 
have been detrimental to it at Reykjavik, 
and while the American strategic defence 
initiative should lead Europeans at last to 
start thinking hard about their defence, 
Europe persists in refusing to consider the 
matter. 
Yet what future would there be for this 
European entity if its spirit of defence were 
lacking? Far from being a leading actor on 
the international stage, it would become a 
prey. A strong and plausible Community 
must be based on three sound pillars: a 
competitive economy, advanced tech-
nology and a determined defence effort. 
Alas, we have not reached that stage. A 
relaunching on the basis of the idea of 
defence would thus be impossible. " 
38. During the debate on the ratification of the 
single act on 20th November 1986, Mr. Caro 
made a speech in which he referred specifically 
to the security aspects: 
" Finally, we must note that the single act 
does not imply the European Community 
assuming responsibility for security 
matters, except a rather vague reference to 
the political and economic aspects of 
security to which Community activities in 
this field would be confined, at least for 
the next five years. 
Can it be deduced that the presence among 
the Twelve of countries which do not view 
their security problems in the same way as 
their partners is the principal reason for 
the paralysis of the Community where 
defence matters are concerned? A so-called 
informal meeting of ministers for foreign 
affairs and defence of the seven members 
of Western European Union was held in 
Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November. 
It perhaps provided a few elements of an 
answer to this question. 
At that meeting, it emerged that the 
dangers that would have been involved for 
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Europe in the disarmament agreement 
that the United States seems to have tried 
to conclude with the Soviet Union in Reyk-
javik had been clearly perceived by all 
and that the Seven were at last determined 
to agree on upholding, particularly in the 
North Atlantic Council, the requirements 
of European security. At the same time, 
the Seven decided to set up an intergov-
ernmental working group on security in 
the Mediterranean, i.e. on all the threats to 
Europe stemming from instability in the 
region with their terrorist-related conse-
quences. 
The ministers of the Seven thus gave a 
welcome answer to the recommendations 
the WEU Assembly, of which I have had 
the honour of being President for more 
than two years, has been making for a long 
time. In this capacity, I have done my 
utmost to put these views over to govern-
ments and I am gratified to note that at 
last they seem determined to follow them 
up. In so doing, they are in no way contra-
dicting the provisions of the single act 
since this recognises the responsibilities of 
the WEU countries in security and defence 
matters. 
We must now pay careful attention to 
what is happening among the Seven in 
order to assess the determination of 
European governments to meet jointly the 
challenges stemming from the wealth of 
current events over the last six months. 
There is indeed no point in agreeing on 
formulae, institutions and procedures if 
they do not provide Europe with the 
means of mobilising its available forces in 
order to assert its interests in the world 
whenever necessary. 
In any event, there is no contradiction 
between a single European act aimed at 
laying down the means the Twelve intend 
to use in sectors where the treaties setting 
up the European Community gave them 
responsibility and the reactivation of 
WEU as now being conducted by the 
Seven. The two steps are complementary 
and I tried to express this by referring the 
idea of a European political area to the 
WEU Council. 
This area must now be filled by keeping 
the Twelve regularly informed about what 
is happening among the Seven, and the 
single act, while not very precise on this 
point, nevertheless opens the door for 
co-ordination between the two institutions 
which must henceforth tackle questions 
relating to Europe's security, each one for 
the aspects for which it is responsible. 
I have been convinced for a long time that 
solidarity between the Western European 
countries is a fact we cannot evade. It is 
imposed on us by geography and by the 
diminishing economic, political, techno-
logical and military part that Europe plays 
in the world. I therefore consider it 
evident that when seven - and, I hope, 
soon nine - European countries manage to 
speak with a single voice on foreign policy, 
security and defence matters, they will put 
forward the point of view of Western 
Europe as a whole. " 
39. In his speech, Mr. Raimond, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, regretted that: 
" ... Europe was not in a position to speak 
with a single voice, as would be desirable, 
particularly on the problems of European 
security. However, the framework offered 
by political co-operation or by Western 
European Union allows France to express 
its opinion among its partners. 
We have been able to note, just as Mr. 
Caro said but perhaps to a more limited 
extent, that the French position thus 
expressed had an influence on our 
partners' positions, even if they do not yet 
say so publicly. 
While it is difficult to build European 
defence, this is largely due to the German 
problem and the division of Germany. 
The co-operation we have embarked upon 
with our Western European partners, 
whether in regard to armaments or on 
political and strategic matters, to a certain 
extent makes up for this shortcoming. 
All forms of bilateral and sometimes mul-
tilateral co-operation with the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Britain, Italy and 
Spain indirectly strengthen the building of 
Europe." 
40. In the same context, Mr. Bosson, Minister 
Delegate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
responsible for European affairs, added: 
"Where our external security is con-
cerned, I wish also to quote the example of 
WEU. Speaking under the scrutiny of 
President Caro, I wish to state that France, 
at the last meeting of the Council of Min-
isters of that organisation, was the most 
advanced delegation in all matters that 
were the subject of proposals 
enlargement to Spain and Portugal, 
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increased material and financial means for 
the organisation, mandate given to its 
Agency Ill to extend its studies, increase in 
the number and level of meetings between 
senior officials concerned and creation of 
European defence study meetings at the 
IHEDN. On all these points, French pro-
posals were ahead of those of the other six 
countries. " 
41. On lOth December 1986, when the Senate. 
debated the single European act, several senators 
referred to the proposals by the Prime Minister 
to the WEU Assembly for drawing up a charter 
of European security principles. While Mr. 
Lecanuet and Mr. Pintat welcomed the idea, Mr. 
Faure deplored that: 
" ... we are a long way from Robert 
Schuman's dream of a united states of 
Europe. Even if I were alone here I would 
continue hammer and tongs to proclaim 
my devotion to that great idea which, it is 
true, consisted of safeguarding nations 
with all their affective, cultural, past and 
present features, but also of going beyond 
the states to set up a power in Western 
Europe, a great power which would have 
been present in Reykjavik, whereas we 
have no one to blame but ourselves for our 
absence." 
42. Mr. Pontillon said he was not against the 
idea of a security charter if that implied seeking 
and effectively implementing a joint guarantee 
for all: 
"Co-operation in European security does 
not depend only on the ability of our gov-
ernments to agree on the concept of a 
combat aircraft or on the performances of 
a tank but above all on our joint ability to 
face up to the prospect of a significant 
reduction in the American conventional 
commitment and a proportional reduction 
in the nuclear guarantee. 
We must now act rather than react; we 
must go beyond the wishful thinking stage, 
i.e. the assessment of possibilities of 
co-operation, and at last be an actor in the 
great debate on defence and the control of 
armaments. " 
43. On the role of Western European Union, 
Mr. Pelletier expressed the idea of setting up a 
European security council. 
"Security Europe? Western European 
Union - WEU - exists but it has so far 
been the sleeping beauty that the Prime 
Minister was recently right to try to 
awaken. However, WEU can but be a 
forum. What we need are structures and 
means of action which do not bow to the 
supranational sirens to which Pierre 
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Mendes France fell victim in 1954 with his 
plan for a European army. 
In my opinion, a European security 
council should be set up to hold periodical 
meetings of ministers for foreign affairs 
and defence, with chiefs of staff taking 
over in the interval. 
Our rapid action force, because of the 
polyvalence of its units and tasks, might, if 
needed, provide an essential element. 
Other national units would have to be 
formed to set up this European inter-
vention force whose role might be limited 
to safeguarding the Community's supplies. 
Each unit would be national and under 
national command but might be made 
available to a European command which 
would determine joint deployment plans 
when the security of supplies was 
threatened. 
Hence it would be a conventional force 
respecting states' sovereignty but certain 
elements should also be prepared, if nec-
essary - there is a great need for this - to 
counter international terrorism. 
In doing this, the purpose is not to revive 
the EDC (European Defence Community) 
but to affirm a Community will. " 
44. Answering speeches and questions, Mr. 
Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, stressed 
the importance of developing the role of the 
WEU Council of Ministers. He then referred 
again to the Reykjavik meeting: 
" The problem is indeed that of nuclear 
deterrence and of the global nature of 
deterrence, i.e. not only the problem of 
nuclear weapons but also that of conven-
tional and chemical weapons. I am not 
sure that what made Europe see the light 
after Reykjavik was fear. 
However, it is a fact that Europe, as many 
speakers stressed, felt it had not been con-
sulted or not sufficiently consulted on a 
matter which was of such importance for 
Europeans. 
If the discussion on European defence is 
put realistically and topically, it is cer-
tainly based on ambiguity. Is the purpose a 
strengthening of the cohesion of Euro-
peans in the Atlantic Alliance? No one 
wants this to be weakened since the 
presence of American conventional and 
nuclear forces, as I have just stressed, is 
necessary for the defence of Europe. On 
this point, France's position has never 
varied. 
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Conversely, as the Prime Minister told the 
WEU Assembly on 2nd December, greater 
cohesion between Europeans and a 
stronger expression of their support for 
certain principles they share should help to 
make the alliance more effective and 
stronger. 
If the purpose is to envisage Europe 
having totally independent means, we 
shall then consider that the coupling 
between the two shores of the Atlantic is 
an element of security. 
Here too, as the Prime Minister said on 
2nd December, the Atlantic Alliance is not 
threatened by risks of division. We have 
something of a feeling, justified or not, 
that decisions crucial for Europe might be 
taken without the latter having any say in 
the matter. Here we come back to the pre-
vious problem. Europeans must therefore 
consult each other more on security 
matters. As I said earlier, WEU is an 
appropriate framework. " 
45. On 18th December 1986, Mr. Raimond, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the National 
Assembly after information reports had been 
presented on the activities of the Assemblies of 
the Council of Europe and Western European 
Union. Answering Mr. Caro, Mr. Raimond con-
sidered WEU was a good framework for dis-
cussing the security and defence of Europe, as 
shown by Mr. Chirac's address at the last session 
of the WEU Assembly, in which he proposed the 
adoption of a charter of European security prin-
ciples. He added that the enlargement ofWEU to 
include Spain was justified by the fact that it had 
the same security concerns. 
(iv) Italy 
Summary 
46. Examining topical international political 
problems in Italy, your Rapporteur has recorded 
a number of parliamentary initiatives which 
show the keen public interest in that country in 
European security matters. In all discussions it is 
possible to see the remarkable significance 
attached by parliament and government to the 
work of WEU and of its Assembly in particular. 
Assembly recommendations are quoted in 
debates and are used as the basis of questions to 
the government. When the government adopts 
positions on subjects such as Italian partici-
pation in the SDI research programme and the 
prospects of disarmament following Reykjavik, 
it often refers to discussions in the WEU 
Council. The wish to be kept informed in the 
most appropriate manner is demonstrated by the 
fact that certain committees organised hearings 
of foreign experts. 
Chronology 
47. For instance, on 5th March 1986 the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of 
Deputies was addressed by Ambassador Nitze of 
the United States on the state of East-West rela-
tions and the American-Soviet negotiations in 
Geneva following the proposals made by Mr. 
Gorbachev on 15th January 1986. After his 
address, the ambassador answered many ques-
tions put by some ten members of the com-
mittee. 
48. The problem of Euromissiles, the position 
of French and British nuclear forces and Soviet 
conventional superiority were the main interests 
of most of those who put questions. Parliamen-
tarians were also interested in the participation 
of Europeans in the SDI research programme 
and wished to know whether the United States 
was prepared to consult its European allies con-
tinuously on this programme. Several speakers 
stressed the importance of keeping a careful 
watch on the reactions of European public 
opinion to questions relating to their security. 
The European aspect of the various problems 
was therefore clearly foremost in all speeches. 
49. On 26th June 1986, the same committee 
sought more information by inviting Ambas-
sador Petrovsky, Soviet Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. The threat to Europe stemming 
from the Soviet military system, particularly the 
SS-20s, was the main subject of questions. One 
parliamentarian asked how the division of 
Europe could be overcome. 
50. In the Senate on 3rd April 1986, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee discussed gov-
ernment statements on Italian participation in 
the SDI research programme and on the pros-
pects of negotiations on disarmament and the 
control of armaments made by the Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs and Defence. On that occasion, 
Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
while emphasising the government's determi-
nation to contribute actively to the success of the 
disarmament negotiations, confirmed the impor-
tance of close consultations with the European 
allies in WEU. Several senators, including Mr. 
Orlando, Mr. Milani and Mr. Schietroma, 
stressed this aspect. 
51. In the days following the Reykjavik 
meeting, several senators put questions on its 
consequences. These included Mr. Milani and 
Mr. Pasquino, who asked on 14th October 
1986: 
" 
3. what action the government intends 
to take, including in the Eurogroup of the 
Atlantic Alliance and in the European 
Community, to ensure that the European 
countries, which were left completely out 
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of the stage of the United States-Soviet 
dialogue which has just come to an end 
and indeed out of the strategic defence ini-
tiative (decided upon, implemented and 
developed unilaterally b~ the United 
States without even formal discussion in 
NATO) can again play a dynamic, con-
structive role in order to bring about new 
detente, no longer based on fragile bipo-
larity but enhanced by the effective 
presence of European countries from both 
blocs." 
52. In a question put in the Senate on 16th 
October 1986, Mr. Gualtieri, Mr. Ferrara Salute, 
Mr. Covi and Mr. Venanzetti asked the gov-
ernment: 
" 
(a) what steps it intends to take to 
strengthen European solidarity and 
contacts between the United States 
and Europe with a view to promoting 
the return of both the United States 
and the Soviet Union to the negoti-
ating table; 
(b) what line of conduct the Italian Dele-
gation will follow at the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe 
which is to be opened in Vienna in 
November 1986." 
53. The various questions were debated by the 
Senate on 22nd October 1986. Mr. Orlando, Mr. 
Pozzo, Mr. Milani, Mr. Chiarante and Mr. 
Gualtieri called inter alia for Europe's voice to be 
heard and for a politically united Europe to be 
set up. Mr. Gualtieri recalled the steps taken to 
reactivate WEU. 
54. Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, spoke during the debate, saying: 
"There is an equally important aspect 
which concerns us as Europeans. If, for 
instance, as some believe, now that the 
Euromissile question has reached 
maturity, we can obtain results in this area 
as well as with the freezing of short-range 
missiles, the discussion would then return 
to the level of conventionfil weapons. This 
is certainly a complex negotiation but it is 
starting on a somewhat encouraging basis, 
i.e. the positive result of the Stockholm 
conference. 
The question arose as to whether the nego-
tiations on the reduction of forces should 
be held in the context of the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe or 
elsewhere and, in the latter case, whether 
they should be held in Vienna in the 
context of the MBFR talks - I apologise 
for using these letters but they are now an 
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everyday thing - or whether an ad hoc 
forum should be created. I think it is a 
secret for no one that we have not yet 
managed to reach agreement on this point. 
France, for instance, is in favour of the 
CSCE, while other countries - including 
certain neutral and non-aligned countries 
- object, saying they do not wish to be 
mixed up with a negotiation which they 
consider should be confined to the 
member countries of the Warsaw Pact and 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
I consider there can be no question of an 
effort to reduce conventional forces 
without the participation of France or 
another European country. " 
55. The Chamber of Deputies debated the 
results of the Reykjavik meeting on 28th October 
1987 on the basis of many questions on Italy's 
participation in the SDI research programme. 
Several deputies called for a stronger European 
influence in the conduct of East-West policy. 
56. On 11th December 1986, Senators Milani, 
Pasquino, Cavazzuti and Fiori asked what was 
the government's position on the dynamic role 
Europe could play to relaunch East-West negoti-
ations after Reykjavik, and on 21st December, 
during the debate on the budget, the Senate 
debated a draft recommendation urging the gov-
ernment to make every effort to facilitate the 
conclusion of an agreement on Euromissiles on 
the basis of the rapprochement achieved in Reyk-
javik and to ensure that an agreement was con-
cluded between the Atlantic Alliance and the 
Warsaw Pact on a balanced reduction of conven-
tional forces. 
57. On 21st January 1987, Mr. Masciadri put 
a question in the Senate, asking for the opinion 
of the Minister of Defence on Recommendation 
441 on developments in the Soviet Union and 
East-West relations, adopted by the WEU 
Assembly on 4th December 1986, concerning 
inter alia the definition of European positions on 
armaments and the limitation of armaments and 
efforts to ensure that the Geneva negotiations 
resulted in an agreement on a verified worldwide 
ban on chemical weapons. He also asked the 
minister for his opinion on the problem of a 
balance of conventional forces in Europe in 
order to facilitate an agreement on the reduction 
of the number of Euromissiles without 
jeopardising the security of Europe. The govern-
ment's answer is not yet known. 
M Luxembourg 
Summary 
58. In the context of the debate on the pros-
pects of nuclear disarmament in Europe, WEU's. 
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role in developing a specifically European 
identity in security matters is a major subject of 
government statements, which underlines the 
seven governments' deep-rooted attachment to 
the indivisibility of United States and Western 
European security. Members of the Luxembourg 
Delegation to the WEU Assembly played an 
active part in all debates, often on the basis of 
recommendations adopted by the Assembly. 
Two parliamentarians criticised the dual Council 
of Europe/WEU mandate and Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges proposed combining the WEU 
Assembly mandate with that of the North 
Atlantic Assembly. 
Chronology 
59. In a foreign policy statement in the 
Chamber of Deputies on 27th February 1986, 
Mr. Goebbels, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, gave the following views on Europe's 
role: 
" Where Europe is concerned, we cannot 
limit ourselves between now and the end 
of the century to being passive onlookers 
as the great powers act. Being a credible, 
loyal partner in the alliance means that we 
for our part remain active and assume our 
share of responsibility in the process of 
detente and defence. This is particularly 
true insofar as the Ten, then the Twelve of 
the Community have not yet succeeded in 
acquiring a defence dimension. 
That is why we shall take our future role as 
Chairman of Western European Union 
very seriously. As you know, there is a 
political will to reactivate WEU and make 
it, if appropriate, the nucleus of future 
European defence. However, it must be 
clear that this reactivation and the future 
role that might be assigned to WEU must 
not be detrimental to the European Com-
munity insofar as a number of members of 
the latter could not belong to this reacti-
vated organisation. Nor must the reacti-
vation process weaken the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
On the contrary, if the reactivation our 
government is supporting is to have 
meaning, it must aim to strengthen both 
the Community and the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
Insofar as Spain and Portugal have 
announced their intention to join the 
organisation, the question of future 
European defence will probably be highly 
topical in the coming months. " 
60. On 5th and 6th March 1986, Mr. Goerens, 
Mr. Hengel, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges and Mr. 
Burger spoke during the debate in the Chamber 
of Deputies on the government foreign policy 
statement, asking inter alia for details of the gov-
ernment's position on European security and the 
reactivation and enlargement of WEU. 
61. On 26th November 1986, answering a 
question put by Mr. Hengel on the government's 
position on Recommendation 432, Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, said of disarm-
ament problems: 
" Arms control and disarmament have 
always played a large part in WEU's dis-
cussions. Thus, the first part of the minis-
terial meeting held in Luxembourg in 
November was devoted to an analysis of 
the aftermath of Reykjavik: what would be 
the consequences for Europe of the pro-
posals discussed by the United States and 
the Soviet Union at that meeting? This 
analysis will be pursued at the level of 
political directors and defence experts. " 
62. On 20th January 1987, Mr. Fischbach, 
Minister of Defence, answered a question put by 
Mr. Urbany on disarmament, which included 
the following points: 
" 
2. At its ministerial meeting in Halifax last 
May, the Atlantic Alliance set up a high-
level working group which is now defining 
a joint approach to negotiations on con 
ventional weapons. Quite recently in 
Brussels, the ministers for foreign affairs of 
the alliance adopted a declaration on the 
control of conventional weapons. In this 
declaration they said they were prepared 
to start East-West talks with a view to 
establishing a new mandate for negotia-
tions on the control of conventional 
weapons covering Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiations on 
strengthening conventional stability in 
Europe might also be encouraged by a con-
structive answer from the Warsaw Pact to 
the proposals the West submitted in the 
MBFR talks on 5th December 1985." 
63. In the government foreign policy 
statement on East-West relations, security, dis-
armament and WEU on 22nd January 1987, Mr. 
Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said: 
" Beyond the hopes raised in Reykjavik, 
no one can gloss over the fact that the 
prospects chosen by the two highest 
authorities of the Soviet Union and the 
United States caused some emotion in 
Europe. Moreover, since that event the 
community of destiny of America and 
Europe embodied in the Atlantic Alliance 
has been at the centre of very intense dip-
lomatic activity. Is this surprising? I do 
not think so. There are at least two major 
explanations for it, one a contradiction 
and the other a paradox: 
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In Reykjavik, Europe was conspicuous by 
its absence. The complaint of certain 
leaders of the old continent who denounce 
American preponderance in the alliance 
was therefore well and truly started up 
again. But it must be noted that this situ-
ation is not due to the deliberate will of the 
American Government but is the result of 
the division of Euro~ans themselves. 
That is the contradiction. 
On the other hand, it would also seem that 
certain Europeans, who in the past have 
never stopped asking the American 
authorities to take brave initiatives and 
hold constructive talks, are now very 
critical of the prospects opened up in 
Reykjavik. Is this not a paradox? 
We are now really at the heart of a debate 
which, although very well known, is never-
theless in present circumstances of special 
significance for Europe and Luxembourg. 
As it has the chairmanship-in-office of 
Western European Union (WEU), our 
country has been trying for six months to 
channel all the initiatives and proposals 
having a direct link with European 
security. The stake is a high one. It goes far 
beyond institutional vicissitudes. If demo-
cratic Europe wishes to co-operate on an 
equal footing with the United States of 
America in its due place, it must assume 
more responsibility for its own security. 
Only at this price can Europe establish a 
more balanced transatlantic relationship 
within the alliance. 
The fact that seven governments have 
recently spoken so openly of their security 
problems and in this context recalled their 
determination to act to preserve peace on 
the European continent seems to me an 
important gain. By stressing the vital 
interest of maintaining an adequate 
deterrent capability in Europe throughout 
all the stages of the disarmament process, 
they showed their deep-rooted attachment 
to the indivisibility of the security of the 
United States and of Western Europe. 
The session of the WEU Assembly held in 
Paris at the beginning of December in 
which certain members of this chamber 
played an active part deliberately followed 
the same line. Innovative ideas were even 
put forward. I am thinking in particular of 
the proposals made by Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac on the definition of a 
European security charter. The coming 
weeks will show whether we are facing a 
salutary leap forward in the history of 
WEU. 
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But the idea of a non-nuclear world might 
cause a complete upheaval in the overall 
strategy of the alliance to the detriment of 
Europeans in view of the prevailing 
imbalance of conventional weapons in 
favour of the Warsaw Pact countries. As 
the importance of nuclear arms recedes, 
conventional weapons come even more 
into the limelight. It is therefore not exag-
gerated to claim that at the heart of the 
negotiations on European security lies the 
search for a true balance, at lower levels, of 
conventional forces and armaments. This 
is the aim of the negotiations which are in 
principle to start in the framework of the 
CSCE, the Atlantic Alliance having given a 
favourable opinion. Other talks - I mean 
the MBFR negotiations which have been 
under way for thirteen years and whose 
aim is precisely a reduction of conven-
tional forces in the Central Europe region 
- will give us a better grasp of the 
enormous difficulty ofthe task before us. 
In the coming negotiations, which will 
doubtless leave their mark on the year 
1987, it is essential to develop Europe's 
own identity, to maintain close consulta-
tions in the context of the alliance and to 
call on public opinion to distinguish 
between reliable, concrete disarmament 
proposals and sheer propaganda 
manoeuvres. For this purpose, the gov-
ernment will rely on the assistance of 
members of the chamber. " 
64. During the debate that followed this 
statement, speakers included Mr. Dondelinger, 
Mr. Angel, Mr. Margue, who deplored the dual 
Council of Europe/WEU mandate, and Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges, who proposed combining 
the mandate of the WEU Assembly with that of 
the North Atlantic Assembly. 
(vi) Netherlands 
Summary 
65. It was mainly in the Second Chamber of 
the States General that a continuing, intensive 
debate was held on European security matters in 
the cont~xt of the dialogue between the two great 
powers m 1986. The Second Chamber voted in 
favour of continuing negotiations on the basis of 
the ~eykjavik pre-agreement. However, many 
questiOns were put on the consequences of the 
zero option and the positions adopted in other 
Western European countries. While stressing the 
importance of WEU, the government advocated 
better liaison between European forums in order 
to enhance the European contribution to the 
alliance. In a draft motion tabled on 1Oth 
December 1986, Mr. Engwirda and Mr. Eisma 
proposed a government initiative to set up a 
European satellite organisation. 
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Chronology 
66. On 17th November 1986, the Standing 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the 
Second Chamber put many questions on nuclear 
disarmament, the concept of European security 
in various organisations, Western Europe's con-
tribution to the Atlantic Alliance and the dis-
persal of forums for discussing security ques-
tions. 
67. The government's answer underlined the 
importance of Western European Union: 
" Discussions on security matters in 
European political co-operation are 
limited to the political and economic 
aspects. Part of the discussion on the 
European dimension of security is 
therefore held in other forums. These -
Western European Union, Eurogroup and 
the IEPG - have their own history, tasks 
and membership. 
The government considers the possibilities 
offered by the various forums should be 
used to the maximum. It is also important 
for France, which does not belong to the 
NATO integrated military organisation, to 
be involved as far as possible in Western 
Europe's discussions on security and 
co-operation in armaments matters. 
An attempt is being made to avoid dupli-
cation of work in the various forums and 
we do not want other forums to be set up. 
While recognising the different mem-
bership, tasks and features of each of the 
forums dealing with Western European 
security co-operation, greater cohesion 
should be sought in their work... Better 
liaison between the European forums 
would strengthen the European contri-
bution to the alliance. European dis-
cussion of the results of the proposals 
made at the Reykjavik summit meeting 
will also encourage the closest possible 
cohesion between the various European 
forums. " 
68. On lOth December 1986, three draft 
motions were tabled on security policy, including 
one by Mr. Engwirda and Mr. Eisma asking the 
government to take or endorse the initiative of 
setting up a European satellite organisation while 
the Netherlands held the chairmanship-in-office 
ofWEU. 
(vii) United Kingdom 
Summary 
69. During the continuing, intensive debate in 
both houses of the British Parliament, the gov-
ernment specified that WEU did not wish to set 
up a formalised inner group of certain member 
countries and stressed the importance of main-
taining the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance. On 
Mr. Chirac's proposal to draw up a European 
security charter, the government confirmed that 
it endorsed many of his concerns. In particular, 
it endorsed Mr. Chirac's assertion that deter-
rence in Europe required a strategic link between 
the two sides of the alliance and the presence of 
conventional and nuclear forces in Europe. Six 
members of the United Kingdom Delegation to 
the WEU Assembly tabled a draft resolution in 
the House of Commons on 4th March 1987 
drawing attention to the dangers of disturbing 
disparities in conventional, chemical and 
shorter-range nuclear weapons. On European 
co-operation in defence matters, the Prime Min-
ister confirmed that the United Kingdom had 
encouraged such co-operation, inter alia through 
reactivated WEU. In a speech to the Royal 
Institute for International Affairs in Brussels on 
16th March 1987, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
called for an effective WEU. 
Chronology 
70. In a government statement to the House of 
Lords on 15th October 1986 on the results of the 
Reykjavik summit meeting, Lady Young, Min-
ister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, welcomed the fact that the unity of the 
alliance had not been called in question by the 
results of the meeting. 
71. During the ensuing debate in which about 
a dozen members of the House of Lords spoke, 
Lord Kennet asked whether the government 
would not agree that a proper European foreign 
and defency policy must now be quickly 
developed that could allow Europe to be present 
at negotiations which affect our very existence. 
72. On 13th November 1986, in the debate in 
the House of Lords on the speech from the 
throne relating to foreign affairs, several 
members advocated strengthening Europe's 
position. Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement, said he was convinced 
more effective European co-operation was nec-
essary. But in present circumstances there was no 
cheaper or as effective European alternative to 
the Trident system. 
73. On 8th December 1986, Lord Kennet put 
a question in the House of Lords on action taken 
on Chancellor Kohl's proposal to the Bundestag 
on 6th November on seeking increased German-
French-British contacts on disarmament and 
security matters. In her answer, Lady Young, 
Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, recalled that the WEU member countries 
had recently agreed procedures to increase con-
sultation on security and disarmament issues in 
order to strengthen the European contribution to 
the alliance. There was no question of a 
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formalised inner group. Europeans were com-
mitted to maintaining the solidarity of the 
Atlantic Alliance. Exchanging views on matters 
of direct concern to Europe improved discussion 
within the alliance and strengthened the transat-
lantic bond. 
7 4. After further speeches, Lady Young con-
firmed that European states were consulted regu-
larly and closely. Lord Beloff had asked about 
the government's position towards Mr. Chirac's 
proposal on drawing up a European charter of 
security principles. Lady Young confirmed that 
the government shared many of the concerns 
expressed by the French Prime Minister. It wel-
comed his support for the text which the British 
Prime Minister had agreed last month with Pres-
ident Reagan at Camp David and concurred 
wholeheartedly with Mr. Chirac's emphasis on 
the importance of nuclear deterrence and the role 
of the British and French nuclear forces. The 
government welcomed in particular his assertion 
that deterrence in Europe required a strategic 
linkage between the two sides of the alliance and 
the presence of American conventional and 
nuclear forces on our continent. 
75. On 15th December 1986, in a 
wide-ranging debate in the House of Commons 
on the future of NATO, Mr. Spicer expressed 
concern about the United States' future com-
mitment to NATO. The amendments tabled by 
Senators Mansfield and Nunn aimed at with-
drawing American troops over a period of five 
years. Mr. McNamara had been concerned at the 
fact that Europeans were behind the Americans 
in advanced technology. NATO's strength 
depended to a large extent on the industrial 
strength of the European nations and it had 
therefore asked for the creation of a sound indus-
trial basis in Europe so that the latter would be 
an ally rather than a customer of the United 
States. 
76. Mr. Freeman, Under-Secretary of State for 
the Armed Forces, said inter alia that the Amer-
icans would question the security of their con-
ventional forces in Europe if they had to 
withdraw their nuclear weapons from Europe. 
The withdrawal of their nuclear forces would be 
detrimental to NATO's main doctrine, that of 
flexible response. Conventional forces could not 
replace nuclear forces. If the Americans had to 
withdraw their nuclear forces from Europe, the 
entire NATO strategy would collapse. 
77. On 13th January 1987, during a debate in 
the House of Commons on the British army, the 
validity of NATO strategy in Europe and in par-
ticular the consequences of the Soviet Union's 
conventional superiority were widely debated. 
Mr. Hamilton, Under-Secretary of State for 
Defence Procurement, recalled the frustration 
felt by many Americans over what they con-
sidered to be a lack of commitment by Europe to 
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its own defence. If the United Kingdom refused 
to share the cost of European defence, it might 
strengthen the position of Americans who advo-
cated the withdrawal of American troops from 
Europe. 
78. On 23rd January 1987, the government 
said, in answer to a question by Mr. Dubs, that it 
intended to raise the troop levels of the British 
Army of the Rhine to 56 000 by the end of the 
decade and to improve its equipment. 
79. On 19th February 1987, answering a 
question put by Mr. Soames on the government's 
achievements since 1983, the Prime Minister 
said Britain had promoted closer European 
defence co-operation, notably through a revived 
Western European Union. On the government's 
objectives, she said it would continue to con-
tribute to peace with freedom and justice in 
Europe by maintaining effective defences in 
co-operation with its NATO allies. 
80. On 4th March 1987, six members of the 
United Kingdom Delegation to the Assembly, 
i.e. Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir 
Anthony Grant, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir John 
Osborn and Mr. Hill, tabled an early day motion 
in the House of Commons on the United 
Kingdom's response to the Soviet arms offer, in 
which they drew attention inter alia to: 
" ... alarming disparities between Warsaw 
Pact and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation forces on the central front, 
apart from the specific menace of SS-20s, 
namely military manpower of 55 divisions 
against 24, 22 000 tanks to 9 000, tactical 
aircraft 4 000 to 2 400, artillery 7 000 to 
5 000 and an overwhelming Soviet superi-
ority in chemical warfare weaponry, and 
most ominously shorter-range nuclear 
weapons in a ratio of at least seven to one 
in favour of the Warsaw Pact, many of 
which can, from their present sites, destroy 
Western Europe, including a substantial 
part ofthe United Kingdom, while none of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's 
short-range missiles can destroy any target 
within the Soviet Union ... " 
81. In a speech to the Royal Institute for Inter-
national Affairs in Brussels on 16th March 1987, 
Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, advocated closer 
consultations between Europeans on defence 
matters. He said: 
" That is what we have been attempting, 
increasingly, to do within WEU. We have 
tried to make it into a forum where foreign 
and defence ministers can talk through the 
problems of European defence, as a 
prelude to bringing a clearer and dis-
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tinctive European contribution into the 
deliberations of the alliance as a whole. 
A better European defence effort, 
galvanised perhaps through WEU, can 
lead to a more substantial European pillar 
of the alliance. It can help the United 
States to justify to sceptics the mainte-
nance of its own contribution to European 
defence." 
Ill. The impact of the work of the WEU 
Assembly on debates in member countries 
82. Under Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Assembly, the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations selects from the 
texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its 
opinion, should be debated in national parlia-
ments. It was obviously aware of the situation 
following Reykjavik when, at its meeting on 3rd 
December 1986, it gave first choice to political 
texts, and principally Recommendation 438 on 
the political activities of the Council and Recom-
mendation 441 on developments in the Soviet 
Union and East-West relations. Moreover, 
events in the Mediterranean area last year led it 
also to select Recommendation 439 on European 
security and the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, 
your Rapporteur has no information as to 
whether this last recommendation was quoted in 
debates in the countries the most concerned. 
83. Moreover, many parliamentarians made 
use of ideas contained in other recommendations 
in taking initiatives and intervening in their par-
liaments. Action taken on Recommendation 441 
was considered in the previous chapter. The 
other main subjects are examined below. They 
concern the evolution of WEU, more particu-
larly following the Reykjavik summit meeting. 
(i) New impetus to the reJU:tivation of WEU 
(Recommendations 432 and 438) 
84. In the activities of national delegations, 
the French Delegation took a welcome initiative. 
On 18th December 1986, Mr. Valleix, Chairman 
of the delegation, submitted a special infor-
mation report to the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the National Assembly on the activities of 
WEU in 1985-86. This document is a very good 
source of information for non-member parlia-
mentarians and concludes on an optimistic note, 
as follows: 
" During the period under review, the 
reactivation of WEU obviously stopped 
being a topic of discussion and became a 
fact. The parliamentary Assembly played a 
driving role in its implementation in cir-
cumstances which were not always easy. 
Today, the achievements are undeniable. 
First of all, the reactivation of WEU has 
entered people's minds. It is now accepted 
that WEU is both the European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance and the only ade-
quate institutional framework for dis-
cussing security matters. 
The Assembly has continued to be the 
'conscience' of WEU and was quickly able 
to tackle essential questions such as the 
European answer to the SDI or the 
aftermath of Reykjavik. 
... The prospects described by Mr. Chirac 
in his address, particularly the proposed 
charter of European security principles, 
cannot fail to provide food for thought for 
members of WEU in the years to come. 
Similarly, his endorsement of the 
enlargement of WEU to include Spain and 
Portugal should accelerate a process which 
so far has been considered to be very slow. 
There are factors here which are very 
encouraging for the work of the entire 
French parliamentary delegation. " 
85. Several individual initiatives in other 
countries deserve mention. For instance, in the 
House of Commons on 13th February 1987, Mr. 
Murphy asked the government about its policy 
towards the Council of Europe and Western 
European Union. He deplored the fact that 
public opinion knew little about Western 
European Union. In his answer, Mr. Eggar, Par-
liamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, said he con-
sidered: 
" It is important that we bring to public 
attention the work done by both those 
organisations, and, in particular, the 
importance of their roles in the process of 
European integration. By a quirk of the 
modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, which 
founded WEU, the same national repre-
sentatives are members of both parlia-
mentary assemblies, but the issues debated 
in the assembly and other institutions of 
each organisation are different, as is their 
internal structure and recent history. 
The essence ofWEU is the commitment in 
Article V of the revised Brussels Treaty 
whereby all seven signatories undertake to 
provide assistance in the event of an attack 
on any one of them. This commitment to 
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common defence is stronger and more 
binding than the commitment in the com-
parable article of the NATO treaty, a fact 
that is often overlooked. The Brussels 
Treaty also obliges the British Govern-
ment to maintain an army and an air force 
on the continent of Europe in peacetime. 
This was a unique obligation on our part -
something that we had never in our 
history previously contemplated. WEU 
thus embodies our, and our partners', fun-
damental commitment to a collective 
security. This commitment is set firmly 
within the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance. WEU is the means whereby the 
'European pillar of the alliance', to use 
President Kennedy's phrase, can be effec-
tively strengthened. 
In its activities, WEU does not therefore 
seek to duplicate work done in NATO, but 
rather to reinforce it by ensuring that the 
European input is co-ordinated and 
coherent. It is the only European forum in 
which both foreign and defence ministers 
can meet for joint consultations on 
security. Their discussions are prepared by 
regular exchanges at official level. The fact 
that discussion of security questions 
among all twelve members of the 
European Community within the frame-
work of European political co-operation is 
limited in scope reinforces the importance 
ofWEU. Its membershi~ consists of coun-
tries which take their defence obligations 
seriously. It includes the two European 
nuclear powers and all five of the INF-
basing countries - that is to say, the coun-
tries on whose territory the United States 
systems introduced into Europe under the 
terms of the 1979 dual-track decision are 
deployed. 
The WEU Council of foreign and defence 
ministers has met at approximately six-
monthly intervals since reactivation, 
exchanging views on a wide range of sub-
stantive security issues. British ministers 
have played a leading role in those discus-
sions. The most recent meeting at Luxem-
bourg last November was particularly sig-
nificant in providing the opportunity to 
consider the implications for Europe of the 
outcome of the Reykjavik meeting in 
October. Our WEU partners later wel-
comed the Prime Minister's understanding 
with President Reagan, reached at Camp 
David just a day after the Luxembourg 
WEU meeting, as being in the interests of 
Europe as a whole. 
The government attach considerable 
importance to the role of parliamentarians 
in WEU. The Council's recognition of the 
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Assembly's work was amply demonstrated 
in Paris in December last year when the 
French Prime Minister and five other min-
isters from different WEU countries, 
including my noble Friend the Minister 
for Defence Procurement, addressed the 
Assembly at its part-session. I know that 
this record turn-out did not please 
everyone. Some regard it as a burden 
which interfered unduly with the 
Assembly's debates, and governments 
must clearly take account of these con-
cerns in planning their future represen-
tation. At the same time, however, the sig-
nificance for WEU of this ministerial 
interest should not be forgotten. If the 
organisation is to take its place in Europe, 
and if the Assembly is to play its part, 
there will inevitably be a renewed impetus 
to the dialogue between governments and 
the Assembly. That so many ministers 
wished to speak at the session last 
December is testimony to those develop-
ments. 
My noble Friend the Minister of State, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who 
has addressed the WEU Assembly in Paris 
on many occasions, has frequently made 
clear in her speeches the significant public 
role which the government see for the 
WEU Assembly. It is the only European 
body specifically empowered by treaty to 
debate security and defence questions, and 
has unique possibilities to generate better 
public understanding of the issues 
involved. The dissemination of the 
Assembly's reports can be of assistance in 
this area and it is important that, through 
dialogue with the Assembly, governments' 
views can become more widely known and 
form an essential element of the 
debate." 
86. In Luxembourg on 26th November 1986, 
Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
answering a question put by Mr. Hengel on 
Recommendation 432, announced certain con-
crete steps to be taken by his government and 
gave the following details: 
" In drawing up a memorandum on reacti-
vation prepared on the basis of texts sub-
mitted by other delegations and at 
meetings between the various members, 
Luxembourg stressed certain points which 
should help the reactivation of the 
organisation. " 
87. On the other hand, the Italian Govern-
ment's answer to a question put by Mr. 
Masciadri on 21st January 1987 on several 
points in Recommendation 438 on the political 
activities of the Council is not yet known. 
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(ii) Informing public opinion 
(Recommendations 432 and 438) 
88. Several representatives ·stressed this 
important matter, including Mr. Close, who 
asked the Belgian Government on 5th 
November 1986 whether it did not consider it 
essential to conduct a vast campaign to inform 
public opinion and to make it aware of the 
necessary conditions for guaranteeing Europe's 
security and averting the risks of a third world 
war. 
89. In regard to the public relations activities 
of the Council and of the Secretariat-General, 
Mr. Antretter tried to obtain information on 
several occasions. His last question on the 
subject was put in the Bundestag on 22nd 
December 1986: 
" Is the Federal Government aware that, 
contrary to its answer of 6th June 1986 to 
my Question 83, the new public relations 
unit created in the Secretariat-General of 
WEU in London has not yet started work 
since the corresponding post has still not 
been filled? 
What steps does the Federal Government 
intend to take to ensure that this public 
relations unit, created on its initiative, is 
staffed without delay so that it may start 
work?" 
90. In its answer, the government recognised 
that: 
" The new public relations unit of the 
Secretariat-General of WEU in London 
was created on 1st January 1986. 
However, the corresponding post of Head 
of the Press Service has not yet been filled. 
An official from another section of the 
Secretariat-General is at present carrying 
out the work. The Secretary-General has 
given an assurance that he will ensure that 
this post is filled as soon as possible and in 
the prescribed manner. 
The Federal Government has asked its 
representative to the WEU Permanent 
Council to ensure that this post is filled 
without delay. " 
91. In regard to member governments' activ-
ities in this field, on 26th November 1986 Mr. 
Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
answered a question put by Mr. Hengel as 
follows: 
" Inter alia, governments keep the public 
informed by the dialogue with the 
Assembly which plays a particularly 
important role in this connection. The 
press is kept regularly informed of the 
activities of WEU. For instance, a press 
conference was organised at the close of 
the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 
14th November." 
92. This answer obviously does not settle the 
basic problem. The Assembly has already said 
many times that it could not be responsible for 
the governments' information work. It is 
essential for parliamentarians to insist that their 
governments do not confine their action to press 
conferences. 
93. On the other hand, it is gratifying that the 
United Kingdom Government on 20th February 
confirmed, in answer to a question put by Mr. 
Terlezki on whether it would make it its policy to 
make a regular report to parliament on the activ-
ities of Western European Union, that the next 
report would be made after the spring meeting in 
Luxembourg. In his speech to the House of 
Commons on 13th February, Mr. Eggar also 
said: 
" It is important that we bring to public 
attention the work done by both those 
organisations (Council of Europe and 
WEU)." 
94. One may wonder why, in spite of all these 
assertions of good intentions, most governments 
do so little to pursue a true information policy. It 
is interesting to note the figures given by the 
United Kingdom Government on 14th January 
1987 in answer to a question put on the amount 
spent by the NATO information service in 1986 
and 1976 and on the British contribution: 
Total budget 
United Kingdom 
contribution 
1986 
BF 143 million 
(£2.42 million) 
BF 26.9 million 
(£456 000 
or 18.82%) 
1976 
BF 65 million 
(£823 000) 
BF 12.6 million 
(£160 000 
or 19.95%) 
This table shows that the amount has more than 
doubled in ten years. 
95. What about the figures for WEU? First of 
all, it must be borne in mind that there is no 
comparable information service in WEU. 
96. In regard to another aspect of public rela-
tions, new and interesting initiatives have been 
taken. Answering Mr. Antretter, who had asked 
in the Bundestag: 
" Can the Federal Government give details 
of the initiative taken by Mr. Cahen, Sec-
retary-General of WEU, for organising 
European seminars on defence matters 
under the auspices of WEU? Should sem-
inars of this kind also be held in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and, if so, 
how? 
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Mr. Schafer, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, said on 20th March 1987: 
"Particularly since it was reactivated in 
1984, Western European Union has been 
considering organising conferences and 
setting up research bodies to deal with 
security and defence matters. This comes 
within the context of the reform of the 
WEU organs, now under way, with a view 
to adapting them to the tasks resulting 
from reactivation. In October 1984, when 
he was Chairman of the WEU Council of 
Ministers, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
already proposed the · creation of a 
European institute to conduct research 
into security policy. 
The Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. 
Cahen, is also in favour of these ideas 
being followed up. He recently suggested 
to the French Government, on behalf of 
WEU, that participants from all WEU 
countries be allowed to attend European 
seminars on defence matters, to be 
organised in France. For the coming years, 
he also considered other seminars should 
be organised in the WEU member coun-
tries in turn, if necessary under the aegis of 
WEU." 
97. In this context, it should also be noted that 
the European Institute of Public Administration 
in Maastricht has invited members of the WEU 
Assembly to take part in a round table on " West 
European security in a changing world" that it is 
organising on 11th May 1987 in co-operation 
with the Secretary-General of WEU. 
(iii) Institutional reforms and enlargement 
(Recommendations 432 and 438) 
98. Several members stressed the question of 
the enlargement of the organisation and put 
questions to their governments. Answering Mr. 
Beysen, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for 
External Relations, said on 4th December 1986 
that " the problem of enlargement, and hence of 
the admission of new members, is a delicate 
problem that is now being studied ". 
99. Members of the French Government 
made the most positive remarks in this respect, 
including Mr. Bosson, Minister Delegate to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for 
European affairs, after a speech by Mr. Caro (see 
paragraph 40 above) on 20th November 1986 
and Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
speaking about Spain on 18th December 1986 
(see paragraph 45 above). 
100. The Italian Government's answer to a 
question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommend-
ation 438 on 21st January 1987 is not yet known. 
Mr. Masciadri asked inter alia for the govern-
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ment's position on whether a positive answer 
should be given to Portugal's application for 
membership. 
101. Conversely, the United Kingdom Govern-
ment was generally speaking more reserved when 
Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
described its position in the House of Commons 
on 13th February 1987: 
" Ministers have agreed that the WEU 
institutional changes resulting from reacti-
vation should run unhindered until the 
end of this year. They will then undertake 
a review of the performance of the new 
arrangements, which will help to signpost 
the way ahead. Our aim is to get WEU 
established as the focal point of the 
European defence identity and to ensure 
that its working methods are soundly 
based for this purpose. Once the review is 
complete, we shall be able to turn our full 
attention to the question of the possible 
future enlargement of the organisation. In 
doing so, we shall have to reflect carefully 
on the serious treaty obligations to which 
potential new members must commit 
themselves and to ask whether these could 
be undertaken. But that is for the future -
we must first be certain that WEU is 
heading in the right direction and is sure of 
its future role. Until then, it would be pre-
mature to examine the important question 
of enlargement in detail. " 
In his speech to the Royal Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs in Brussels on 16th March 1987, 
Sir Geoffrey Ho we, Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, said: 
"The advantages of broadening WEU's 
membership need to be balanced against 
the importance of maintaining its sense of 
cohesion and purpose. The present mem-
bership is homogeneous. We, you, your 
Benelux neighbours, France, Germany and 
Italy all see broadly eye to eye on both the 
nuclear and the conventional aspects of 
defence. The test of membership must be 
readiness to accept and implement in full 
the commitments of the treaty and to 
make - all of us - the practical military 
dispositions to give effect to this. " 
102. In regard to the pursuit of institutional 
reforms, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for 
External Relations, said on 4th December 1986 
in answer to a question put by Mr. Beysen: 
" At present, we are studying its internal 
organisation and how the existing agencies 
can be given more activities. We propose 
that there should also be contacts at the 
level of political directors, as is the case in 
the European Community and between 
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NATO ambassadors. Similarly, we 
propose that regular contacts also be held 
at the level of military and diplomatic 
experts and that correspondents be 
appointed as is the case in the European 
Community. In this way, new life could 
effectively be given to WEU." 
103. Answering a question put by Mr. Hardy in 
the House of Commons, Mr. Eggar said on 22nd 
January 1987 that other institutional reforms 
would be implemented at the beginning of the 
year. On 26th November 1986, Mr. Poos, 
Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, said: 
" The political directors are to meet four 
times a year and whenever circumstances 
require. 
Ministers of defence will have to play a 
more active part in work so as to make the 
discussion of European security problems 
more detailed and factual. 
The role of the Secretariat-General should 
be enhanced. 
Both NATO and the Twelve must be kept 
regularly informed of the activities of the 
Seven. 
A system of communications on the lines 
of Coreu should facilitate exchanges of 
views between capitals and the secre-
tariat. " 
104. In regard to the role of ministers of 
defence in WEU, in the House ofCommons on 
25th February 1987 Mr. Terlezki asked the 
Secretary of State for Defence what was his 
policy on the role to be played by defence min-
isters within Western European Union and if he 
would make a statement. Mr. Stanley, Minister 
of State for the Armed Forces, answered: 
"Western European Union provides a 
forum for foreign and defence ministers of 
the seven member states to meet jointly to 
discuss issues related to European security. 
Defence and foreign ministers play full 
and complementary parts in these discus-
sions. " 
On 24th February 1987, Mr. Stanley said that 
because of other commitments the Secretary of 
State for Defence regretted that he was unable to 
attend the next ministerial meeting of WEU 
scheduled for 27th and 28th April in Luxem-
bourg and had asked Mr. Stanley to represent 
him. 
105. Several members put questions on the 
composition of the WEU Permanent Council. 
Answering a question put by Mr. Terlezki on this 
subject, the United Kingdom Government spec-
ified on 20th February 1987 that it had no plans 
to change the composition of the Permanent 
Council. Conversely, it was reported in the 
Luxembourg press on 5th March 1987 that: 
" Answering a question put by Mr. Linster, 
who had asked whether the Permanent 
Council consisting of ambassadors from 
the seven member countries to the Court 
of St. James was an appropriate 
framework for reactivating WEU, Mr. 
Poos said this matter was crucial in the 
context of the current reactivation 
process. 
The Luxembourg Minister for Foreign 
Affairs added that the problem was the 
ability of these ambassadors in a reacti-
vated WEU to give the necessary impetus 
or take the necessary political initiatives 
insofar as they did not have the adequate 
infrastructure in terms of staff. 
While reserving for the Permanent 
Council a central role in co-ordinating all 
the work of the organisation, the Luxem-
bourg presidency had just proposed a 
closer association of political directors 
with the activities of WEU. 
These political directors had now met 
twice along with the ambassadors, Mr. 
Poos underlined, and he pointed out that 
they had just, for the first time moreover, 
held a separate meeting on the occasion of 
a twelve-power political committee 
meeting. This real innovation would be 
followed up, he said. 
The minister ended his written answer to 
Mt. Linster by announcing that a further 
joint meeting in the form of an enlarged 
Permanent Council would be held at the 
beginning of April to prepare for the min-
isterial meeting of the Council. " 
106. On 23rd February 1987, Mr. De Bondt 
and Mr. Noerens put a number of questions in 
the Belgian Senate on the basis of Recommen-
dation 438. These questions related inter alia to 
the role of the Permanent Council and of the 
ministers of defence: 
"The Assembly ofWEU has asked several 
times whether the Permanent Council of 
WEU as now composed of the ambas-
sadors in London is best suited for giving 
WEU the political impetus it needs and 
applying in full the decisions set out in the 
Rome declaration. 
Does the government share the view that 
the composition of the Permanent Council 
does not allow it to take the necessary 
political initiatives and does the govern-
ment intend to propose that it be 
reorganised in the framework of the 
impending re-examination of WEU's new 
structures? 
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In his address to the Assembly of WEU on 
3rd December 1986, the Minister of 
Defence of Luxembourg stressed inter alia 
the importance of assigning a greater role 
to the defence ministers within WEU. 
What is the position of the government in 
this context and in which areas has it 
taken special initiatives in order to 
strengthen the role of defence ministers 
within the Council? " 
107. In his answer on 17th March, Mr. 
Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, 
emphasised the following points: 
" 1. The Council has been imple-
menting the Rome declaration for more 
than two years. The ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg in November 1986 con-
firmed member states' firm intention to 
carry through the reactivation process. 
2. The reactivation of WEU includes a 
strengthening of its working structures. 
The Permanent Council ensures 
co-ordination of the organisation's activ-
ities and settles its specific statutory and 
technical matters. 
The political directors of member states, 
who meet more frequently in WEU, give 
political impetus to the process of consul-
tation. 
In close co-operation with representatives 
of the ministries of defence, they play an 
active part in the preparation of minis-
terial meetings and the application of deci-
sions taken there. 
A special working group of senior officials 
from ministries for foreign affairs and 
ministries of defence is responsible for 
studying all matters relating to European 
security interests. 
3. The ministers of defence, who meet 
twice a year in the Council with their 
foreign affairs colleagues, play an active 
part in the co-operation which is being 
developed in the framework of WEU. 
4. According to the Rome declaration, 
the ministers decided to hold in-depth dis-
cussions and to seek to harmonise their 
views on the specific conditions of 
European security, including the devel-
opment of European armaments co-oper-
ation to which WEU can give political 
impetus." 
(iv) Joint production of armaments 
(Recommendations 437, 438 and 440) 
108. On 27th February 1987, Mr. Terlezki 
asked in the House of Commons what tasks were 
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assigned to the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the IEPG. Mr. Hamilton, Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Defence Pro-
curement, answered: 
" Following the revitalisation of both 
Western European Union and the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group 
towards the end of 1984, the Standing 
Armaments Committee has helped to 
provide political impetus towards increased 
European armaments co-operation, 
assisting the IEPG in translating this into 
practical achievement; it also advises the 
WEU Council on these matters. The IEPG 
is directly responsible for the harmo-
nisation of operational requirements and 
research goals, and for promoting the 
establishment of collaborative projects to 
meet these needs. 
The effectiveness of these arrangements 
will be reviewed from time to time. " 
109. The same subject was raised in a question 
put by Mr. De Bondt and Mr. Noerens in 
Belgium on 23rd February: 
"Can the government describe in detail 
which tasks are assigned to the Standing 
Armaments Committee (SAC) on the one 
hand and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group (IEPG) on the other in the 
light of each group's specific character-
istics?" 
The answer was as follows: 
" The WEU Council follows with the 
greatest attention the progress of work in 
the Independent European Programme 
Group (IEPG), which includes eleven 
European countries members of the 
Atlantic Alliance and is responsible for 
strengthening armaments co-operation. 
. 
Inter alia, this co-operation is intended: 
- to allow more effective use of financial 
resources earmarked for the production 
and procurement of armaments; 
- to increase standardisation; 
- to ensure the maintenance in Europe of 
an industrial and technological base in 
defence matters; 
- to ensure that Europe carries weight in 
its relations with the United States and 
Canada. 
The aim of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee (SAC) is to develop, in close liaison 
with NATO, consultations and co-operation 
in armaments 'with a view to finding joint 
solutions which would assist governments 
of member countries in meeting their 
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equipment requirements. To that end it 
shall encourage, on a case by case basis, 
agreements or arrangements on such sub-
jects as the development, standardisation, 
production and procurement of arma-
ments ... concluded between all the coun-
tries of Western European Union or 
between some of them. They would 
remain open to participation by other 
countries of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation'. 
The Council studies what it considers to 
be the most appropriate ways of enhancing 
WEU's contribution to co-operation. " 
110. Two members, Mr. Terlezki and Mr. 
Antretter, tackled a specific standardisation 
problem, i.e. the British-German-Italian 
armoured howitzer programme. Mr. Hamilton, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Defence Procurement, answering Mr. Terlezki 
on 25th February, said he saw no reason to raise 
the matter in WEU. On 13th January, he had 
already summed up the matter in the House of 
Commons: 
" In 1973 the Governments of Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom signed a 
memorandum of understanding to 
develop and produce collaboratively 155 mm 
self-propelled howitzers to meet their 
requirements as then foreseen. That fol-
lowed the successful introduction into 
service of the collaborative FH-70 towed 
howitzer. 
The programme has encountered many 
problems in development and the house is 
well aware of them. That has resulted in 
slippages in the original timescale. At the 
same time, there have been changes to 
long-term operational requirements. To 
take account of the new operating charac-
teristics of self-propelled artillery to be 
able to operate effectively against threat in 
the next century would need further 
extensive development and design modifi-
cations of the existing development proto-
types. That would inevitably lead to 
further slippage of the programme. 
In view of those uncertainties, the defence 
ministers of the three partners have met to 
discuss the way ahead of this important 
collaborative programme. It was acknowl-
edged that because of the various diffi-
culties encountered in the project to date it 
was no longer possible to develop and 
produce a collaborative howitzer in time 
to meet the earlier requirements of the 
nations. Accordingly, it was agreed that to 
meet their most pressing requirements 
nations should seek their own solutions on 
a national basis as judged necessary. 
However, mm1sters reiterated their 
support for the objective of achieving, if 
possible, a collaborative solution to meet 
their long-term requirements in this area. 
Therefore, they instructed their national 
armament directors to continue to explore 
the possibilities of continued collaboration 
for a longer-term procurement, taking into 
account the decisions that were taken 
meanwhile on national purchases so that 
ministers could decide on the best way 
forward in due course. " 
111. On 16th February, he added: 
" A request for quotations has been issued 
to three United Kingdom and one United 
States firms to seek a replacement for the 
105 mm Abbot gun. National armament 
directors will continue to explore the pos-
sibilities of continued collaboration for 
requirements in the longer term. " 
112. Answering a question put by Mr. Antretter 
on the same subject in the Bundestag on 13th 
March 1987, Mr. Wiirzbach, Parliamentary 
Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence, 
said: 
"Joint development of the howitzer 70 by 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Italy has had no 
result which meets tactical requirements. 
By joint agreement, the partners have con-
sequently terminated the form of 
co-operation hitherto practised. In this 
respect, the press reports to which you 
referred are accurate. 
However, all the participating countries 
have already said they were maintaining 
their requirements for a new howitzer and 
intended to harmonise their plans for the 
future model. 
Work has started in this sense. 
During the year, a definition is to be made 
of tactical requirements, taking full 
account of future conditions of use and 
bearing in mind experience acquired 
during previous development work. 
Independently of this, provisional national 
solutions are now being studied in order to 
cover the most urgent immediate require-
ments. 
There are no plans for giving impetus to 
the project in WEU since that organisation 
is not responsible for this type of task. " 
The last paragraph of this answer is remarkable 
and might be the subject of further questions 
relating to WED's arms production duties. 
113. On 21st January 1987, Mr. Masciadri put 
a question to the Italian Government on 
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European helicopters for the 1990s (Recommend-
ation 440). No answer has yet been received. 
(v) Scientific, technological and aer11space questions 
(Rccommendattons 436 and 437) 
114. On 31st July 1986, Mr. Masciadri put 
questions on Recommendations 436 and 437. 
On 30th December 1986 and 20th January 1987, 
the Italian Minister of Defence gave identical 
answers to the two questions: 
" WEU Assembly recommendations are 
addressed to the WEU Council of Min-
isters rather than to member countries. 
The Minister of Defence is consequently 
unable to give a detailed answer to this 
question. " 
It is to be hoped that this kind of answer will be 
the exception. It would indeed be a pity to revert 
to the situation which prevailed in the mid-
seventies when the governments seemed to have 
agreed to limit their answers to questions put in 
national parliaments on Assembly recommenda-
tions. At that time, the Assembly had already 
underlined that there was no real justification for 
a government refusing to answer a question on 
the pretext that the matter was being dealt with 
by the WEU Council (Document 768 of 3rd 
April 1978). The committee should therefore be 
informed if there is any increase in such prac-
tices. 
(vi) Financial questions 
(Rccununcndatwns 433 and 438) 
115. Several members emphasised these ques-
tions, which are crucial for the Assembly's work. 
On 7th February 1987, Mr. Cattanei, Italian 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, answered a 
question put by Mr. Masciadri on 31st July 1986 
on Recommendation 433 as follows: 
" Recommendations of the parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU are addressed to the 
Council of the organisation which is con-
sequently responsible for taking decisions 
on following up Recommendation 433 on 
the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
WEU for the financial years 1985 (revised) 
and 1986. 
The government for its part recalls that 
under Italian chairmanship-in-office of the 
organisation the aim was to remove what 
proved to be the most difficult obstacle to 
agreement between the Council and the 
Assembly, i.e. the 1986 budget. 
The government took vigorous action to 
have the Assembly's requests for 1986 
accepted as far as possible, while applying 
strictly the principle of zero growth, thus 
taking into consideration not only the 
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inflation rate expected in France but also 
compensation for reductions in earlier 
years and the transfer to the Assembly of 
savings resulting from the abolition of 
certain posts in the Paris establishment. 
These measures allowed an increase of 
about 8.6% in the Assembly's budget. 
Although the increase in the budget on 
which a consensus was reached did not 
fully respond to the Assembly's expecta-
tions, the government underlined the 
political value of this decision, which was 
an exception to the principle of zero 
growth, and was also made in order to take 
account of the drop in purchasing power 
recorded in recent years. 
On several occasions, members of the 
WEU Assembly expressed their gratitude 
at the action carried out under Italian 
chairmanship for improving the Assembly's 
participation in the work of the 
organisation and, by this compromise 
step, overcoming budgetary differences. 
On the Italian side, this policy will have to 
be pursued coherently in view of the value 
of the parliamentary organ which is a 
feature of the structure of WEU. It should 
be noted that the Luxembourg chair-
manship, which has distinguished itself by 
its great availability, will pursue the action 
started under Italian chairmanship. 
In spite of progress accomplished during 
the year, the Assembly continues to 
deplore the policy ofbudgetary restrictions 
practised by member states. But it is not 
realistic to think it possible to go beyond 
the strict application of the principle of 
zero growth, a principle which is strin-
gently applied by the large majority of 
member countries, in parallel with similar 
practice on which national budget man-
agement is based. Moreover, the minis-
terial organs too abide strictly by this prin-
ciple and if the Secretariat-General 
appears to have enjoyed a larger increase 
in 1986 it is merely because a symmetrical 
reduction was applied to sums made 
available to the Paris agencies, whose staff 
has been reduced. 
As for the more technical questions raised 
by the honourable member, I feel it appro-
priate to refer to the answer given by 
member countries to Recommendation 
433 of the Assembly. " 
116. In a speech in the House of Commons on 
13th February 1987 answering a speech by Mr. 
Murphy, Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, said on financial matters: 
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" The government attach significance to 
the provision to both the Assembly and 
other WEU bodies of adequate resources 
to carry out their work. It has not been 
easy to establish the appropriate level of 
financing in view of the great changes 
which WEU has undergone in the past two 
years and in which my hon. Friend has 
been involved, but the organisation has 
experienced real budgetary growth in both 
1985 and 1986 and is likely also to do so 
for 1987. When set against the govern-
ment's policy of restricting the budgets of 
international organisations to zero real 
growth, this indicates that WEU has in 
recent years benefited beyond the norm, 
partly as a tribute from governments to 
WEU during its reactivation. British min-
isters have supported the need to ensure 
adequate financing of WEU and will con-
tinue to do so. " 
117. On 24th February 1987, Mr. Eggar 
answered a question put by Mr. Terlezki, saying 
that together with its partners on the WEU 
Council the government sought to provide the 
Assembly with adequate resources to conduct its 
work. The Council had authorised real budgetary 
growth for the Assembly against forecast 
inflation in each of the last three years. 
118. Financial matters were also raised in 
Belgium in the question on Recommendation 
438 put by Mr. De Bondt and Mr. Noerens on 
23rd February 1987: 
" Is the government aware that the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, the European Parliament and the 
North Atlantic Assembly have been able 
to use telexes for working purposes for a 
long time but the Assembly of WEU, the 
only international parliamentary assembly 
with responsibilities in defence and 
security matters, is still without such faci-
lities although they are essential for the 
effective pursuit of its duties? 
Is the government prepared to take strong 
action in the Council of WEU for the 
WEU Assembly to be granted the neces-
sary credits for a telex? " 
On 17th March 1987, the Belgian Government 
answered as follows: 
" The Council is aware of the fact that the 
Assembly must have adequate material 
means for pursuing its work. 
It also has to take account of budgetary 
constraints in the seven member countries 
which made adoption of the principle of 
zero growth necessary. 
In the light of the decisions it has to take at 
the end of the present transitional period, 
the Council will endeavour to examine 
within the framework of the existing WEU 
budget how it might better meet the 
Assembly's future requirements. " 
IV. Conclusions 
119. It emerges from all the interventions 
studied in the parliaments of the seven WEU 
member countries that the trend of East-West 
relations and, in particular, the prospects of dis-
armament offered by the Reykjavik meeting 
seem to have considerably increased the number 
of those urging that Western Europe unite its 
security policy interests in order to make its 
voice heard more clearly in the Atlantic concert 
and in negotiations between the world powers. 
But it is still more significant that the conviction 
that WEU is the appropriate framework for 
attaining this aim has become widespread in 
most member governments. 
120. For many years, it had to be noted that too 
often debates in national parliaments on defence 
and security matters and on the activities of 
WEU were held without any link or cohesion. 
Today, a major aspect of European security has 
been linked directly with the reactivation of 
WEU. Without forgetting the firm undertaking 
entered into by many parliamentarians in this 
sense, it is above all the governments that have 
expressed a determination rarely seen before. 
121. The diversity of proposals and ideas put 
forward by parliamentarians since Reykjavik for 
enhancing European unity in security matters is 
encouraging but also shows that many Europeans 
are still far from having a joint concept in this 
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connection. The work ofthe WEU Assembly, the 
national delegations and their individual 
members and also of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations to spread and 
make better known the concepts recommended 
by the WEU Assembly is therefore crucial. 
122. It is highly gratifying to note the initiative 
taken by the Chairman of the French Delegation 
to the Assembly of submitting an information 
report on the activities of the WEU Assembly to 
the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee on 18th December 1986 which contains 
political conclusions that are encouraging for the 
future work of WEU and its Assembly. It is rec-
ommended that other delegations which regu-
larly prepare information reports after Assembly 
sessions enhance them with political conclusions 
to make them more interesting for other 
members of their parliaments. 
123. It is encouraging to see that many repre-
sentatives, including several members of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions, were very active during the period covered 
by the present report and put questions and 
spoke in plenary sitting or committee on various 
aspects of WEU's work, as shown in Chapter Ill. 
This was perhaps also an indirect effect of the 
post-Reykjavik situation. Many parliamen-
tarians used recommendations selected by the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions and, with one exception that your 
Rapporteur trusts will remain ,an isolated case, 
the governments made an effort to give useful 
answers. However, on governments' activities to 
keep the public informed, the answers to many 
questions are still not satisfactory. A future com-
mittee report should perhaps study means of 
keeping the public informed and their appli-
cation in member countries. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European space policy until 2000 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware that a resolute space policy helps the development of pioneering technology by fostering 
progress in advanced industrial sectors and intellectual, cultural and human resources in Western 
Europe; 
(ii) Convinced that such a space policy can, in the long run, provide solutions to problems of energy 
and raw material supplies, the pollution of the biosphere and also famine, poverty and illiteracy in the 
third world, while fostering day-to-day progress and a better standard of living for the populations of our 
own countries; 
(iii) Determined that Western Europe, through ESA, should be fully independent in space matters 
before the end of the twentieth century; 
(iv) Considering that to enhance scientific capability and make optimum use of relatively limited 
intellectual and financial resources every possibility of European co-operation in both civil and military 
space research must be exploited; 
(v) Anxious to back up the already considerable results achieved by ESA's Ariane programme and 
confirmed by Arianespace in the commercial market; 
(vi) Stressing the urgency of establishing space co-operation for the security of the Western European 
countries, particularly in activities recognised to be stabilising, such as monitoring and communica-
tions, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Support the aim of the European Space Agency (ESA) to make Europe independent in space 
before the end of the century by ensuring that it has all the means necessary, which may mean doubling 
the present budget in the next decade; 
2. Encourage the establishment of liaison between ESA and the authorities responsible for space 
policy in each country of the agency to ensure that all European bodies handling space research are kept 
mutually informed of current or planned civil and military programmes in order to avoid any pointless 
waste of intellectual and financial resources and better prepare for the difficult choices which will inevi-
tably have to be made in the future; 
3. Facilitate as far as possible operations by the European Ariane launcher to ensure that it has at 
least a half share of the market for commercial launches, inter alia by: 
- concluding without delay an agreement with the United States Government defining principles 
according to which the cost of commercial launches should take account of 1he costs borne by 
governments, particularly those relating to launching sites; 
- making arrangements to avoid having western satellites placed in orbit by Soviet launchers pro-
posed on the world market if such offers continue to be made without reciprocity and at a cost 
which does not respect commercial principles; 
4. Endeavour to conclude as early as possible an intergovernmental agreement with the United 
States on the space station in order to bring it into being more quickly while consolidating western 
co-operation, this being an opportunity for Europe, with its partners, to take part in technological 
progress linked with this programme and to advance towards independence; 
5. With the assistance of the WEU agencies for security questions, examine the repercussions of 
establishing a European military programme for communications, navigation, observation and recon-
naissance satellites; 
6. Systematically strengthen European space co-operation which has already made Europe the third 
space power in the world and encourage the space dialogue with the United States each time it may lead 
to balanced solutions for the future. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The committee held a colloquy on the 
space challenge for Europe as recently as Sep-
tember 1985, followed by a report by Mr. Lenzer 
in November 1985. Since then so many develop-
ments have taken place that a report on 
European space policy inevitably has to re-
examine the whole situation. There is ever-
increasing competitiveness in the market for 
space activities. Recognising that earlier pro-
grammes including, for instance, the Giotto 
mission have been very successful, Europe 
cannot afford to rest on its laurels. There are 
many reasons for increasing European space 
efforts if Europe is to keep pace with develop-
ments elsewhere. 
2. It should however also be noted that space 
is part of the common heritage of mankind from 
the very roots of civilisation. This means that in 
the framework of space programmes due 
attention should be paid to the preservation of 
this heritage. 
3. No one can appropriate it for their 
exclusive use because present generations have 
the duty to hand it down to future genera-
tions. 
4. In the 1967 treaty on principles governing 
the activities of states in the exploration and use 
of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, notions like the interest of 
mankind and common heritage of mankind have 
been introduced, following the use of these 
notions in maritime law. Nevertheless at that 
time it was already too late to prevent the mil-
itary use of space, which even now can be con-
sidered as enhancing security. Nor has it been 
possible to prohibit formally the development or 
deployment of anti-satellite weapons or even to 
agree on an international treaty on earth obser-
vation and satellite television. 
5. It should be recognised that any human 
activity, however unimportant it may be, affects 
the environment. Increasing progress in science 
and technology has even produced a situation 
where mankind, through sheer numbers, is 
becoming a threat to its very existence. If, under 
these circumstances, space programmes might 
well contribute to answering a number of funda-
mental questions that humanity is now facing, 
there is reason enough to support them strongly. 
All the more so if the positive impact of human 
activities in space far outweighs the negative 
effects. 
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II. Reasons for civilian space efforts 
6. For many years now, considerable sums 
have been spent on space programmes and, in 
the years to come, these will not diminish. Are 
these programmes a pure luxury, providing 
decent employment for many and an unheard of 
intellectual pastime for others, a modem version 
of the Roman panem et circenses? Or are they an 
absolute necessity, providing the last straw for 
the preservation of the human species? It is not 
easy to answer these questions. But it will cer-
tainly be impossible to stop the eternal human 
search for more knowledge and new discov-
eries. 
7. Nevertheless the development of activities 
in space is of such importance that it should 
force those responsible for funding the budgets to 
consider the achievements and long-term objec-
tives of these activities. They should realise that 
without any exaggeration the decisions to be 
taken may be a turning point in the history of 
mankind. 
8. They should also bear in mind that in the 
foreseeable future space programmes, because of 
the amount of money involved and their unusual 
time-span, will assume a strategic aspect which 
will make government funding indispensable. 
9. The basic questions involved seem to be 
obscured by questions of a less philosophical and 
more down-to-earth character such as the 
imminent shift of emphasis from international to 
national programmes, increasing competition on 
the commercial launch market or tipping the 
balance from civil to military programmes. 
10. Through advances in space technology 
during the last few decades, mankind has dis-
covered completely new phenomena. Our under-
standing of the evolution of the universe has 
been radically modified, which also has a deep 
impact on philosophy yet to be fully under-
stood. 
11. Space science plays an important role in 
the development of science. Its impact today 
extends well beyond the frontiers of astronomy 
and the solar system into the domains of funda-
mental physics and earth sciences. The impor-
tance of space programmes for the intellectual 
progress of mankind cannot be overestimated. 
12. But the public has always been most 
deeply impressed by the spectacular achieve-
ments in what may rightly be called the space 
race. Sputnik I, the first manned space flight, the 
first walk in space, the first man on the moon, all 
inspired awe. Such may rightly be called tangible 
symbols of technological excellence and national 
power, and they are of utmost importance for 
generating financial support for particular pro-
grammes. For some time they were and will con-
tinue to be necessary for maintaining the interest 
of the general public, which will help to make 
political decisions in favour of other expensive 
space programmes more acceptable. If only for 
that reason, manned space flights will continue 
to be a central activity in any of the more 
extensive national or international programmes. 
For modern nations, manned space programmes 
have become what cathedrals were for mediaeval 
cities. 
13. Recent technological innovations and 
experience in space now seem to have demon-
strated more or less sufficiently that the basic 
tools have been created to extend human 
influence and technical achievements into space. 
A most generally-accepted fundamental reason 
for doing so is that in the long run activities in 
space might help mankind to escape the limita-
tions of existing technology within the biosphere, 
where it is disturbing the chemical and thermo-
dynamic balance through the use of resources. 
Expansion into the solar system could offer solu-
tions for energy procurement, raw materials and 
biospheric pollution attributable to the existing 
technical system. It should be noted that an 
acceptable solution of the abovementioned 
problems may help mankind to survive provided 
other problems such as the control of demo-
graphy and ideological controversies are solved. 
14. If we accept the need to extend our tech-
nical infrastructure into space, the next 
important question is how this will have to be 
achieved. Much attention has already been paid 
to the technical feasibility of different missions 
to be accomplished by future space systems, such 
as supplying the earth with energy through solar 
power and the digging and processing of lunar 
material. 
15. Programmatical feasibility is without any 
doubt a far more difficult problem. Here, the 
question is when, on the basis of present space 
technology, space systems will take the place of 
systems on earth which at the moment give 
access to energy and raw materials. The size and 
weight of stations to be placed for this purpose in 
space or on celestial bodies will be far greater 
than anything now known. Transportation capa-
bilities between earth and space and the amount 
of human labour required for the installation and 
maintenance of these stations will be of incom-
parable scale. 
16. For transporting man and materials it is 
quite clear that gravity is a limiting factor which 
must not be neglected. Only the absolute 
minimum necessary should be launched into 
space. Stations of real importance to meet the 
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abovementioned goals should be built mainly 
with materials that are at hand and can be pro-
cessed in space. It is difficult to assess the degree 
of automation that can be achieved in the distant 
future, but in the near future there is no doubt 
that human labour and permanent human occu-
pation will be indispensable for building, oper-
ating and maintaining space stations. At the 
moment, we are still a long way from the mass 
transportation of people from earth into space. 
To put one man into low earth orbit costs F 150 
million, while a return ticket to the moon can be 
estimated at around F 4.5 billion. To put human 
beings on the moon or Mars for more than a very 
short stay would cost at least F 10 billion per 
person. This situation might change considerably 
for low-orbit flights when, by the beginning of 
the next century, alternative launchers with air-
breathing engines for the first phase of flight 
might come into service. 
Ill. Distinction between civilian 
and military programmes 
17. In its reports on the military use of space 
(Documents 976 and 993) and on WEU and the 
strategic defence initiative - guidelines drawn 
from the colloquy on the space challenge for 
Europe (Document 1 036) the committee paid 
close attention to military programmes. Since 
then, the overall situation has not changed to the 
advantage of civilian programmes. 
18. Recent accurate figures on military 
spending are not easily available and, if so, they 
do not always give a reliable picture of the real 
outlay, which is estimated to be higher, but 
recent more or less reliable figures are revealing. 
In 1983, the latest year for which reliable data 
were available, the world space budget amounted 
to $35 billion, which could be divided as 
follows: 
United States 
Soviet Union 
Europe 
Japan 
India 
military programmes 
civilian programmes 
military programmes 
civilian programmes 
ESA 
national programmes 
$ billion 
8.5 
6.5 
13.5 
4.5 
0.75 
0.32 
0.45 
0.09 
19. This means that at least $22 billion or 
more than 62% of the total budget was spent on 
military programmes, a share which has 
increased considerably since then. 
20. There can be no doubt that the greatest 
part by far of the Soviet space budget is spent on 
military space activities. Pentagon officials have 
recently said that 80% of the Soviet space pro-
gramme is associated with military purposes. 
Recently United States space command officers 
indicated that the Soviet Union is maintaining a 
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growth rate of 15% in annual space expenditure 
and that it has doubled its expenditure for space 
programmes compared to 1980. 
21. A report of the United States general 
accounting office, released in March 1987, said 
that for the fiscal year 1987 the United States 
military space expenditures amounted to $1 7 
billion, while the NASA space budget, excluding 
the Challenger replacement funding, only 
amounted to $8 billion. In 1981 the figures were 
$4.8 billion for military space and $5 billion for 
NASA. Annual increases for the defence space 
budget were between 19 and 36%, while NASA 
had only annual increases between 4 and 14%. 
22. In the framework of this report the 
question is how far military programmes can 
influence civilian programmes. Will civilian 
space programmes be boosted by the results of 
military or slowed down for political, psycho-
logical or economic reasons? Should there not at 
least be an exchange of basic information on 
research and development projects so that 
redundancy in this area could be prevented? 
23. In the past, programmes of a military 
nature have certainly had a positive impact on 
civilian uses of space. Military technological 
research and development especially has led to 
improvement of civil technology where the 
market has not been ready to pay for inde-
pendent research and development. 
24. Nowadays, many of the key military appli-
cations have similar civilian applications; meteo-
rology and communications lean to a consid-
erable extent on satellites. Earth observation 
satellites help to find natural resources, manage 
the environment and combat disasters; the roles 
of geodetic satellites include mapping and 
mineral exploration. The economic importance 
of satellite technology for the socio-economic 
development in the third world too is consid-
erable, and this contributes to international sta-
bility and thus greater security. 
25. On the other hand, it cannot be denied 
that the outcome of certain civilian projects may 
be profitable for the military side, as for instance 
in the case in microgravity experiments. 
26. Finally, there is also the possibility of joint 
military and civilian research and development. 
To mention only one example, since March 1986 
a joint NASA defencejSDI team has been con-
ducting an extensive study of the type of space-
craft refuelling and servicing that will be possible 
both from manned vehicles, such as the shuttle, 
and unmanned robot spacecraft. Satellite refur-
bishment capabilities will be essential for the 
operational deployment of large, long-term SDI 
spacecraft and could save costs on smaller mil-
itary and civilian spacecraft, such as reconnais-
sance and communications satellites for which 
orbital refuelling could provide significant opera-
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tional benefits. NASA is contributing 20% of the 
funding, while the Department of Defence and 
the SDI organisation each contribute 40%. 
27. As matters now stand, military space pro-
grammes and the military use of space should 
not be banned. Military satellites can provide 
exact and objective knowledge of the mutual 
threat balance and so help to limit the growth 
rate of arsenals. By improving command, control 
and communications, they contribute to making 
military forces more reliable and effective. In 
this way, they have a stabilising effect, promote 
peace and improve security. 
28. Far more human, material and financial 
effort is put into military research, development 
and applications of space technology than in 
civilian areas, even if there can be no doubt 
about the latter's socio-economic usefulness. It is 
also known that scarce specialised manpower 
and financial means needed for research and 
development for scientific purposes and socio-
economic applications are diverted to military 
programmes and, contradictory as it may seem, 
for want of room there is a limit on the use of 
orbital space. At the moment, there is no formal 
or official way for ESA to be kept up to date with 
the progress of military space programmes in 
Europe. 
29. In view of this, it would seem useful to 
establish, at European level, an official link 
between ESA and national space policy author-
ities to keep each other informed of all current or 
planned programmes, military as well as civilian, 
in order to co-ordinate national and multilateral 
programmes and to prevent waste of human and 
financial resources. 
IV. Developments outside Europe 
30. It is essential to give a brief outline of 
main developments expected outside Europe in 
the next twenty years. The United States and 
Soviet Union are working towards fairly large 
space stations. They tend to lay greater emphasis 
on their military programmes, but also seem to 
have understood the importance of the com-
mercial market in space. In the Far East, Japan 
and China are working vigorously on their 
national space programmes. It is interesting to 
mention India's activities in this area. It is one of 
very few countries to have a dedicated long-term 
space policy with significant continuity. Its aim 
is to use this advanced technology to control 
hunger, poverty and illiteracy. Attention should 
be paid to the budgets available for space pro-
grammes in these countries compared to 
European expenditure on space programmes. 
China 
31. Although until two years ago China was 
considered by western countries as an important 
potential market for the space industry and 
hardly possible as a competitor, this situation 
has now completely changed. It is third in the list 
of space spending nations and already offering a 
range of commercial space services such as 
launch vehicles, satellite communications and 
ground stations. 
32. In 1956, China started a development pro-
gramme for military rockets to deliver its nuclear 
weapons which was given highest priority after 
Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the early 
1960s. This launch infrastructure enabled China 
to put its first satellite in orbit in April 1970 with 
a Long March 1 booster. Since then it has 
launched nineteen successful spacecraft. In 
recent years such rapid progress has been made 
in the development and manufacturing of 
modern missiles that China is now able to offer 
the world a satellite launching service. 
33. It is estimated that China is spending F 20 
billion a year on space research and devel-
opment. The first Chinese astronaut could be 
launched in the next few years and a small 
reusable space shuttle is expected to fly by the 
mid-1990s. The Chinese are offering to accom-
modate two to four astronauts and a two tonne 
payload in their Long March 2 for low-altitude 
payloads and Long March 3 for small 
geosynchronous payloads. 
34. Inter alia, the Chinese have launched and 
are operating a number of earth-imaging satel-
lites and communications satellites. New satellite 
programmes include a 700 kg polar orbit weather 
spacecraft to be launched in 1987, a 
geosynchronous orbit weather spacecraft and a 
remote-sensing satellite with specifications 
similar to the first generation French Spot satel-
lites which will be launched between 1988 and 
1990. 
35. Advanced new computer systems, some 
built by China and others imported from the 
United States and Europe, coupled with the 
growing number of Chinese co-operative 
arrangements with the United States and Europe 
in the field of space and aircraft technology will 
accelerate Chinese space programme develop-
ments. On the other hand, this progress will be 
slowed down by the lack of Chinese expertise in 
managing and integrating large aerospace pro-
grammes. 
36. Communications, weather, earth resources 
and military observation satellites are now tech-
nical priorities necessary for both national 
prestige and service to the population. For this 
reason, in June 1985, the Chinese joined the 
board of Intelsat, the international telecommuni-
cations satellite organisation. 
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37. The second geosynchronous communica-
tions payload was launched successfully in 1986 
and the launch of a second generation communi-
cations satellite is planned for 1987. 
India 
38. In 1972, India established the Indian 
Space Commission, an advisory body to the 
prime minister, to promote the development and 
application of space technolqgy and space 
science for the economic and social benefit of 
India. This body formulates space policy and 
proposes the budget for the country's space activ-
ities. 
39. The Indian Department of Space, also 
created in 1972, is the executive agency for car-
rying out the space programme itself. Its oper-
ating agencies are the Indian Space Research 
Organisation (ISRO) and the Indian National 
Satellite Space Segment Project Office. 
40. For the first fifteen years of the space 
department's activities, the total appropriation 
was less than $1 billion, but funding has now 
been increased to some $200 million per year. 
41. From the beginning, India has been deter-
mined to develop a satellite programme tailored 
for the special needs of the country. In this 
framework India designed and built the Insat 1 
series, a concept of a multi-puipose satellite to fit 
the needs of a developing nation which covers a 
large geographical expanse and lacks ground-
based television facilities in many remote areas. 
This basic concept could be widely used in devel-
oping countries. The first of this series, Insat lA, 
was launched in 1983. In sat 1 C was scheduled 
for launch on a shuttle flight in September 1986 
but meanwhile India has booked the Insat 1 C on 
Ariane for launch in early 1988. 
42. To design the lnsat 1 series, India used its 
experience with the earlier advanced technology 
satellite (A TS), which provided television to 
rural communities and Bhaskara 1 and 2, 
remote-sensing satellites which provided much 
useful information about surface and forestry 
conditions, floods and other important sources 
for the development of the country. 
43. The Insat 2, now being designed as an 
updated version, will have about one and a half 
times the capacity of the Insat 1 series and is 
scheduled for initial launch in the early 1990s. 
44. The system for predicting meteorological 
conditions developed for lnsat is among the 
most efficient in the world, particularly for pro-
viding early warning of tornadoes. 
45. For the use of remote-sensing data, India 
has set up a unique system with a specialised 
central institute, a decentralised distribution 
network and regional centres for user instruction 
and data processing. 
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46. The Indian Space Research Organisation 
Satellite Centre (ISAC) is currently producing the 
second of the four planned, stretched Rohini 
series (SRS) 150 kg (330 lb) satellites with a 
variety of pay loads, the first of which was lost in 
a launch failure in March 1987, and the Indian 
resources satellite (IRS) 950 kg (2 090 lb), while 
it is anticipating designing and manufacturing 
the Insat 2. IRS is to be launched in mid-1987 by 
a Soviet space booster and will be used to 
provide earth resources data. Fuel will be suffi-
cient to stabilise the satellite for about three 
years. SRS is to perform gamma ray experiments 
and several other scientific experiments. 
47. India has also set up a national pro-
gramme for launch vehicles, which resulted in a 
first successful launch of an SLY (satellite launch 
vehicle) in 1980. Its improved version, the 
ASLV, capable of placing 150 kg in low orbit, 
malfunctioned during its first launch in March 
1987. The GSLV, to enter into service in 1992, 
will have a geostationary capability. 
Japan 
48. Japan started its space activities relatively 
late. The National Space Development Agency 
(NASDA) was established in 1969. The other 
but, in terms of budget, much less important 
organisation in these matters is the Institute of 
Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS). 
49. In the first phase of its space activities, 
Japan co-operated very closely with the United 
States. This led to the development of the N -1, 
N-2 and H-1 launch vehicles on the basis of the 
Delta design and to the building of satellites in 
conjunction with United States companies. 
50. In 1983 a new long-term space programme 
was introduced, marking the beginning of the 
second phase, which seeks to make Japan an 
autonomous space nation. In this framework, the 
1986 space budget in Japan was 131 billion yen. 
This programme includes the development of 
the H-2launch vehicle, capable oflifting 4 400 lb 
( 1 980 kg) into geostationary orbit. The first 
launch is scheduled for 1992. 
51. On 18th February 1987, NASDA success-
fully launched its first remote-sensing spacecraft, 
entirely Japanese built, the Marine observation 
satellite MOS-1 on an N-2 launch vehicle. The 
engineering test satellite, ETS-5 (set for launch in 
mid-1987) with a three-axis stabilised 
geosynchronous orbit for navigation, search and 
rescue and aircraft communications relay is also 
scheduled for launch in 1987. They are both 
meant to be forerunners of operational satellites 
which could be serious competitors for Europe 
and the United States in space applications as 
from about 1995. 
52. On 5th February 1987, the Astro-C sat-
ellite was launched. It was designed and built 
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together with British scientists in order to study 
X-ray sources in the universe. 
53. Japan is planning to launch a spacecraft 
for a lunar mission in 1990 which will make it 
possible to practise swing-by techniques that 
could be used for future flights to the moon and 
planets. 
54. Japan has responded positively to the 
United States offer to take part in the space 
station programme and has said it will spend 
some 300 billion yen for its part of the pro-
gramme. 
Soviet Union 
55. It is very difficult to say what kind of 
long-term goals the Soviets have in mind, 
because they surround them with the greatest 
possible secrecy. Notwithstanding this difficulty, 
their achievements so far are known and it is 
more or less possible to assess their aims. 
56. As regards civil and military applications 
such as meteorology, telecommunications, navi-
gation, reconnaissance and remote sensing, the 
Soviets have developed the technical means, but 
on a modest level with relatively heavy satellites 
of limited reliability. 
57. Because the Soviets use low-performance 
satellites with a short life-cycle, they have to 
multiply their launches to ensure the required 
services. This explains their enormous activity 
with about a hundred launches each year and 
600 ton payloads put into orbit (three to four 
times as much as the United States). In 1986 the 
Soviets launched 91 boosters to place 114 satel-
lites in orbit, while the United States launched 
six, Europe two and Japan two. 
58. The Russians owe a great deal of their suc-
cessful achievements in space during recent years 
to their caution and tenacity. Well-tried designs 
for their space vehicles and launchers have a 
very long lifespan. Soyuz, the main launch 
vehicle now in service, was also used for Sputnik 
I and, later, for the flight manned by Yuri 
Gagarin. The cosmonaut transport vehicle, oper-
ating until last year, was designed in 1962. 
59. Vostok, Gagarin's space vehicle, was the 
first of a whole family of reusable spacecraft 
which at the moment is still in use for reconnais-
sance, biological research, remote-sensing and 
microgravity experiments. Important advantages 
of this policy are long production runs and cost-
saving for many items. The fact that, for 
instance, in the Venus study programme only the 
eighteenth attempt succeeded illustrates Russian 
tenacity. 
60. It should be acknowledged that space tech-
nology in the Soviet Union is progressing 
rapidly, as was clearly indicated by the success of 
the V ega mission in 1986 to study the Halley 
comet. 
61. After launching their first Salyut station in 
1971, the Russians have increased their activities 
to prepare for a permanent space station. With 
their last station in the Salyut series, the Salyut 7 
launched in 1982, they had problems, most of 
which they were apparently able to solve. They 
have used it as a manned space station, per-
formed a transfer between Salyut 7 and Mir, a 
new space station, and subsequently moved it 
into a higher orbit, for use as a laboratory for 
several more years. 
62. In February 1986, the Russians launched 
their Mir space station which is far superior to 
the Salyut stations. Mir is provided with much 
more technical equipment and more powerful 
solar cells. Attached to the main station, which 
can accommodate five or six cosmonauts, is a 
docking compartment with four docking parts 
for modules which will be equipped for scientific 
or technical experiments. After a first inspection 
by the cosmonauts Kisim and Soloviev in 
summer 1986 however, the station was left 
unmanned until this year. On 5th February 1987, 
cosmonauts Romanenko and Laveikin were 
launched on board a new type of space vehicle, 
the Soyuz TM-2 and docked with the space 
station Mir, following the entirely new guidance 
system Kurs. It is expected that they will stay in 
the station for at least ten months. Before the end 
of this decade, four modules are to be added to 
Mir to make it similar in size and importance to 
the space station being planned by the United 
States for the mid-1990s. 
63. A first growth module, the 12.1 ton K vant 
laboratory, which carries X-ray experiments 
from agencies in West Germany, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom and ESA was 
launched on 31st March 1987 and docked with 
the Mir station on 11th April 1987. It is not yet 
certain how long the Kvant module will remain 
operational, but the preliminary observation 
programme is based on a one-year lifetime, 
which could be extended to two years or more. 
64. The Soviets also developed a shuttle 
arbiter provided with jet engines for more 
flexible landing capability than the United States 
arbiters. According to United States officials, a 
first launch might be conducted in 1988. This 
Soviet shuttle, to be launched by the new SL-W 
heavy-lift booster, is expected to be able to place 
up to 66 000 lb of cargo in orbit - about the same 
as the United States shuttle. The flexibility of the 
Soviet design allows the substitution of a cargo 
pool in place of the manned arbiter to launch 
much heavier unmanned cargo, altogether able 
to place a 220 000 lb payload in orbit, as much as 
the Saturn V moon rocket capability abandoned 
by the United States in 1973. At the United 
States space command it has even been said that 
the Soviet Union is evaluating a three-stage 
version of the heavy-lift launcher, capable of 
placing 330 000 lb in orbit. Using this and the 
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shuttle's capability, the Soviet Union would be 
able to build a heavy space station in the mid-
1990s for one hundred cosmonauts. The launch 
of Soviet military cosmonauts into geostationary 
orbit could take place within fifteen years. These 
may be mere allegations, but it is true that the 
Soviet Union is determined to use space inten-
sively for both active and passive military pur-
poses. 
65. The Soviets developed an interplanetary 
spacecraft for a mission to Mars and its moon 
Phobos in 1988. This spacecraft can be adapted 
for future missions to planets, asteroids and 
comets. 
United States 
66. The United States Government is in the 
process of readjusting its space policy for the 
next decades. 
67. At the moment, the United States has 
started to increase the NASA budget significantly 
in order to give new impetus to its civil space 
programmes. Figures quoted here are the agreed 
budgets for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 and the 
budget requested by NASA for fiscal year 1988. 
The budget for 1987 includes an extraordinary 
appropriation of $2.1 billion to provide full 
funding for manufacturing a new space shuttle to 
replace Challenger. Figures are given in millions 
of United States dollars. 
1986 
7 764 
1987 
10 508 
(mcluding 2 100 
for a new shuttle) 
1988 
9 481 
68. In 1987, NASA will present a new long-
range strategic plan, Space 1995, with directions 
for the United States national space programme 
for the years beyond 1994 to be discussed and 
adopted by the government later. The director of 
this planning effort is Sally Ride, a former 
astronaut. 
69. In the meantime, President Reagan reaf-
firmed in August 1986 the plan to build and 
operate a space station, which has been opened 
for international co-operation and for which the 
main contractors should be chosen in 1987. This 
space station and ESA's co-operation programme 
in the framework of Columbus will be men-
tioned in Chapter VIII of this report. 
70. An indication of what the new national 
programme Space 1995 will contain may be 
obtained from published reports by two of the 
more than a dozen organisations that will con-
tribute to their drafting. 
71. In mid-1986, the National Commission on 
Space presented to the White House a phased 
development programme, covering the period 
from 1995 to 2020 with total expenditures 
amounting to $700 billion. Expenditure is based 
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on a growth rate of the gross national product of 
about 2.4% annually and a proportionally and 
steadily growing NASA budget, but in the 
meantime the commission is assuming that there 
will be continuing international and commercial 
contributions to the programme. In its report, 
the commission presupposes there will be an 
operational manned space station by 1995. 
72. Among the more striking proposals in the 
report can be mentioned the development of 
high-performance electric propulsion systems 
such as ion propulsion engines and mass-drive 
reaction engines run by propellants derived from 
raw materials mined from asteroids, the moon 
and Martian moons. Ion engines, using electric 
fields to accelerate ions, are considered to be well 
suited to missions requiring low thrust sustained 
for long periods. Mass drivers accelerating by 
magnetic fields are thought suitable for 
launching payloads of any material extremely 
efficiently. 
73. A first manned outpost on Mars is 
scheduled for 2015 in the commission's report. A 
continuing programme should be undertaken to 
develop engineering methods for separating 
materials found in space into pure elements 
suitable as raw materials for propellants and 
manufacturing. Research should also be carried 
out in constructional and manufacturing space 
materials not requiring energy-intensive 
chemical separation. 
74. The construction is proposed of closed 
ecological systems, independent of earth, using 
on-site planetary materials. 
75. The commission also stressed the need to 
develop intelligent autonomous systems. Basic 
technology spending should be tripled. It con-
siders artificial intelligence indispensable for 
cargo trips beyond the moon, roving the surface 
of Mars and operating unattended propellant 
processing plants that take raw materials from 
asteroids, Phobos or Mars. 
76. A precondition for real progress in space 
exploration is the availability of launch services 
and a drastic reduction in transportation costs 
within the inner solar system. The commission 
recommends putting a new cargo vehicle in oper-
ation by the year 2000, which will be able to 
deliver payloads into orbit at a cost of $200 per 
pound. It should be noted that launch costs of 
payloads by the space shuttle are estimated at 
$4 000 per pound, excluding research and devel-
opment costs. For a wide range of missions such 
as intercontinental passenger transport, low-cost 
orbital transport and defence missions, an air-
breathing hypersonic aerospace plane is advo-
cated which should be available soon after the 
year 2000. 
77. For the next century there are great oppor-
tunities for extra-terrestrial prospecting and 
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mining of mineral resources from asteroids, the 
moon and Mars and its moons and industrial 
development in space by way of space-based 
" self-replicating " factories to circumvent the 
cargo limitations of rockets and the high costs of 
space transport. The factories would provide the 
industrial capacity to transport, process and 
manufacture finished products derived from 
thousands of tons of material. 
78. It should be noted, however, that the 
Space Science Board of the National Academy of 
Sciences in its recently issued " Major direc-
tions " study, which provides scientific advice to 
NASA on space science planning for 1995-2015, 
directs NASA towards goals different to those 
endorsed by the National Commission on 
Space. 
79. According to this study, although it is not 
opposed to exploration as an objective, the main 
aim of the civilian space programme should be 
to advance knowledge of science and its applica-
tions for human welfare. It does not support the 
establishment of manned bases on the moon or 
Mars but advocates keeping manned space 
activity in near-earth orbit and leaving scientific 
research beyond that region to automated probes 
and observatories. 
80. Microgravity scientists should accomplish 
extensive basic science work to determine if 
orbital factories for profitable manufacturing of 
exotic but valuable materials are feasible. The 
effects of long-term weightlessness on humans 
should be studied in much greater detail before 
the United States can mount a manned Mars 
mission. 
81. The study stresses the importance of con-
tinuous observations of the entire earth, recom-
mends completing the exploration of the solar 
system and studying Mars intensively. In solar 
and space physics it recommends a programme 
to image the sun's magnetosphere, explore the 
interstellar medium and conduct high-resolution 
solar imaging. 
V. Developments in the international 
commercial launch market 
Introduction 
82. It should be noted that there are vast 
opportunities for the commercial use of space 
which until now have been largely unused. The 
best known branches of commercial use at the 
moment are communications, broadcast and 
earth observation satellites in different configu-
rations. There are however also great opportun-
ities in the field of microgravity experiments, not 
only for the metallurgical industry, but also for 
chemical, pharmaceutical and other companies, 
which so far have not generally responded very 
actively. 
83. There are good prospects for 
semi-conductors, which could be manufactured 
in exceptionally clean conditions, new materials, 
difficult to obtain under circumstances of normal 
gravity, and separation techniques in organic 
chemistry, especially the crystallisation of 
proteines, with far-reaching implications for 
pharmaceutical companies. 
84. According to some specialists, production 
in microgravity could well be the only sector 
which may justify, for civil purposes, the devel-
opment of a new generation of launchers and a 
space infrastructure. 
85. Due to the accidents with a European and 
several United States launchers, including the 
space shuttle Challenger in 1986, the whole 
market for commercial launchers was thrown 
into confusion, space operations have suffered 
set-backs and the image of routine has been 
jeopardised. Insurance rates will certainly be 
raised and could even reach 35% ofthe value of a 
launch package. 
United States 
86. The United States will not be able to start 
new shuttle launches, even at a reduced pace of 
five per year at the most, before September 1988 
or later that year. Commercial launching capabil-
ities in the United States will therefore be vir-
tually inexistent until 1989. Many people, even 
those closely connected with satellite exploi-
tation, had not seriously taken into account the 
possibility of long delays in launch schedules. 
Satellite programmes had to be postponed and 
operators realised that it might not be wise to put 
all their money on the same horse. 
87. In August 1986, President Reagan decided 
to remove the space shuttle and NASA from the 
commercial satellite launch market, intending to 
boost the United States commercial expendable 
launch vehicle (ELY) industry. After this 
decision, United States private companies 
started to develop vehicles for a market which 
some experts estimate at $10 billion by the end 
of the 1990s. 
88. Three companies, General Dynamics, 
Martin Marietta and McDonnell Douglas, espe-
cially responded to a call of the United States air 
force to develop an EL V which should in the first 
place be able to deploy the Navstar GPS (global 
positioning system) satellites, a task originally 
assigned to the space shuttle. In the meantime, 
the United States Government considered this 
an excellent opportunity to give a boost to the 
development of ELVs for the commercial 
market. 
89. In this framework, in January 1987, the air 
force selected McDonnell Douglas to build seven 
Delta II boosters to launch Navstar satellites 
with options for thirteen additional ELVs. The 
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first EL V is scheduled for launch in 1988, while 
the first oftwenty-eight Navstar satellites should 
be launched in January 1989. This ELV pro-
gramme should furthermore provide launch 
capacity for other Defence Department payloads 
and for commercial spacecraft. Ai.r force officials 
have stated publicly that the ability of the 
McDonnell Douglas Delta vehicle to attract 
commercial launches was a key factor in the 
award of this contract. In fact, it was quite clear 
to everybody concerned that the Delta II was 
selected because it was the cheapest launcher 
available for the specific needs of the air force. 
The air force purchased the Delta lis at an 
average price of $33 millions. In terms of per-
formance, the commercial version of the Delta II 
does not seem very well suited for the market, 
but thanks to its selection by the air force it may 
well be a strong competitor for medium-sized 
communications satellites. 
90. The launch capability of Delta II into 
geostationary transfer orbit will gradually 
increase from 3 190 lb for the first nine launches 
to 4 010 lb for the final version with stretched 
solid strap-on boosters. This upgraded version 
will not be available before mid-1990. Com-
mercial launch prices will be set after agreement 
is reached with the air force on the fees it will 
charge for using its launch facilities and on a 
number of other issues. One of these issues is 
whether McDonnell Douglas will be allowed to 
purchase surplus Thor engines to convert them 
into Delta engines, in which case several com-
mercial launches would be possible already in 
1989-90. At the moment commercial satellite 
owners are said to have placed four orders for 
launches with a Delta vehicle. It is important to 
note, however, that McDonnell Douglas will not 
be able to guarantee that commercial satellite 
users will not be " bumped " by military pay-
loads if a launch failure disrupts the schedule. 
91. Martin Marietta is competing on the 
market with the Titan Ill, capable of putting a 
10 000 lb ( 4 500 kg) payload into geostationary 
transfer orbit for a price between $90 and 100 
million, depending on the service provided. The 
Titan Ill will be commercially operational in 
1989. Up to now, Martin Marietta has received 
ten paying launch reservations for the years 
1989-1990 and recently was selected by the 
Intelsat consortium for two Intelsat VI launches 
in 1989. The company has ordered six payload 
fairings of the Ariane 4-type and options for 
another twelve from the Swiss company 
Contraves AG. 
92. It should be noted that the United States 
air force is a permanent customer for Titan 
vehicles. It has signed contracts for refurbish-
ments of eight Titan lis with options for five 
more vehicles through 1993. This vehicle has a 
low-level polar orbit performance capability of 
4 200 lb (1 890 kg). It has also ordered twenty-
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three Titan IV vehicles, with a low earth orbit 
performance capability of 39 000 lb (17 550 kg) 
and a geosynchronous orbit performance capa-
bility of 10 000 lb ( 4 500 kg). 
93. General Dynamics is currently modifying 
eleven Atlas ICBM vehicles into Atlas E 
vehicles, the last to be completed in February 
1988 for use by the United States air force from 
Vandenberg air force base, and has said that 
other contracts with the air force for launch 
vehicles are still under discussion. 
94. For commercial launches, General 
Dynamics is offering two versions of the Atlas 
G-Centaur, one with a 10-foot-wide standard 
payload fairing, the other with a longer 
13-foot-wide payload fairing. These vehicles 
have a geosynchronous transfer orbit per-
formance capability of 5 200 lb (2 250 kg) which 
could increase to 7 000 lb (3 150 kg) in the 
future. Until now however there have been no 
new government contracts for launch vehicles to 
keep the production going. 
Heavy-lift launch vehicles 
95. The United States air force, which is pre-
paring a heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLL V) pro-
curement programme has set a payload capa-
bility of 100 000 to 150 000 lbs (45 to 68 tons) 
into low earth orbit as a goal for the new HLLV, 
primarily to launch SDI payloads. It is essential 
for the HLL V launch costs to be reduced to no 
more than one-third oftoday's launch costs, with 
an ultimate goal of one-tenth. Key technologies 
to be involved are a liquid oxygen hydrocarbon 
engine, high temperature and high strength mate-
rials, automation of ground-processing, launch 
and recovery-post processing and state-of-the-art 
avionics. The air force would like to begin HLL V 
operations in about 1993. 
96. Boeing and Hughes Aircraft Company are 
preparing the development of an HLLV, Jarvis, 
which should be able to put a 77 000 lb (35 ton) 
payload into a 220 nautical mile orbit. If a first 
customer can be found, actual development 
could start in 1987 and the first Jarvis launch 
could take place in 1990. Boeing foresees a 
market of at least six and possibly ten HLLVs 
per year in this category for SDI, military, NASA 
and commercial purposes. Launch fees are esti-
mated at more than $150 million. 
97. Rockwell International has proposed an 
HLL V design with an unmanned reusable glide 
vehicle which would be capable of placing a 
maximum payload of 139 000 lb (63 tons) in a 
150 nautical mile orbit with a launch rate of 
twelve to fifteen a year from 1994-95. According 
to Rockwell, this HLL V could reduce launch 
costs by more than two-thirds compared with the 
price of the space shuttle. 
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98. NASA also wanted to be involved in the 
HLL V development and is investigating inter-
nally at the moment at which stage of the space 
station build-up or maintenance this vehicle 
could be used. 
99. Many NASA officials are advocating a 
heavy-lift launcher to meet national space trans-
portation needs during the space station era, but 
the NASA administrator announced recently 
that for launch and construction of the space 
station, no HLL Vs will be used, only the 
shuttle. 
* 
* * 
100. In the United States, commercialisation of 
EL Vs and HLL Vs is closely tied to winning 
United States Government contracts. Never-
theless, since President Reagan's decision to 
remove the shuttle from the commercial satellite 
launch business in order to boost the United 
States commercial EL V industry, less progress 
has been seen than was expected by some offi-
cials. 
101. The United States Congress will no doubt 
consider alternatives for United States 
involvement in the commercial launch industry 
if satisfactory results of the new policy fail to 
appear in the first half of 1987. 
Soviet Union 
102. The Soviet Union announced recently that 
it has four different vehicles available for com-
mercial launches: Vertical, a sounding rocket 
which can lift 650 kg to an altitude of 900 km; 
Cosmos, which can place 1.2 tons in a low earth 
orbit; Soyuz capable of placing 7 tons in a 
350 km orbit and Proton which can launch 
about 20 tons into a 200 km low earth orbit or 
2.2 tons in geostationary orbit. The cost of the 
last-mentioned launch is estimated at $40-45 
million, representing half the actual price of 
Ariane 4, for 80% of its payload. It has to be 
added that this price in no way represents the 
real costs involved for the Soviet Union which, 
due to the geographical position of the Soviet 
launch centre, Baikonur, at latitude 45.6° North, 
needs much heavier launchers for the same 
payload than is the case for the United States 
with the Kennedy space centre at latitude 28.22° 
North or Arianespace with Kourou at latitude 
5.08° North. 
103. The Soviet Union is trying very actively to 
sell its commercial services, especially the 
orbiting of satellite payloads on its Proton 
launchers, at extremely competitive prices. 
Ariane is considered by the Soviets as their main 
competitor. The Soviets have called on the 
United States to end restrictions that prevent 
most western satellites from being launched on 
Soviet vehicles. They have said that spacecraft 
booked for commercial launches can be super-
vised continuously by the customer prior to 
launch to ensure that there is no unauthorised 
technology transfer. Meanwhile the Soviets have 
also declared that they are ready to co-operate 
with all countries, which might mean that foreign 
modules will be allowed to dock with their space 
station. In a further stage, one could even 
imagine that foreign scientists and astronauts 
will be transported by the Soviet Union to their 
own modules on a commercial basis. 
104. The consequences of these developments 
will certainly have to be assessed with consid-
erable caution. The Soviet Union is offering 
capable and reliable launchers in the immediate 
future at prices below the real market value. It 
will only favour a one-way traffic and under no 
circumstances allow western launch companies 
to bid for the launch of Soviet or other eastern 
bloc satellites according to rules of fair compe-
tition, thus making use of free trade principles in 
other countries without exposing its own 
economy to these principles. In this way, the 
Soviet Union is posing a serious threat to the 
competitiveness of Europe's Ariane and other 
commercial launchers in the western world. 
Moreover, it would be impossible for any launch 
vehicle authority to launch a modern satellite 
without detailed knowledge of the technical 
properties ofthis spacecraft. With this in mind, it 
will be very hard to believe in any assurance by 
Soviet authorities that there will be no 
unauthorised technology transfer. 
Japan 
105. Japan, which is developing its H-2 launch 
vehicle, scheduled for first launch in 1992, will 
not be bidding on the international launch 
market until 1994, when the H-2 is due for its 
first commercial launch. The H-2 is expected to 
be capable of lifting 4 400 lb ( 1 980 kg) into 
geostationary transfer orbit. According to an 
agreement with fishermen's organisations, 
launches in Japan are limited to two periods of 
forty-five days each a year which means that 
even under the most favourable circumstances 
only four H-2 launches could take place each 
year, two of which are reserved for Japanese 
satellites. 
China 
106. Since last year, China has been actually 
promoting its launch vehicles on the interna-
tional market through the China Great Wall 
Industry Corporation (CGWIC). At the moment, 
only the Long March 2 and the Long March 3 
with a medium cryogenic propulsion system are 
available. The Long March 2 was first launched 
in November 1974 and has failed once in a total 
of nine launches. A more capable version of the 
Long March 2, the Long March 2/4L, is now 
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under development and will come into service in 
the year 1990. 
107. The payload capability of these different 
launch vehicles is as follows: 
LM-2 LM-3 LM-2/4L 
Low earth orbit 
(200 km) 2.5 tonnes na* 9 tonnes 
Geostationary transfer 
orbit 1.7 tonnes 1.4 tonnes na* 
Geostationary orbit na* na* 1.6 -
3 tonnes 
108. The development of a Long March 4 
booster that could place about 4 500 lb in 
geosynchronous transfer orbit with a lift-off 
thrust double that ofLM-2 and LM-3 has almost 
been finished. This vehicle will be used for 
launching Chinese satellites, probably from the 
end of 1987 or beginning of 1988. 
109. In the first months of 1987 the CGWIC 
signed its first fixed commercial launch contracts 
with the American companies Teresat Inc. for 
launch of the Westar 6 satellite and Pan 
American Pacific Satellite Corporation for 
launch ofthe Pacific Star 1, both to take place in 
1988. These companies have mentioned that 
they paid less than $30 million for a launch, at 
least 10% to 15% below current prices in Europe 
or the United States. It has also been made clear 
that launch insurance fees at the People's 
Insurance Company are below international 
rates. The CGWIC has also indicated that 
recently some thirty customers from twenty 
countries have made initial launch reservations. 
The Chinese authorities have guaranteed their 
overseas customers that Chinese customs will 
admit spacecraft hardware without inspection 
and that owners of the hardware may convey 
their own satellites to the launch site. 
110. To accommodate commercial and scien-
tific spacecraft that normally would have diffi-
culty in finding cost-effective and available 
launch slots, China is developing a multiple 
payload arrangement for the LM-2 to carry four 
spacecraft into orbit. 
111. Notwithstanding all these act1v1ties, 
western commercial launch organisations do not 
consider China to be a real competitor for the 
near future, but developments should be 
watched closely. Until now, it has not made 
more than one or two launches each year, a 
rhythm which may be increased to three or four 
launches in the next few years. The Chinese, 
however have said they will be able very soon to 
produce and launch ten to twelve vehicles a year. 
Europe 
112. Europe with Arianespace as its com-
mercial launch contractor is offering the Ariane 
* not available. 
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launcher in several versions. Until now Ariane 2 
with a capability of 5 000 kg in low earth orbit 
and 2 175 kg in geostationary transfer orbit and 
Ariane 3 which can place 5 800 kg in low earth 
orbit and twice 1 195 kg in geostationary transfer 
orbit were both available. 
113. Ariane 4, which is scheduled for first 
launch in 1987 and entry into service in 1988, 
will be able to place 8 000 kg in low earth orbit 
and 4 200 kg in geostationary transfer orbit. 
114. The Ariane 5, now under development 
and scheduled to be ready by 1995, will be 
capable of lifting two 2 500 kg pay loads simulta-
neously into geostationary transfer orbit with an 
enhanced reliability of 98% in both manned and 
unmanned vehicle launches. 
115. The Ariane programme was seriously 
delayed after the failure of the V -18 mission on 
30th May 1986, when an Ariane 3 vehicle had to 
be destroyed due to problems with the third stage 
engine ignition. 
116. In 1986, Arianespace concluded eighteen 
firm launch contracts of which ten were signed 
after the V-18 failure and five had made earlier 
reservations on the United States space shuttle. 
Altogether since its establishment in March 1980 
Arianespace has concluded fifty-nine satellite 
launch contracts with twenty-two different cus-
tomers for a total ofF 16.4 billion. It is expected 
that some eight to twelve new contracts will be 
signed in 1987. Production and launch capacity 
of Arianespace is now fully booked until 1990. 
Ariane launches at Kourou should start again in 
June 1987. For this year six launches are 
scheduled, among which is the first launch of 
Ariane 4 with a payload consisting of the 
European meteorological satellite Meteosat 3 
and the United States telecommunications sat-
ellite Panamsat. Next year, there should be eight 
launches and nine in 1989. 
11 7. Arianespace hopes to keep half of the 
western commercial launch market which it esti-
mates at around twenty satellites each year until 
the end of this century. 
Launch prices 
118. For commercial launches, Ariane has been 
the price reference until now. Arianespace 
however does not have a fixed scale, its price 
being dependent on the method of payment, 
required performances, etc. It is not unlikely that 
prices of all future launchers will be influenced 
by increasing competition on the market. 
119. Under the United States air force's direct 
cost-pricing policy, commercial users of air force 
launch facilities save substantially since 
recoupment of research and development money 
for facilities, depreciation and overheads are not 
charged for launches. Military labour, military 
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leave and retirement, military operations and 
maintenance and contractor overheads are not 
charged against launches. 
120. It is exactly this launch fare policy which 
bothers Europeans the most. They reproach the 
United States that government launch facilities 
are put at marginal costs at the disposal of 
United States companies for commercial 
launches. Shortly, a new agreement will be con-
cluded between the United States air force and 
commercial launch companies regarding the 
facility use fees, which will be essential for the 
setting of launch prices. The United States, in 
turn, have accused Europe of subsidising 
launching costs. ESA retorts that in the case of 
Arianespace, the cost of launches is propor-
tionally shared between governments and com-
mercial customers, including the cost of launch 
facilities. Already in 1985, Europe asked the 
United States to start negotiations for defining 
new rules for commercial launch competition. 
No official answer has yet been given but the 
United States is now willing to start negotia-
tions. 
A preliminary appreciation of the market 
121. Even though the overall situation on the 
commercial launch market is quite confused, 
some conclusions may be drawn. 
122. In recent years, expectations of the size of 
the commercial launch market have been greatly 
exaggerated. Many of the commercial opportun-
ities mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter are still more speculative and unlikely to 
become reality before the beginning of the next 
century. For the foreseeable future, the gov-
ernment sector will continue to be the primary 
user of space. A determined and steady gov-
ernment policy must be maintained if com-
mercial space projects of any importance are 
ever to succeed. 
123. Serious world market studies in Europe 
and the United States have demonstrated that in 
the near future the market for commercial 
launches, primarily of communications satellites, 
is rather limited. A modest backlog due to recent 
launch failures and the ensuing technical reap-
praisal of the space shuttle and Ariane, will 
brighten the market until around 1990. After 
that, the demand will stabilise on a lower level 
until the year 2000. Between now and the year 
2000 there will be an average demand of 15 to 20 
satellite launches each year in the western 
world. 
124. There is a tendency to build satellites in 
the 2 500 kg class for which only the Ariane 4 
and the Titan Ill have a capability. Most com-
panies want to make sure that there is a second 
choice oflauncher at hand when their first choice 
is not operational at a given moment. 
125. Under these circumstances it is most likely 
that Ariane 4 and Titan Ill, both with compa-
rable performance capability, will be the 
strongest competitors, with Ariane determined to 
keep its 50% share of the market and fair chances 
for Titan IV to take one-third. The commercial 
Delta 11 will certainly be competitive for smaller 
payloads, but the limited demand leaves no 
room for more than three competitors. It should 
be noted that the prospects for commercial 
launchers could deteriorate even more when 
NASA is allowed once more to offer its space 
shuttles for commercial launches. This could 
happen if NASA decided to rely more on cheaper 
HLL Vs for building and maintaining the space 
station, thus making three or four space shuttles 
partly available for other services. 
126. At European and United States Gov-
ernment level, agreement should be reached 
defining principles according to which the cost of 
commercial launches should take account of the 
costs borne by governments, particularly those 
relating to launching sites. Other nations might 
be invited to join this agreement. 
127. European governments should take all 
necessary measures to prevent unfair compe-
tition from Soviet launchers. They should care-
fully observe the Cocom list to ensure that no 
unauthorised technology transfer is possible 
during a commercial launch of a western satellite 
by a Soviet launch vehicle. 
VI. Developments within Europe 
at a national level 
128. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the United Kingdom and, soon, Italy have each 
established a national space organisation to 
co-ordinate all activities in this area at national 
and international level. Some of the smaller 
European countries have done likewise. It should 
be emphasised that all countries participating in 
ESA programmes should establish such a 
national space organisation lest valuable research 
and financial resources be lost. 
129. Attention is drawn to important national 
programmes, with equal regard to budgetary 
implications. Comparison of figures in recent 
years might lead to the conclusion that larger 
countries tend to increase their contributions to 
national programmes more rapidly than to ESA 
programmes. 
130. It should be stressed that squandering 
European space efforts in national, or even natio-
nalistic, programmes leads to waste of money 
and intellectual energy. In so doing, Europe will 
fall back in a race where its competitors do their 
best to unite forces on the widest possible 
scale. 
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France 
131. In France, the budget for the national 
space agency, the Centre National d'Etudes 
Spatiales (CNES), has been increased from 
F 4. 74 billion in 1985 to F 5.84 billion in 1986. 
The policy for CNES is to continue its lead role 
in development and expansion of the Ariane 
launcher family, play a key role in the devel-
opment of the Hermes manned mini-spaceplane, 
continue the expansion of the Spot earth 
resources satellite programme and maintain a 
dominant position in ESA. 
132. In the 1986 budget F 2.2 billion francs 
were earmarked for France's contribution to ESA 
programmes (37.99% of the CNES budget), 
making it the largest category of expenditure. 
133. The sum ofF 1.23 billion has been allo-
cated to national programmes, a 20.06% increase 
from last year. Here the development pro-
gramme for the Spot 4 and 5 improved earth 
observation satellites as a follow-on to the initial 
Spot 1, 2 and 3 spacecraft will receive the largest 
share, F 839.29 million. Spot 4 and 5 are to be 
launched in 1990 and late 1994, providing conti-
nuity for the commercial Spot programme. 
134. In the national programme funding, 
F 191.3 million is allocated to research and 
development activities. A development plan for 
1986-89 is concerned particularly with emerging 
technologies such as advanced propulsion 
systems, manned space stations and future 
in-orbit infrastructure to support activities such 
as materials production and the use of 
electronuclear generators. 
135. A significant part of the budget, F 674.16 
million, is spent on launch and operational 
utility systems, of which F 461.4 million go to 
the Kourou launch facility, where Ariane is 
launched. 
136. Another important part of the CNES 
budget, 12.69%, is allocated to bilateral 
co-operation. 
Italy 
13 7. According to a draft national space plan, 
Italy should increase national space spending by 
16% and shift the emphasis from small satellite 
programmes to large infrastructure projects such 
as Columbus and Ariane 5. 
138. A five-year plan for government spending 
on space for the years 1988-92 should increase 
current expenditure of about $395 million per 
year to $460 million per year, a large part of this 
increase being meant for Italy's share of Ariane 5 
and Columbus. 
139. At the moment the major Italian space 
programmes are ltalsat, IRIS, SAX and the 
tethered satellite. Italsat is a telecommunications 
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satellite to be launched in 1988; Italian research 
interim stage (IRIS), of which the first flight is 
expected in the late 1980s, is a vehicle for 
moving satellites weighing less than 2 000 lb 
from the space shuttle's low earth orbit to 
geostationary orbit; satellite astronomica X 
(SAX}, now under development, will study 
stellar radiation sources; the tethered satellite, an 
Italian initiative, now being jointly developed by 
Aeritalia and Martin Marietta, will be deployed 
from the space shuttle at the end of a tether up to 
100 km long to conduct atmospheric, iono-
spheric or electrodynamic experiments away 
from the environment of the shuttle. The first 
deployment of this satellite is scheduled for 
1990. All these programmes are to be continued, 
but new programmes will emphasise devel-
opment of a long-term space infrastructure. 
Italian policy-makers are convinced that 
investment in long-term programmes such as 
Columbus and Ariane 5 will provide a better 
return than spending on smaller projects with 
quick return. 
140. Spending will be equally divided between 
ESA projects (Columbus and Ariane 5) and 
national projects, such as research and telecom-
munications satellites. Gradually, however, the 
national projects will become more concerned 
with Columbus, where microgravity studies are 
considered to be of the greatest interest. 
141. The Italian Government is also intending 
to establish a national space agency, the initial 
proposal for which was submitted to the Italian 
Parliament more than a year ago. 
* 
* * 
142. The German and British national space 
programmes are being redefined at the 
moment. 
European military space programmes 
143. Although fairly recently reports by Mr. 
Wilkinson on the military use of space (Docu-
ments 976 and 993) have paid attention to 
various European initiatives in the field of mil-
itary space programmes and opportunities for 
further European involvement, it seems appro-
priate to mention some new developments and 
to recall old initiatives that are still worth consid-
ering. 
France 
144. In spring 1987, France decided to spend 
F 15 billion on a ten-year programme to develop 
the military satellite systems Helios and Syracuse 
11. 
145. The Helios project envisages three or four 
remote-sensing satellites of which the first should 
be operational in 1993. Based on the principles 
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of the civilian Spot satellites, but with enhanced 
capabilities, the Helios satellites should provide 
France with an autonomous source of detailed 
visual information. It has been announced now 
that Italy and Spain will participate in this pro-
gramme for 15% and 5% respectively. Syracuse 
11, a network of satellites of which the first is 
scheduled for launch in 1991, should in con-
nection with the future Telecom 11 network 
provide the French armed forces, including air-
borne and submarine forces, with an advanced 
and well protected communications system. This 
will be a considerable step forward, compared 
with the existing Syracuse I network which pro-
vides communications only with land forces and 
surface ships of the naval forces. 
United Kingdom 
146. The British Skynet military satellite com-
munications system was dealt with in Document 
976, but since then a third satellite has been 
ordered for the Skynet IV series in May 1985. 
According to the Defence Ministry, this Skynet 
IVC is needed " to meet increased requirements 
and to improve reliability over an extended 
period " and will be placed in a geosynchronous 
orbit on longitude 53° East above the Indian 
Ocean. 
147. In recent months there has been some 
commotion about a new intelligence-gathering 
space project called Zircon, a geosynchronous 
satellite equipped with a large dish aerial to 
provide information on all types of defence-
related radio transmissions over a large part of 
Europe and the Middle East. There were 
rumours that the total cost of this project might 
be around £500 million. According to the Min-
istry of Defence, which neither confirmed nor 
denied the programme costs mentioned here, 
this project is still in a preliminary phase. 
European co-operation in military space pro-
grammes 
148. In Recommendation 410 on the military 
use of space, adopted on 21st June 1984, several 
paragraphs were devoted to possible European 
involvement in military space programmes. In 
the reply of the Council to this recommendation, 
communicated to the Assembly on 27th 
November 1984, it was said "the Council has 
taken note with interest of the Assembly's 
recommendation and the proposals therein. 
However, it is not in a position, at this stage, to 
give precise and detailed replies. " 
149. More than two years have elapsed since 
then but the Council does not seem to have been 
at all active in this important area. Meanwhile, 
however, there have been a number of interna-
tional developments with possible far-reaching 
consequences for Europe's defence policy, for 
instance, the arms control proposals made in 
Reykjavik, a possible agreement to remove 
intermediate-range nuclear forces from European 
soil and the ever-increasing United States 
pressure on Europe to do more for its own 
defence. 
150. In this light, it seems all the more appro-
priate for the WEU member states to consider 
the establishment of a European programme for 
close military space co-operation to enhance 
their security. As has been mentioned earlier, the 
primary aims of this programme should be a 
telecommunications satellite network, a military 
observation satellite system and a navigational 
satellite system. It is widely recognised that these 
systems have a stabilising effect. They will 
provide European governments with auto-
nomous and independent means of assessing the 
international situation. Moreover, they will rein-
force Europe's identity and demonstrate its 
determination to accept responsibility for its 
own defence. 
151. As negotiations to establish this pro-
gramme will take some time whereas interna-
tional developments in security matters appear 
to be moving rapidly towards an entirely new 
situation, it would seem appropriate for the 
Council to begin to study it seriously in the very 
near future. 
VII. International co-operation 
on a multi- or bilateral level 
152. Elsewhere in this report it has been 
stressed that the vast and complicated space pro-
grammes that are being planned for the next 
century cannot be tackled without international 
co-operation to put all available efforts 
together. 
153. In this chapter some programmes of multi-
and bilateral co-operation will be mentioned, 
especially regarding ESA and individual 
European countries. These programmes demon-
strate an irreversible trend towards increasing 
scientific and technological co-operation at inter-
national level. In some or even many cases they 
may have been inspired partly by political 
reasons. On the other hand this kind of co-
operation is compulsory for programmes to 
rendezvous with Halley's comet, or the solar-
terrestrial science project mentioned hereafter 
which are of a scale and complexity which 
surpass the capabilities of one nation, certainly if 
it wishes to expand activities in more than one 
aspect of space. 
Inter-Agency Consultative Group 
154. In 1981, the Inter-Agency Consultative 
Group (IACG) was established to co-ordinate 
encounters with Halley's comet. Member 
agencies of the IACG now are NASA, Japan's 
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Institute of Space and Astronautical Science 
(ISAS), the Soviet Union's Intercosmos and 
ESA. 
155. Solar-terrestrial science has been chosen as 
the next IACG collaborative effort with twelve 
separate missions now being planned from 1989 
to 1994. The first mission in this framework 
should be Ulysses, an ESA mission to explore for 
the first time the third dimension of the solar 
system by flying high over the poles of the sun. 
However, the launch date for this spacecraft is 
far from sure after earlier delays caused by can-
cellation of a NASA solar-polar spacecraft that 
should have complemented Ulysses and by the 
cancelling of all shuttle launches after the Chal-
lenger accident. Another mission of the greatest 
importance for the solar-terrestrial programme 
will be Cluster, a co-operative ESA/NASA 
project where four spacecraft will be launched in 
1994 to explore the boundary regions of the 
earth's magnetosphere. The Soviet Union's 
Intercosmos has offered to supply two Soviet 
spacecraft to the Cluster programme to increase 
data-gathering capabilities. 
United States-Europe-Canada-Japan 
(i) Earth observation system 
156. Space officials from NASA, ESA, Canada 
and Japan have started negotiations on a 
co-operative programme to design a series of 
spacecraft, the earth observation system (EOS). 
This programme envisages three or possibly four 
spacecraft equipped with advanced sensor 
systems in a polar orbit which should monitor 
damage to the earth caused by natural forces and 
human enterprise and at the same time perform 
more traditional meteorological and scientific 
functions. 
(ii) International space station 
157. Since 1984, NASA, ESA, Canada and 
Japan have been partners in the development 
programme for a manned space station which 
should be operational around 1995. In this 
report, Chapter VIII is devoted to this 
co-operative programme, while the ESA contri-
bution will be discussed in Chapter IX on 
European space programmes. 
Soviet Union-Europe 
(i) Mars-Phobos project 
158. The Soviet Union is preparing a compli-
cated mission to Mars and its moon Phobos. In 
July 1988, two spacecraft will be launched which, 
after entering orbit around Mars, will be directed 
for a close and slow fly-by of Phobos during 
which small landers will be released. The main 
spacecraft will continue operating in Martian 
orbit to conduct further observations of the 
moon, Mars and the sun. 
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159. A number of European countries and ESA 
have agreed to participate in this programme, 
contributing a wide range of high techno.logical 
scientific instruments to execute expenments 
covering a wide range from remote laser mass-
spectrometric analysis of soil to a long-term 
automated lander. 
(ii) Kvant astrophysics module 
160. As has been mentioned in paragraph 63 of 
this report, West Germany, the Netherlands,, 
Great-Britain and ESA have contributed several 
X-ray experiments to the K vant astrophysi~s 
module which was docked to the Soviet Mir 
space station on 11th April 1987. European sci-
entists have said that this co-operative pro-
gramme will allow them to obtain a l~rg~ re!urn 
quickly at a relatively low cost. The mdicatwns 
are that the next ESA X-ray satellite will not be 
in orbit until the 1990s. 
161. The Soviet Union will have access to all 
basic information from the European experi-
ments but it has only generally agreed to share 
data f;om its experiments with European scien-
tists, without guarantee of access to its basic 
data. The Soviet Union has failed to respond to 
western requests for detailed mission plans. 
Soviet Union-France 
162. French-Soviet bilateral co-operation in 
space has already been practised for the last 
twenty years. Several interesting programmes are 
now in progress, among which should be ~en­
tioned Alissa, a mission which for the first .ttme 
will make use of a lidar, a laser radar, that wtll be 
placed on the Mir space station in 1991-92 to 
study the global distribution and variation ?f 
aerosols in the troposphere and stratosphere m 
order to determine their influence on the 
climate. 
163. Another Soviet/French mission is Vesta, 
scheduled for 1992-94 and designed for the 
exploration of Mars and t<;> provide data ~n at 
least five different astermdsjcomets dunng a 
five-year flight. ESA has been asked by Fra~ce's 
CNES to participate technically and financially 
in the construction of two small spacecraft 
intended for this miSSion which should 
encounter at least two comets and six 
asteroids. 
164. In October 1988, a French astronaut will 
be launched on board a Soyuz TM-2 together 
with two Soviet colleagues to spend a month in 
the Mir space station. The programme on board 
Mir will include technological and biomedical 
experiments, while it has also an important role 
to play in the preparations for Hermes, the 
European mini-spaceplane. 
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Soviet Union-United Kingdom 
165. In March 1987, the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union signed a space science 
co-operation agreement, which among other 
things aims at integrating British scientists into 
Soviet science teams in preparation for the 1988 
mission to Mars and its moon Phobos. A 
co-operative X-ray astronomy spacecraft m~ssi~n 
is under consideration, as well as co-operatwn m 
ultra-violet astronomy, life sciences and space 
processing in zero-gravity. 
Soviet Union-United States 
166. In November 1986, following the 
agreement in Reykjavik between President 
Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to ini-
tiate full-scale co-operative civil space pro-
gramme negotiations, United States and Soviet 
negotiators agreed on a ne~ space pact b.et~een 
both countries which was signed by the mmisters 
for foreign affairs of both countries in April 
1987. 
167. Agreement was reached on sixteen project 
areas, including significant Mars missi<;m 
co-operation for joint selection of potential 
landing sites for future landings as well _as 
co-ordination of missions such as the Soviet 
Mars-Phobos and the United States Mars 
observer flights. Both countries will co-operate in 
the selection of lunar landing sites and in pro-
grammes regarding life sciences, astrono~y, 
astrophysics, earth sciences and solar-terrestnal 
research. 
168. The new agreement will renew 
co-operation, originally established in the 1972 
agreement which the United States allowed to 
lapse in 1982 as a sign of its disappro:val of t~e 
use of Soviet troops to support martial law m 
Poland. 
VIII. International co-operation 
in the United States space station 
169. In January 1984, President Reagan 
directed NASA to begin development of a 
permanently-manned space station. In its initial 
phase, the station should provide work space, 
docking ports and living quarters for a crew of 
six to eight. The space station should be used for: 
- commercial and government scientific 
research and technology development; 
- commercial manufacturing of critical 
materials and pharmaceuticals not 
available on earth; 
- assembly, service and repair of satellites 
and other large structures in space; 
- research focused on extending the time 
man can stay in space as a first step 
towards an even more ambitious 
manned space programme. 
170. At the same time, the President invited 
friends and allies of the United States to partic-
ipate in the space station programme. This invi-
tation has been accepted by Canada, ESA and 
Japan. ESA has proposed the Columbus pro-
gramme, including a pressurised module and two 
platforms. Japan also proposed a pressurised 
module, while Canada is contributing the mobile 
service centre. 
171. Recently, the United States space station 
programme has been under severe criticism after 
revelations of new cost estimates, according to 
which, in 1984 dollars, the programme will cost 
$14.5 billion (or $21 billion in 1987 dollars) 
instead of the originally planned $8 billion. 
172. In January 1987, the Congressional budget 
office even proposed cancelling the programme 
because of a lack of compelling arguments in 
favour of the programme. It said that the station 
does not adequately support the traditional 
United States space policy objectives, will fulfil 
no significant Defence Department purpose and 
is far behind the Soviet Union's station time-
schedule. The office furthermore has expressed 
its doubts about NASA's ability to conclude 
agreements with its three abovementioned 
partners on the division of facilities and oper-
ating costs in such a way as to serve United 
States interests adequately. As an alternative to 
cancellation, the Congressional budget office has 
proposed a reduced programme, intermittently 
using manned and unmanned facilities. 
173. According to an agreement on a two-phase 
programme, reached in March 1987 with the 
United States administration, NASA is allowed 
to proceed with a phase-one scaled-back space 
station at a cost of $12.2 billion in 1984 dollars. 
This agreement provides only temporary 
approval to allow station contracting, final 
approval by the President having been post-
poned until the autumn ofthis year. The admin-
istration will review station costs again before 
hardware contracts are awarded this autumn. 
174. A phase-one space station is meant to 
comprise the four pressurised modules of the 
United States, Japan and ESA. 
175. According to the latest station plan, the 
first element should be launched in mid-1994, 
while permanently manned capability should be 
achieved in the beginning of 1996. 
176. A new series of meetings with European 
partners was scheduled for the second week of 
May 1987. 
177. The four partners in the space station pro-
gramme are meanwhile continuing their negotia-
tions on an intergovernmental agreement con-
cerning the control and use of space station 
facilities. The most recent meeting of delegations 
from the United States, Canada, ESA and Japan 
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was held in Washington on 12th February 1987, 
where all partners reaffirmed tb.eir intention to 
co-operate, but also remained far from 
agreement in several key areas. 
178. At this last meeting, a new draft intergov-
ernmental agreement approved by the United 
States Department of Defence and other agencies 
was discussed with the other partners. While in 
earlier discussions the United States Delegation 
had expressed the view that all station elements 
must be open to all partners, the new draft 
agreement granted this right to only the United 
States and Canada. ESA and Japan would be 
allocated 50% use of their own respective 
hardware contributions and no use of United 
States or Canadian hardware unless special 
arrangements were made. 
179. Control of the station modules is another 
important and very contentious issue. NASA has 
proposed a multilateral management board for 
the station to plan and co-ordinate operations. 
180. If no consensus can be reached, NASA as 
chairman of the board would IIJ.ake the decision. 
The partners do not object to the idea of a man-
agement board and agree that NASA should 
have ultimate authority in emergencies, but they 
want to retain final authority for control of their 
own elements. ESA has insisted on retaining 
control of its Columbus pressurised module and 
the two European platforms. 
181. Another contentious issue was the con-
fessed interest of the United States Department 
of Defence to use the station for national security 
purposes. Recently, however, the Department of 
Defence, NASA and the State Department 
agreed to remove all mention of possible use of 
the station for national security purposes from 
the draft intergovernmental agreement and only 
refer to it in an attached paper called the 
"Agreed Minutes". 
182. In a new draft intergovernmental 
agreement, which the United States sent to its 
partners at the end of April 1987, mention of 
several other difficult issues was deleted with the 
intention of deferring them to memoranda of 
understanding to be negotiated later. Among 
these are the multilateral management board, the 
mechanism for deciding disputes among the 
co-operating agencies and details about station 
operations. 
183. Although negotiations on an agreement 
may be difficult, at this particular time 
co-operation with the United States in the space 
station programme should be regarded as 
essential. This is the only practical way to 
promote a balanced partnership. Moreover the 
Columbus programme is the only direct way for 
ESA to obtain extensive experience of the com-
plicated techniques required for manned opera-
tions in space. 
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184. During its recent visit to the United States, 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions was informed by Pentagon 
officials of their surprise and even distress over 
European inconsistency in co-operation pro-
grammes. On the one hand, the European 
partners and allies are very reluctant to sign any 
co-operation agreement regarding the United 
States international space station because it 
might be used for national security purposes, but 
on the other hand, it was said, many'European 
countries have agreed to participate individually 
or within the framework of ESA in the Soviet 
Kvant astrophysics module or Mars-Phobos 
mission, while it is widely known that the results 
of all experiments in Soviet space missions may 
be used for military applications. Europeans 
agreed to participate in the K vant module even 
when there was no clear agreement on sharing 
data from experiments and no knowledge of 
detailed mission plans. According to the same 
Pentagon officials, results from European experi-
ments in the Mars-Phobos mission may also 
have security implications yet to be assessed. 
185. Concluding this chapter it should be noted 
that the most malicious comments on the United 
States offer of international participation in the 
space station have been that this programme 
could be a way of diverting European and Jap-
anese money to the station which otherwise 
could have been used to develop competitive 
threats to the United States. In the European 
space business a feeling certainly prevails that 
the United States likes to co-operate as long as it 
is convenient and does not pose a threat to 
United States programmes, yet another reason to 
seek European autonomy. 
IX. European programmes up to 2000 
186. It is quite clear that the entire European 
space programme reflects a strong quest for 
autonomy in space. In these circumstances, one 
may wonder whether it is really necessary to 
spend so much money on becoming independent 
and autonomous in space operations, now that 
Europe can also rely on all kinds of space infra-
structure available elsewhere. 
187. When trying to answer this question it 
should be recalled that in recent years Europe 
has experienced, and to a certain extent still is 
experiencing, the consequences of fragmented 
co-operation. It may be sufficient to mention the 
negotiations for participating in the space station 
and the many delays in the Ulysses programme. 
Ulysses is a European solar-polar spacecraft, 
which was to be launched in an ESA-NASA 
co-operative programme. Earlier delays were 
caused by autonomous changes in NASA 
planning for the upper stage to be used for 
deployment from the space shuttle and by 
United States cancellation of NASA's own solar 
observation spacecraft which should have been 
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sent to the sun with Ulysses in a co-ordinated 
mission. Ulysses had to be stored two years for 
these reasons and was scheduled for launch in 
May 1986 on the Challenger. NASA and ESA 
recently announced their decision to launch 
Ulysses in October 1990 with the American 
space shuttle. 
188. The United States, the only partner of real 
importance for Europe in space programmes, 
will not easily relinquish its ability to proceed 
alone. One can well imagine that its unswerving 
concern for defence, technological leadership and 
the maintenance of future commercial interests 
are reasons enough to cherish and protect its 
leadership in space. Europe will achieve a 
position of equality in the negotiations only if it 
manages to reduce the United States' lead in 
space capabilities. Evolution towards 
co-operation based on mutual dependence will 
be achieved only through a change in rela-
tionship and not through political and legal nego-
tiations. 
189. Europe is certainly in a rather ambiguous 
position. On the one hand it is virtually obliged 
to have access to the economic and technological 
benefits of industrial and economic space activ-
ities and so to develop and maintain a space 
capability sufficient to meet requirements in all 
areas and to take its own decisions. On the other 
hand, the growing dimensions of space systems 
force everybody concerned to pool their 
available forces. 
190. Even if the final goal is global co-operation 
between space nations based on interdepen-
dence, Europe should do everything possible to 
retain its competitive ability in the commercial 
market, reduce the capability gap with the 
United States and impose itself as a fully-fledged 
partner, not as a group of assistant countries 
from which the stronger member expects only 
support and cheers. 
191. A fully-developed space transportation 
system is clearly the key to gaining indepen-
dence. A space system is credible only if a corre-
sponding transport system is available. The 
Ariane 5 launch vehicle and Hermes mini-
spaceplane will meet these needs. 
192. On 1st January 1987, Norway and Austria 
joined ESA, which now has thirteen member 
countries. By approving the long-term plan for 
the years 1985-95 at their meeting in Rome in 
January 1985, the European ministers confirmed 
the member countries' intention gradually to 
increase the ESA budget. Hereafter are the main 
figures for the years 1986 and 1987 in millions of 
units of account: 
Ariane/Hermes 
Telecommunications 
Spacelab/Columbus 
Earth observation 
Scientific and general 
Total budget 
1986 
305 
180 
139 
165 
251 
I 040 
1987 
362 
288 
195 
180 
347 
I 372 
193. In view of a new updated programme, to 
be decided upon at a ministerial meeting in 
November 1987, a much more detailed and con-
siderably higher cost estimate has been made for 
the long-term plan covering the years 1987-2000. 
This estimate takes into account operational 
costs of the launchers and other infrastructure 
mentioned in paragraphs 201 to 211 of this 
chapter and even costs having regard to the 
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autonomous space station and reusable launcher 
with advanced air-breathing engines which will 
be developed to ensure European independence 
in space in the beginning of the next century. 
194. In terms of 1985 prices and millions of 
accounting units a comparison of costs of both 
long-term plans reads as follows: 
Breakdown of estimates in the new ESA 1987-2000 long term plan 
(in millions of Ecus - 1985 rates) 
Programmes 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
General budget (GB) 110.2 114.3 121.1 132.9 144.1 155.7 
Programmes as so-
ciated with GB 56.6 52.6 54.8 55.4 60.4 64.3 
Science 163.0 171.0 179.0 190.0 199.0 209.0 
Technology 6.2 9.7 11.7 17.8 23.9 27.3 
Earth observation 173.6 185.3 219.2 196.8 222.8 234.0 
Microgravity 20.3 52.0 77.0 96.0 116.0 129.0 
Telecommunica-
tions 293.0 273.0 229.0 251.0 260.0 274.0 
Space station 175.4 243.5 307.2 340.4 431.8 480.4 
Space transportation 396.9 487.3 599.0 719.0 770.0 812.0 
Plan 1987-2000 
Total 1396.1 I 588.7 I 798.0 1999.3 2 228.0 2 385.7 
Plan 1985-1995 
Total I 363 I 576 I 783 I 783 I 873 1873 
195. France has stressed already that more 
money may be needed in the coming years, so 
that it would be unrealistic to limit ESA's annual 
budget. Such a limit would also be contrary to 
the ESA convention establishing the principle of 
optional programmes. Indeed, more expenditure 
may be expected over the years to come, espe-
cially regarding the Columbus programmes 
where much still depends on the outcome of 
negotiations with the other partners in the space 
station. 
196. As it is impossible to review the whole 
European space programme in detail, only the 
most important subjects are mentioned in this 
chapter. 
A. The space science programme 
197. To achieve a quantum jump of scientific 
significance and to offer the European Com-
munity a front-line research capability, ESA has 
started work on a long-term space science pro-
gramme. 
198. At present, more than 2 000 scientists in 
Europe are making use of the results of space 
investigations. Europe should not fail to give this 
group reasonably frequent flight opportunities to 
develop its line of research lest scientists prefer 
to work on other topics. 
199. The same is true for industry, where highly 
skilled teams ensure technological development. 
Scientific space programmes constitute a " tech-
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
161.9 164.1 164.3 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 164.5 2 091.1 
64.2 65.2 65.5 66.7 67.7 68.7 69.7 70.7 882.5 
220.0 224.0 224.0 224.0 224.0 224.0 224.0 224.0 2 899.0 
30.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 353.6 
229.0 229.0 237.0 244.0 249.0 244.0 254.0 260.0 3 177.7 
131.0 131.0 135.0 137.0 135.0 135.0 135.0 135.0 I 564.3 
263.0 261.0 242.0 230.0 230.0 215.0 210.0 255.0 3 486.0 
485.0 495.0 582.0 527.0 452.0 552.0 552.0 552.0 6176.7 
811.0 779.0 641.0 652.0 683.0 609.0 600.0 600.0 9 159.2 
2 395.5 2 380.7 2 323.2 2 277.6 2 237.6 2 244.6 2 241.6 2 293.6 29 790.1 
I 791 
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nological pull " - another reason to provide 
enough programmes to keep this advanced 
industry in the lead. To provide continuity of 
effort to scientific institutes and industry in 
Europe, a total of some twelve to fifteen missions 
is required over the next fifteen years. 
200. The ESA space science programme should 
be feasible within a twenty-year period with a 
time schedule extending to 2004. A budget of 
about 200 million units of account a year is 
envisaged. 
201. The programme is based on four corner-
stones, i.e.: 
(i) The solar-terrestrial programme, to 
investigate solar, heliospheric and 
space plasma physics. It envisages 
among others the operation of an 
observatory in space and the launch 
of a multi-spacecraft space plasma 
physics mission; 
(ii) Planetary exploration, envisaging a 
mission to primordial bodies such as 
asteroids and comets to return 
material from these bodies. Thus an 
asteroidal sample could be compared 
with meteoric material for elemental 
and isotopic composition enabling 
the material to be classified. A com-
etary sample might contain not only 
unaltered pristine solar system 
material, but possibly also interstellar 
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and stellar material, giving essential 
insight into the physics and chemistry 
of the star formation region: 
(iii) X-ray spectroscopy. This programme 
aims at placing an observatory into 
orbit with multiple telescopes, pro-
viding the required sensitivity to 
perform detailed spectral diagnostics 
of many classes of objects with low 
surface brightness. It will allow the 
evolution of the large- and small-scale 
structures of the universe to be 
studied. Simultaneous observation of 
several characteristics of astronomical 
objects will be possible, thus 
achieving a much better under-
standing of ongoing physical pro-
cesses; 
(iv) Heterodyne spectroscopy. A heter-
odyne spectroscopy mission is 
envisaged to explore the sub-
micrometer domain which is the last 
remaining gap in the electromagnetic 
spectrum. This range contains not 
only the continuum radiation from 
dust, but also a large number of very 
important atomic and molecular tran-
sitions which provide a direct probe 
for studying the physics and chem-
istry of the cool universe in the range 
of 3-1 000 km. 
Apart from these cornerstones in the scientific 
programme, there are a number of conventional 
medium-sized projects, each costing about 200 
million units of account, which will also be 
realised before 2004, such as Giotto, Ulysses and 
Hipparcos. 
B. Launchers and other infrastructure 
202. ESA is developing a programme in order 
to have at its disposal a complete infrastructure 
for all kinds of space missions by the year 2000. 
This programme is integrated in a package deal 
to be presented for approval by the member 
states at a ministerial meeting in November 1987 
and covers authorisation for development of 
several parts of a full infrastructure, a condition 
for autonomy in space. Its elements are: 
(a) Ariane 5 
203. This is a further development of the 
Ariane launcher series to launch unmanned pay-
loads similar to those orbited by the United 
States shuttle and the Hermes mini-spaceplane. 
The Ariane 5 will have a payload capacity of 15 
tons (33 000 lb) in a 400 km circular orbit and of 
5-8 tons (11 000 - 17 600 lb) in a geostationary 
transfer orbit, depending on the version used. 
The central core's propulsion system is a Vulcan 
HM-60 cryogenic engine with liquid hydrogen/ 
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liquid oxygen propellant. The Ariane 5 is 
scheduled to become operational in the mid-
1990s. Costs of this project are estimated at 3. 35 
billion units of account (at 1985 prices). 
(b) Hermes 
204. This is a manned mini-spaceplane to 
provide the transfer of crew and supplies to and 
from the space station, as well as to perform a 
range of in-orbit servicing tasks with satellites, 
platforms and other systems. Hermes, equipped 
with an ejectable crew cabin, should be able to 
carry a crew of three persons and a payload of 
6 600 lb (3 000 kg) in a pressurised cargo com-
partment. This spaceplane should be operational 
around 1995. Costs are estimated at 3.11 billion 
units of account (at 1985 prices). 
205. In October 1986, France decided to con-
tribute 45% of the $35 million preparatory devel-
opment programme for Hermes, while the 
Federal Republic of Germany will contribute 
30%. Later, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland committed 
themselves to participation; Canada, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom are expected to 
do the same. 
206. The preparatory programme should define 
Hermes' use and mission roles and should enable 
ESA to prepare for a decision in 1987 on full-
scale development. 
207. Aerospatiale and Dassault-Breguet have 
been selected as the industrial prime contractors, 
other contractors being MBB, Dornier, Aeritalia, 
Fokker and Matra. 
(c) Columbus 
208. This a programme for a manned space 
module and three other spacecraft functioning as 
part of or in co-operation with the United States 
space station. Costs of this programme are esti-
mated at 4.85 billion units of account (at 1985 
prices). 
209. Following President Reagan's invitation to 
participate in the United States space station 
programme, Europe, relying on its experience 
with Spacelab, proposed Columbus. At the 
moment, ESA has proposed the following ele-
ments to NASA for further evaluation: 
(i) A pressurised module for permanent 
attachment to the NASA space 
station. This manned module should 
primarily be used for materials and 
fluid physics research and as a labo-
ratory for life sciences. Launching by 
the space shuttle is envisaged; 
(ii) A man-tended free-flyer. This free-
flying pressurised module would not 
be manned permanently, but could be 
visited by a crew for routine mainte-
nance, resupply of consumables, 
repairs and experiment exchange or 
set-up. It should be used for mate-
rial sciences, fluid physics and life 
sciences. The design is planned for 
launch by the Ariane 5; 
(iii) A polar platform. This unmanned 
spacecraft should operate in a sun-
synchronous orbit at an altitude of 
about 800 km and be launched by 
Ariane 5. Its main function should be 
earth observation but it might also be 
used for astronomical observation 
and for any discipline that can make 
use of the pressureless microgravity 
environment. It complements the 
space station's capability and human 
intervention could take place via the 
space shuttle or Hermes; 
(iv) An enhanced Eureca spacecraft dedi-
cated to a wide range of missions, in 
particular microgravity and space sci-
ences. This platform is envisaged as 
flying alongside the space station. 
Unlike the other elements of the 
Columbus programme that are 
scheduled to be operational by 1995, 
the enhanced Eureca should be 
deployed in 1991 to allow experi-
ments and tests of operational con-
cepts to be conducted before the space 
station is available. The existing 
Eureca will be used for space station 
technology support and help Euro-
peans to master techniques such as 
rendezvous docking and fluid transfer 
in orbit. With possible European 
autonomy in mind, the compatibility 
of Eureca with Ariane and Hermes is 
being studied. 
210. Of these four modules, only the 
pressurised module {i), the man-tended free-flyer 
(ii) and the polar platform (iii) have been agreed 
to by NASA at the moment. 
{d) DRS (data-relay satellite) 
211. This satellite is for autonomous per-
manent communications with and between 
shuttles, space stations and platforms. DRS 1 
and 2 will be launched from 1994-95 and DRS 3 
at the end of 1995. The cost ofthis project is esti-
mated at 0.88 billion units of account (at 1985 
prices). 
(e) Future European launcher 
212. In the long-term plan for the years 1987-
2000, a budget has been allocated for a study pro-
gramme to develop a future European launcher 
(FEL), known as FESTIP (Future European 
Space Transportation Infrastructure Pro-
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gramme). According to ESA, the· FEL should be 
considered as a means for delivering frequently 
and easily pay loads between 5 and 10 tons into 
low orbit. This is different from Ariane 5's task, 
which is to deliver heavier pay loads of up to 20 
tons into the same orbit at a lower frequency. 
FESTIP will preferably study one- or two-stage 
fully reusable launchers with an air-breathing 
propulsion system and horizontal take-off and 
landing. All these characteristics 1can be found in 
the Hotol and Sanger projects now being carried 
out on a national level. Hotol is a British devel-
opment project, funded on a 50/50 basis by 
industry and government with a hybrid air-
breathing and rocket propulsion system which 
uses atmospheric air as the oxidant up to Mach 5 
at 85 000 ft ( ± 25 000 m) and then switches to 
rocket propulsion. The German national aero-
space research establishment DFVLR is studying 
Sanger, a reusable two-stage horizontal launcher 
consisting of a winged booster on which a shuttle 
orbiter-type vehicle is mounted. The booster 
would be separated at Mach 6 for its return to the 
launch site, while the orbiter would continue into 
a 400 km circular orbit. Both rocket and ramjet 
propulsion versions are under study. On the 
other hand, FESTIP will also include more tradi-
tional launchers, fully or partly recoverable and 
making use of advanced rocket propulsion 
systems. ESA estimates that a decision for the 
FEL could be taken between 1992 and 1995, fol-
lowed by operational availability around 2005 
and 2010. 
* 
* * 
213. Notwithstanding these tremendous efforts, 
Europe should realise that it is not sufficient to 
spend vast sums of money on space infra-
structure only. As soon as the infrastructure is 
ready, money should also be available to support 
users of the space station and other dependent 
spacecraft since it seems likely that the private 
sector will be most reluctant to become involved 
in the substantial long-term investments that will 
be required for taking part in space station 
research projects. 
C. Earth observation, space telecommunications 
and microgravity 
(a) Earth observation 
214. This is centred on the ERS-1 project and 
follow-on missions. The first ERS-1 launch is 
scheduled for December 1989-February 1990. 
The ERS-1 is a microwave remote-sensing 
satellite, expected to become the forerunner of a 
series of European remote-sensing satellites that 
could become operational in the 1990s. This 
satellite is being developed by a multinational 
consortium headed by Dornier Systems (Federal 
Republic of Germany) and will be used to 
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provide data on oceans, coastal regions and polar 
ice areas to help in weather forecasting, assist 
shipping and fishing and improve understanding 
of ocean-related phenomena. A second ERS 
could provide users with five to six years of con-
tinuous data before an operational multisatellite 
global monitoring system is established. The 
Meteosat weather satellite programme is another 
aspect of earth observation satellites. Two pre-
operational spacecraft were launched in 1977 
and 1981. Three operational Meteosats could be 
launched as from 1987. 
(b) Space telecommunications 
215. This will be a continuation of present pro-
grammes centred on the development and 
in-orbit testing of advanced payload systems. 
216. In 1986 the second largest portion of the 
ESA budget ( 180 million units of account, or 
17.3% of the total budget) was spent on telecom-
munications programmes. The main element is 
the payload and spacecraft experimentation pro-
gramme (PSEP), expected to run from 1986 
through 1995 with overall funding at 765 million 
units of account. Its main objectives are to 
improve the competitiveness of European 
industry in the communication markets of the 
1990s and to counter advances elsewhere in the 
world. It should demonstrate new services to 
enlarge the scope of satellite applications and 
introduce and experiment with new techniques 
for designing satellite systems that are more com-
petitive with expanding ground communications 
networks and identify with advanced tech-
niques. 
(c) Microgravity 
217. This aspect is centred on an enhanced 
utilisation programme for Spacelab and Eureca 
leading to the use of Columbus and the interna-
tional space station for microgravity research 
and development. 
X. Conclusions 
218. By the end of this century, Europe must be 
fully autonomous in space in order to be a 
serious partner in future international space pro-
grammes and to keep pace with developments in 
advanced technology in other parts of the 
world. 
219. International co-operation in space pro-
grammes will be indispensable to accomplish the 
technologically and financially demanding space 
operations that are ahead in the coming years. 
220. To be able to accomplish European 
autonomy, the ESA budget will have to be 
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increased at least up to a total of 30 billion units 
of account and probably more between the years 
1987 and 2000 which will mean doubling the 
budget in the next decade. 
221. Establishment of an official link between 
ESA and national space policy authorities should 
be considered to keep all European space 
research authorities informed on current and 
planned programmes with a view to preventing 
unnecessary waste of human and financial 
resources. 
222. Until now, the European Ariane has been 
operating very successfully on the commercial 
launch market. With more competitors from 
other countries, including the United States and 
the Soviet Union, entering a market which will 
most likely not expand in the foreseeable future, 
Ariane will have to go to great lengths to keep its 
50% market share. As space industry is one of the 
essential high technology industries, European 
governments should watch carefully Ariane's 
development and do everything possible to facil-
itate its operations. They cannot afford to lag 
behind when governments of other countries are 
doing their best to promote their own com-
mercial launch vehicles. 
223. In this framework, an agreement between 
the United States and European governments 
containing rules for commercial launch activities 
should be reached as soon as possible. 
224. In the years to come, ESA participation in 
the United States international space station will 
be essential for rapid progress in the devel-
opment of European space capability. All 
available European ingenuity should be used to 
reach an intergovernmental agreement con-
cerning the control and use of space station facil-
ities as soon as possible. 
225. If ESA and its individual member states 
are trying to conduct a balanced and unbiased 
international space co-operation policy, they 
should assess carefully the possible security 
implications of their co-operation in Soviet pro-
grammes. 
226. Bearing in mind recent international 
developments, and recalling the committee's 
report by Mr. Wilkinson on the military use of 
space (Document 976), it seems appropriate for 
WEU to examine the establishment of a 
European programme for military space 
co-operation, including satellite systems for tele-
communication, earth observation and navi-
gation. Such a programme could provide Europe 
with autonomous means of assessing the interna-
tional situation, reinforcing its identity, and 
demonstrating its determination to accept 
responsibility for its own defence. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part ll: Political activities of the Council 
(i) Protesting against the fact that the thirty-second annual report of the Council reached it only on 
27th April 1987; 
(ii) Noting that at the ministerial meeting on 28th April no action was taken on the proposal to draw 
up a European security charter; 
(iii) Noting and regretting that no effective decision has yet been taken on the Assembly's budgetary 
requests and that the words used by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council need clarification; 
(iv) Noting that the Council has taken no practical action on its intentions to reorganise the WEU ser-
vices; 
(v) Noting and regretting that the Council has given no answer to the countries which have applied 
for membership of WEU and Portugal in particular; 
(vi) Noting that the absence of effective and adequate information given to the public on the Council's 
activities leaves considerable doubt about its intention to set up a European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Convene as swiftly as practicable a conference of heads of state and of government of the sig-
natory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of countries effectively determined to take part in a 
European security organisation in the context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to define jointly security 
requirements for the next ten years and the role to be attributed to WEU to this end; 
2. Respond favourably to Portugal's application before the end of the year. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Order 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part I/: Political activities of the Council 
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Anxious to play a useful part in preparing a conference of European heads of state and of 
government on security, 
INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE to organise as early as possible, and not later than 
spring 1988, a colloquy which would be open to the public and bring together a number of prominent 
Europeans not at present exercising governmental duties to draw up specific proposals: 
(a) for defining the matters that the conference of heads of state and of government on security 
should include in its agenda; 
(b) for directing the reactivation of WEU. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The thirty-second annual report of the 
Council reached the Office of the Clerk on 24th 
April 1987, thus, for the second year running, 
preventing the drafting of a reply by the General 
Affairs Committee in time for examination at its 
meeting on 29th April. According to Rule 41, 
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly: " All reports on the agenda of a part-
session shall be adopted by committees at least 
three weeks before the opening of the relevant 
part-session. A report not adopted in time shall 
be withdrawn from the agenda. " The date limit 
for adopting the present report is therefore 
Monday, 11th May. 
2. At its meeting on 29th April, the com-
mittee therefore considered that it was not pos-
sible, in view of the time required for reflection, 
drafting and distribution, to submit a reply to the 
thirty-second annual report of the Council at the 
first part of the thirty-third ordinary session. As 
in 1986, it is therefore obliged to wait until the 
second part-session in order to submit a serious, 
detailed study. 
3. Your Rapporteur again has to emphasise 
how harmful such delays, for which the Council 
bears sole responsibility, are for an effective dia-
logue with the Assembly. The latter will probably 
not be able to give its views on the Council's 
activities in 1986 before the end of 1987, when 
this will no longer have much significance in 
view of the decisions that the Council is to take 
in 1987 which will probably make the remarks 
about 1986 pointless. 
4. As the General Affairs Committee has 
always said, informal meetings at which no 
minutes are taken such as those held between the 
Presidential Committee or the Committee for 
Relations with the Council, on the one hand, and 
members of the Council, on the other, generally 
allow useful and friendly remarks to be made, 
but they do not really commit the Council. Thus, 
the words of three successive chairmen-in-office 
of the Council, Mr. Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and 
Mr. Poos about matters relating to the 
Assembly's budget have so far led to no effective 
results but have helped to raise false hopes in the 
Assembly. The same is true of certain political 
information provided at such meetings, admit-
tedly subject to the necessary reservations - for 
instance concerning the creation of a European 
security council - and which the Council has 
never confirmed. It should be recalled, 
moreover, that, contrary to the claim in para-
graph 5 of the reply to Recommendation 438, the 
presidency does not meet the Assembly but 
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only committees at the close of ministerial 
meetings. 
5. The extraordinary session in Luxembourg 
on 28th April 1987 was the first experience of a 
meeting concerning the Assembly as a whole on 
such an occasion and this innovation is to be 
welcomed. As it is hardly possible to hold 
extraordinary sessions each year, consideration 
might be given, in conjunction with the Council, 
to arranging for ordinary spring sessions to 
coincide with ministerial meetings. This would 
mean both sides making a considerable effort to 
reach agreement on dates very early in the year. 
In any event, the annual report of the Council is 
and must remain the basis for all exchanges 
between the Council and the Assembly in 
accordance with Article IX of the treaty and the 
policy pursued by the Council in delaying its 
publication and reducing the substance of its 
replies to recommendations and written ques-
tions is part of an overall attitude whose results 
are already being felt: the Assembly is increas-
ingly unable to exercise any supervision what-
soever of the Council's activities. 
6. The thirty-second annual report certainly 
makes no revelations about the Council's acti-
vities in 1986. The various meetings between 
WEU bodies and representatives of the Council 
held in 1986 and at the beginning of 1987 and 
the half-yearly report relating to the first part of 
1986 already gave some indication, albeit not 
very specific. Conversely, it is interesting to note 
that, in referring to WEU's statutory activities, 
the annual report reveals that the latter are no 
longer of great importance and now have very 
little place in the Council's work. The Council 
did not in fact carry out the arms control for 
which it is still responsible. What did it do in the 
joint production of armaments? Apparently 
nothing. Consideration will also have to be given 
to how it covers the meetings of political 
directors from the ministries for foreign affairs 
since this information throws little light on a 
question that the Assembly cannot fail to raise: 
are such meetings, like those of senior officials 
from ministries of defence, really WEU acti-
vities, as the Council claims? If they are, the 
Council is bound to report on them to the 
Assembly. In paragraph 4 of its reply to Recom-
mendation 438, it says that it will " continue to 
keep the Assembly informed about its acti-
vities". If it did not do so, would it be possible to 
speak of the reactivation ofWEU? Would it even 
be possible to speak of respecting the treaty? 
Your Rapporteur can but reserve his conclusions 
until he and the committee have been able to 
analyse the annual report more thoroughly. 
7. In the present report, your Rapporteur will 
therefore have to confine himself to commenting 
on certain recent activities of the Council of 
which he has learned by various official or un-
official means, and, in accordance with the 
request made by the Presidential Committee on 
30th March 1987, he will give his views on the 
proposal to call for a European summit meeting 
on security. 
11. Activities of the Council 
8. Certain government representatives have 
told your Rapporteur how disappointed they 
were with what they considered to be 
the excessive severity with which the first part of 
the present report described the Council's activ-
ities. Here, your Rapporteur can say that most 
committee members criticised the first part of 
this report not for excessive severity but for 
being too compliant towards the Council's prac-
tices. This was again so when the General Affairs 
Committee considered this second part of the 
report on 29th April. This means that there is 
now a deep-rooted misunderstanding, not to say 
real incomprehension, between the two WEU 
bodies. This would probably not be very serious 
if the misunderstanding were limited to our 
organisation, but press reports and various reac-
tions by the public recorded by your Rapporteur 
indicate that Europeans as a whole have not 
much faith in the reactivation of WEU. 
9. Proof of this general scepticism is to be 
found in the remarks made by Mr. Delors, Pre-
sident of the Commission of the European Com-
munity, on Europe I radio station on the 
occasion ofthe thirtieth anniversary of the Rome 
Treaty on 15th March 1987. Quoting two para-
graphs of the Rome Treaty, Mr. Delors said he 
considered the treaty gave the Community 
defence responsibilities. He added that the Com-
munity leaders not only could but should handle 
security matters and that there was no point in 
hiding behind WEU and repeating that it was the 
only organisation with defence responsibilities. 
He called on the Community to consider the 
prospects for nuclear disarmament and the cost 
of the conventional armaments that would be 
necessary if such disarmament became effective 
and to adopt a European position on Mr. 
Gorbachev's proposals on the subject. It 
therefore appears that such an authorised 
observer as the President of the European Com-
mission himself does not take the reactivation of 
WEU very seriously and considers it to be a sub-
terfuge designed to conceal the absence of 
government will to handle security matters. In 
these circumstances, how could these govern-
ments hope that the public will adopt a positive 
attitude towards a reactivation which, insofar as 
it exists, remains so discreet, not to say clan-
destine? 
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10. It can admittedly be seen that our coun-
tries' governments are starting what the 
Assembly has always asked, i.e. they are holding 
meetings of senior officials to consider matters 
relating to Europe's security, associating minis-
ters of defence with WEU's activities, setting up 
groups to study essential matters to provide grist 
for their work. But the Assembly, the press and 
the public know nothing of these meetings and 
studies and no one is in a position to assess the 
results. Paragraphs 5, 6 and 15 of the reply to 
Recommendation 438 claim that the media 
receive appropriate information about the Coun-
cil's various activities. This is precisely a point 
on which your Rapporteur finds some difficulty 
in following the Council's assessment. He in no 
way wishes to contradict its statements, but he 
has to note that parliamentarians from all 
member countries are complaining about the 
ignorance in which the public is kept by the 
media about WEU's activities although, in 
recent months, considerable progress has been 
recorded. This lack of information is probably 
due to the nature of WEU and the intergovern-
mental character of all its activities, which means 
the Council is subject to the principle of una-
nimous agreement before communicating any-
thing whatsoever about what is done in its name. 
But if the governments are not careful, the reacti-
vation of WEU will very soon lose all credibility 
and sink into indifference and oblivion. It should 
be recalled that the main reason for reactivation 
in 1984 was to ensure that public opinion played 
a larger part in efforts for Europe's security. The 
Council's information policy does little in this 
sense. Inter alia, it should be recalled that on 
28th April Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, answering a question by our colleague, 
Mr. Wilkinson, undertook to communicate to 
the Assembly an interim report by the Council 
on matters relating to space defence, but he was 
unable to say when. 
11. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall here 
some of the questions that members of the 
Assembly have to put because the Council does 
not provide them with the information they are 
entitled to receive in accordance with the treaty 
and undertakings entered into by the Council in 
recent years. 
(a) Does the Council still consider itself 
bound by paragraph 2 of its own reply to Recom-
mendation 319 in which it said in 1978 that: 
" In this context, the duty which belongs to 
the Council alone of informing the 
Assembly on all aspects of the application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty forms a 
major aspect of their political activities. 
The Council therefore intend to meet the 
Assembly's request for fu.ller information 
on consultations between member coun-
tries on matters relating to the application 
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of the modified Brussels Treaty. They aim 
to expand and develop the information 
supplied in their replies to recommenda-
tions and questions, which cover a wide 
range of matters relating to European 
policy, in the annual report, which, as the 
Assembly was able to note, is now 
becoming fuller and more complete, and 
in speeches made by the Chairman-in-
Office and ministers at plenary sessions 
of the Assembly and informal joint 
meetings." 
Replies it has given in recent years to 
recommendations or to written questions put by 
members of the Assembly, particularly on the 
IEPG, indicate that this is not so. This is con-
firmed by the replies to Recommendations 437 
and 438 (paragraph 12). 
(b) Does the Council still consider itself 
bound by the protocols to the 1954 Paris Agree-
ments? The annual report for 1986 shows that it 
does. But in that case how does it intend to apply 
them in the new structures it is in the process of 
setting up? 
(c) Does the Council still consider itself 
bound by its own decision of 1955 setting up a 
Standing Armaments Committee? If so, why did 
that committee not meet in 1986 or so far in 
1987? 
In this connection, the reply to Recom-
mendation 438 (paragraph 11) is in contradiction 
with the reply to Written Question 271 to which 
it refers since that reply specified that: " The SAC 
will meet in the not too distant future", whereas 
the Council now seems to have made this 
meeting subject to the results of a hypothetical 
reflection to which it referred in its reply to 
Written Question 271 but which has not yet 
taken place. 
(d) Does the Council consider that effective 
action might be taken on its document on WEU 
and public awareness? What kind of action? 
(e) Does the Council still consider itself 
bound by Article XI of the modified Brussels 
Treaty authorising member countries to " invite 
any other state to accede to the present treaty on 
conditions to be agreed between them and the 
state so invited "? If so, can it explain why it has 
still not acted upon the interest shown by Spain 
and Portugal in taking part in the activities of 
WEU? Can it explain why it would be necessary 
to wait for the outcome of" reactivation " which 
has already been under way for three years before 
inviting these countries to take part in the reacti-
vation? Does it not think this shillyshallying 
might put these two countries off taking part in 
reflection on Europe's security that the WEU 
countries moreover declare to be desirable? 
Already in May 1985, the Assembly for its 
part voted quite clearly in Recommendation 420 
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for the admission of Portugal which had applied 
for membership in October 1984. It has now 
decided to invite a delegation of Portuguese par-
liamentary observers equivalent to the one to 
which Portugal would be entitled if it were a 
member of WEU so as to demonstrate publicly 
the firmness of its decision. It is still waiting for 
the Council to reach a decision. 
The Financial Times of 6th April 1987 
published an interview with Mr. Papandreou, 
Prime Minister of Greece, in which he said that 
his country too had applied to join WEU, speci-
fying that this was not a formal application but a 
wish conveyed through diplomatic channels. It is 
clear that Mr. Papandreou's action in making 
this wish public made it an effective candidature. 
Yet your Rapporteur feels that Greece's candi-
dature raises a number of problems which 
cannot be solved in the near future: 
(i) Greece's relations with NATO and 
the United States are at present at a 
difficult stage and it does not seem 
very desirable for WEU to appear as 
an alternative solution to NATO if 
current negotiations between Greece 
and the United States are not suc-
cessful in the fairly near future. 
(ii) Relations between Greece and Turkey 
have recently been fairly tense. In 
March 1987, a clash was feared 
between the two countries over 
matters relating to the exploitation of 
the Aegean seabed. In these condi-
tions, it seems difficult for the WEU 
member countries to agree to the 
accession of Greece or Turkey to the 
modified Brussels Treaty whose 
Article V provides for the inter-
vention of all signatory countries on 
behalf of any of them which may be 
the subject of an armed attack in 
Europe. Whatever those concerned 
may feel about the interests defended 
by Greece and Turkey - and it is well 
known that they are not unanimous -
these are matters over which an 
organisation responsible for Europe's 
security, and already having difficulty 
in taking action, cannot take the risk 
of becoming seriously divided or even 
involved in armed conflict. 
However, the Turkish observers at 
the meeting on 29th April 1987 said 
they considered the simultaneous 
accession of Greece and Turkey might 
help to reduce tension between the 
two countries, which obviously meets 
the Assembly's wishes. They thought, 
not without reason, that the two 
countries' membership of NATO had 
already allowed the worst to be 
avoided and that their accession to 
WEU might improve their relations. 
(iii) The policy pursued by Greece in the 
Middle East differs considerably from 
that of most WEU member counties 
in that area. It was a major factor in 
weakening the joint positions adopted 
by the Twelve towards terrorism in 
1986. It seems hardly desirable for 
WEU to expose itself to such diffi-
culties. 
Because of its dilatory attitude towards the 
applications of Spain and Portugal, the Council 
has had to deal at one and the same time with 
the cases of these two countries, whose accession 
to WEU might enhance its reactivation, and 
the case of Greece, to which has already been 
added that of Turkey which, not being a member 
of the European Community, raises a particular 
question of principle. On 13th April 1987, the 
Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs announced 
that its government was asking to join WEU 
because of the importance Turkey attached to 
the defence of Europe in the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance and its interest in the unifi-
cation of Europe. At the same time, Turkey 
applied for membership ofthe EEC. The absence 
of a decision by the Council on the applications 
of Portugal and Spain singularly complicated the 
problem raised by the possible enlargement of 
WEU. 
12. The doctrine according to which mem-
bership of the Economic Community and of 
WEU are a priori linked perhaps does not corres-
pond with present European facts. There is no 
doubt that it is strongly felt that European 
security must be reconsidered and, in spite of 
Mr. Chirac's proposals in December 1986, the 
Seven still seem incapable of responding to this 
feeling. They showed this again on 28th April 
1987. 
13. Yet the shape of the reactivation of WEU 
will depend on the Council's answer to these 
questions. If the Council intends to reactivate an 
existing institution on the basis of the modified 
Brussels Treaty by developing exchanges of 
views between governments on security-related 
matters after having reduced its arms control 
functions to almost naught, it is clear that it must 
consider itselfbound by the treaty and by its sub-
sequent decisions and commitments. If, on the 
contrary, it intends to establish a new form of 
intergovernmental co-operation in security 
matters without the backing of commitments as 
specific as those contained in the modified 
Brussels Treaty, it must make its intentions 
known and explain its views, particularly in 
regard to the role of the Assembly, enlargement 
and co-operation in armaments matters. 
14. So far, the Council has never raised the 
question of revising the treaty and, moreover, it 
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is difficult to see which articles of the treaty 
proper could be revised since the deletion of the 
lists annexed to Protocol No. Ill restored the 
balance of member countries' commitments. 
However, certain observers have considered 
such a revision, including the Federalist Inter-
group for European Union of the European Par-
liament at its meeting in Strasbourg on 1Oth 
Aprill987 at which it instructed a working group 
to report on European defence and tackle this 
matter. It has yet to be determined what kind of 
revision would at present be possible and 
desirable. Should Protocol No. Ill be completely 
deleted, together with the complementary Pro-
tocol No. IV? Should Protocol No. 11 be revised, 
since only its Article VII still corresponds to the 
present requirements of European security? Your 
Rapporteur is tempted to think so because he 
considers the non-application of certain provi-
sions of a contract might give rise to doubt about 
the signatories' intention to apply the other pro-
visions of the contract. In this connection, the 
main point is still that Article V, which is the 
principal foundation of European security, must 
retain its full scope, particularly its deterrent 
value. The fact that anyone, like Mr. Delors, can 
wonder about the will of the governments to take 
action in the framework of WEU casts doubt on 
their intention to apply Article V. 
Ill. Organisation of European security 
15. At its meeting on 30th March, the Presi-
dential Committee was informed by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly of a letter written by a 
member of the Belgian Delegation, Mr. De 
Decker, Chairman of the Liberal Group of the 
Assembly, to Mr. Martens, Prime Minister of 
Belgium, which read as follows: 
" In view of the proposals by Mr. 
Gorbachev on disarmament, Mr. Delors, 
President of the Commission of the 
European Communities, launched the idea 
of a twelve-power summit meeting to 
work out a joint European answer. 
This proposal was welcomed by President 
Franco is Mitterrand, and you yourself said 
the juridical limits to the responsibilities 
laid down in the Rome Treaty could not in 
themselves constitute a limit to political 
will if this were common. 
As you know, only Western European 
Union, based on the Brussels Treaty, has 
responsibility for handling security 
matters at European level. 
Following the discussion aroused by the 
problem of the deployment of Euro-
missiles, France and Belgium initiated an 
effort to revitalise the organisation, which 
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had been working in low gear for a number 
of years. 
WEU has the great advantage of being 
composed of states which are all members 
of both the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC. 
Moreover, these states form the hard core 
of Europe and all have relatively similar 
views about European security problems. 
In particular, they have all shown their 
agreement with Article V of the Brussels 
Treaty which provides for total military 
solidarity as an expression of a will for col-
lective and reciprocal legitimate defence. 
The revitalisation of WEU has been pro-
gressing steadily since 1984 and, in the last 
two years, the ministers of defence and 
foreign affairs of the seven states have met 
together on five occasions. 
However, I feel that the heads of state and 
government of our states do not yet per-
ceive very clearly the political importance 
of WEU although it alone can advance 
harmonisation of Western European 
security policy and, in so doing, accelerate 
the process of European political inte-
gration. 
This is the spirit in which, in addressing 
the Chairman-in-Office of the European 
Communities, I wish, in all modesty, to 
make the suggestion that you propose to 
the Prime Minister of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, whose Minister for Foreign 
Affairs is at present Chairman-in-Office of 
WEU, to send jointly to your five other 
colleagues heads of state or government of 
WEU member countries an invitation to a 
special meeting, which might be held in 
Brussels, to consider Mr. Gorbachev's pro-
posals and endeavour to lay the founda-
tions of a joint policy on defence, security 
and disarmament matters for our con-
tinent. 
Thank you for the attention with which I 
hope you will consider my proposal, which 
is intended to advance the building of 
Europe and the cause of peace. " 
16. The Presidential Committee decided to 
refer this letter to the General Affairs Committee 
for consideration, with the request to report on it 
at the first part of the thirty-third ordinary 
session of the Assembly. The matter raised by 
Mr. De Decker appeared to be within your 
Rapporteur's mandate. He has not yet been 
informed of the Belgian Prime Minister's answer. 
However, the newpaper Le Monde dated 7th 
April 1987 gave the following information about 
Mr. Tindemans's position: 
"Contrary to the wish of Mr. Jacques 
Delors, President of the Brussels Corn-
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mission, Mr. Tindemans, Chairman-in-
Office of the Twelve, said that NATO and 
Western European Union (WEU) were the 
appropriate forums for studying matters 
relating to European security, not the 
Council of the Community. " 
1 7. It therefore seems clear that, where the 
responsibilities of WEU are concerned, the 
Belgian Government's opinion is no different 
from that of Mr. De Decker. The first part of the 
present report quoted statements by Chancellor 
Kohl (paragraph 50), confirmed by Mr. 
Genscher, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
on 27th March 1987, and by Mr. Chirac, Prime 
Minister of France (paragraph 57), expressing 
similar positions. Finally, Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, in a speech on 
European security to the Royal Institute of Inter-
national Relations in Brussels on 16th March 
1987, stressed the need for a" European defence 
identity " and referred to the reactivation of 
WEU. He said: 
" A better European defence effort, 
galvanised perhaps through WEU, can 
lead to a more substantial European pillar 
of the alliance. It can help the United 
States to justify to sceptics the mainte-
nance of its own contribution to European 
defence." 
Finally, Sir Geoffrey added: 
" If we want our particular European con-
cerns to be clearly perceived and taken 
into account in negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, then 
we must argue them out clearly among 
ourselves and come wherever possible to a 
common view. That is what we have been 
attempting, increasingly, to do within 
WEU ... The NATO Alliance itself must 
remain the decision-making forum for 
defence matters." 
18. Whereas the positions adopted by Mr. 
Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, 
quoted in paragraph 51 of Part I of this report, 
make WEU only one of the appropriate instru-
ments for building the European pillar of the 
alliance, Italy and Luxembourg, who held the 
chairmanship-in-office of the WEU Council 
successively in 1985-86 and 1986-87, left not the 
slightest doubt that they shared the point of view 
expressed by Mr. Tindemans on the responsibi-
lities ofWEU. Mr. De Decker's proposals should 
therefore not run into any opposition based on 
such a consideration. 
19. However, it is evident that the govern-
ments of member countries will not wish to take 
steps towards a formal demonstration aimed at 
" laying the foundations of a joint policy on 
defence, security and disarmament matters for 
our continent" if they are afraid the United 
States will consider this to be a reason for 
reducing its military presence in Europe. In this 
connection, in the absence of an official 
statement by the American authorities, your 
Rapporteur has been able to record two testi-
monies made at almost the same time and yet 
very different. On the one hand, Mr. Owen, 
Lead~r of the ~ritish Social Democrat Party, 
speaking to Social Democrats in Brussels on 
22nd March 1987, recalled that in April 1985 the 
United States administration had informed 
members of WEU " in blunt and direct terms 
that the United States saw no need to revitalise 
Western European Union and that any larger 
European role in defence should take place 
within NATO". Your Rapporteur must 
emphasise that the Assembly was never 
informed of this step and that in December 1986 
the Council refused to confirm another 
American approach, dating back to February 
1985, asking that matters relating to disar-
mament not be studied in WEU, although the 
General Affairs Committee was informed of this 
by the State Department after learning about the 
matter in press reports. 
20. Moreover, on 31st March Mr. Chirac 
Prime Minister of France, told Mr. Reagan of 
efforts to strengthen the coherence of Europe's 
defence policy, particularly in the framework of 
Western E~ropean Union. On 1st April, he made 
the followmg statements on Europe I radio 
station: 
" Question.- Does President Reagan accept 
the idea of European defence? 
Mr. Chirac.- The words European defence 
are perhaps a little ambitious and pre-
mature. But what is sure is that Europe's 
security, while depending largely on the 
existence of nuclear deterrence, on the link 
and on the soundness of the link, also 
depends on the defence effort of the 
European nations and on the coherence of 
that effort, i.e. a better concerted effort on 
the part of the European nations. This is 
what led me, when addressing the parlia-
mentary Assembly of WEU on 2nd 
December 1986, to propose a European 
defence charter, which has already been 
approved by several countries, including 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Today, 
I was very happy to hear the President of 
the United States express a very positive 
opinion on this initiative. I say happy 
because, for a long time, the United States 
had rather mixed feelings about WEU ini-
tiatives. President Reagan told me quite 
clearly that he was in favour of the ini-
tiative I had taken. 
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Question.- With an American guarantee, 
can Europeans go forward in creating their 
own defence? 
M~. Chirac.- Europeans are seeking 
neither the guarantee nor the blessing of 
anyone, not even of an ally and friend; 
Europeans are adult and capable of having 
their own policy. It is nevertheless inte-
resting to see tl;lat the United States 
approves of this step for, after all, it might 
have been a little suspicious about this ini-
tiative which concerns only Europeans, 
moreover members of the Atlantic 
Alliance; but the President approved of 
it. " 
21. Finally, while it was possible until recently 
to wonder whether the reactivation of WEU 
would not lead to a pointless revival of 
East-West tension, the invitation to a delegation 
from the WEU Assembly to hold talks in 
Moscow on East-West relations and disarma-
ment with representatives of the Supreme Soviet 
and the way the Soviet authorities received this 
delegation from 6th to 11th April 1987 are likely 
to calm fears in this connection although, at the 
very moment the visit was taking place, the 
Soviet press apparently resumed its earlier 
attacks on the reactivation of WEU and at the 
same time on any other attempt to organise 
Europe's participation in the defence of our con-
tinent. It should be recalled that, reactivated or 
not, WEU involves no military deployment and 
no one has proposed creating WEU forces or 
commands. It is evident that in the aftermath of 
Reykjavik the Soviet Union had the impression 
that certain European countries had brought 
pressure to bear in the alliance to put over their 
views on security matters. France in particular 
was blamed for its particularly negative attitude 
towards Mr. Gorbachev's proposals. 
22. However, this should not prevent Euro-
peans from speaking together on matters which 
concern them and, just as the United States 
seems to have been convinced in 1986 that 
exchanges of views between Europeans in WEU 
would in the long run enhance the cohesion of 
the alliance, the Soviet Union for its part should 
understand that these exchanges do not neces-
sarily run counter to its disarmament proposals 
if it agrees to disarmament being effectively 
verified and if it does not set itself the aim of 
weakening the security of Western Europe. 
Remarks made by Soviet leaders to members of 
the Bureau of the Assembly in Moscow from 7th 
to lOth April 1987 show that they were not 
insensitive to the reactions of the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance. 
23. All these considerations indicate that Mr. 
De Decker's proposal should encounter no major 
obstacle. Moreover, there is no doubt that it is 
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being made at a very suitable moment, because 
the need for a solemn proclamation of the prin-
ciples on which European security is based is 
making itself felt very keenly, particularly 
because the negotiations on the limitation of 
armaments are arousing strong hopes in Europe 
that there will be a significant reduction in the 
level of armaments of all kinds on European 
territory and certain fears about the possible 
weakening of Europe's security because of these 
negotiations. The visit by the Bureau of the 
Assembly to Moscow, like the Assembly's recent 
difficult debates on disarmament, confirm the 
reality and urgency of the problem. Proof is also 
to be found in the statement by the Action Com-
mittee for Europe of 24th March 1987 whose 
members, with the exception of the Irish, under-
lined the need to establish a European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance to allow our nations to 
remain masters of their destiny. 
24. The proposal to hold a summit meeting 
on security matters meets several kinds of 
requirement since it would appear to be a logical 
follow-up to the proposal made by Mr. Chirac on 
2nd December 1986 on drawing up a European 
security charter. It might formalise the adoption 
of this charter which is particularly necessary if 
European public opinion is to be convinced that 
Europe must assume responsibility for its own 
security since, as your Rapporteur has under-
lined, the WEU Council has done nothing to 
advance in this direction. 
25. It should be mentioned on the one hand 
that Mr. De Decker's initiative is being taken at 
a time when many voices are being raised 
throughout Europe calling for a summit meeting 
to consider matters of European security. Con-
versely, like Mr. Delors, some favour holding 
such a summit meeting in the framework of the 
Twelve, although others endorse Mr. De 
Decker's wish that it be held in the framework of 
WEU or speak of a meeting of heads of state and 
of government of all the European member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance. Now does not 
seem to be the time for juridical wrangling and 
the decision to hold a summit meeting merely 
requires the agreement of those who will take 
part in it. To risk failure in making the shape of 
the Europe to be represented correspond to one 
or other specific view of the future of the 
European institutions would probably not be 
wise. It is political will that should bring together 
the participating countries and Mr. Chirac's pro-
posal now seems the best basis for defining this 
political will, particularly if the terms proposed 
by the Assembly in Document 1089 are fol-
lowed. 
26. However, your Rapporteur wishes to add 
to Mr. De Decker's proposal another, i.e. to 
invite, as well as the heads of state or of 
government of the seven WEU member coun-
tries, those of the countries which have applied 
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for membership of WEU which unreservedly 
express their endorsement of the principle of 
organising European participation in the Atlantic 
Alliance and the modified Brussels Treaty and 
whose admission to WEU the Council considers 
would not encounter major obstacles. Speaking 
of the possible enlargement of WEU, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe said in his Brussels speech that 
he considered " the test of membership must be 
readiness to accept and implement in full the 
commitments of the treaty". This might be 
applied to a summit meeting which, as Mr. 
Tindemans, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the European Council, 
said in a press conference on 19th March cannot 
be held on a twelve-power basis because Ireland 
considered it impossible to discuss military ques-
tions. Your Rapporteur's proposal to hold this 
summit meeting in the framework ofWEU, but a 
WEU dedicated to enlargement, in accordance 
with a method practised by the European Com-
munity on several occasions since 1970, se6ms to 
meet the concerns of those who, like Sir Geoffrey 
Howe, consider WEU must retain the benefits it 
derives from the fact that " the present mem-
bership is homogeneous " as well as of those who 
think the WEU framework is a little narrow for 
crystallising European thinking on security 
matters, as Mr. Mitterrand, President of the 
French Republic, told the President of the 
Assembly when he received him on 2nd April 
1987, and others who, like Mr. Tindemans, con-
clude that responsibilities should not be mixed. 
The General Affairs Committee, in particular, 
expressed the wish that Portugal be invited to 
take part. 
2 7. On the other hand, the agenda proposed 
by Mr. De Decker corresponds very well to the 
aims assigned by the Seven in the Rome decla-
ration to a reactivated WEU, since it does not 
include truly military questions as such, left to 
NATO or the military commands, but does 
include Mr. Gorbachev's proposals on disar-
mament and " the foundations of a joint policy 
on defence, security and disarmament matters". 
This might be completed by following Sir 
Geoffrey Howe's suggestion on making " real 
headway in the standardisation of equipment, 
the elimination of waste and the rationalisation 
of infrastructure and support services ". 
28. Your Rapporteur therefore asks the 
Assembly to give its full support to Mr. De 
Decker's proposal and recommend that the 
Council implement it. 
IV. Conclusions 
29. Thus it would appear that the reactivation 
of WEU, in spite of the growth in the number 
of intergovernmental meetings held in the 
framework of the Seven, is still not in focus and 
that many questions that the governments 
intended to solve before the end of 1987 are still 
unsolved, whether it be a matter of the future of 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the 
SAC and the three new agencies, the possible 
enlargement of WEU or the very nature of the 
various seven-power meetings. The inadmissible 
delay in transmitting the annual report of the 
Council to the Assembly is probably caused by 
this lack of focus and indecision, also demons-
trated in the vagueness of replies to recommen-
dations and written questions or even in their 
contradictions. This also helps to prevent the 
public being kept seriously informed about what 
is actually happening in the Council and explains 
the general scepticism, expressed by Mr. Delors 
on 15th March, about the reality of reactivation, 
which is shared even by those who stress the 
need for it. 
30. Henceforth the public must be kept 
informed of the governments' true intentions. 
Mr. Chirac's proposal on 2nd December 1986 
was intended to allow them to be expressed. 
Mr. De Decker's proposal should lead to their 
adoption being made official by countries which 
will take part in a meeting of heads of state and 
of government. 
31. If the Assembly wishes to play an effective 
part in this twofold undertaking, it too should 
take steps to convince public opinion of the need 
now felt to give accurate, official expression to 
the requirements of European security. This 
seems to have been the aim of the Presidential 
Committee when it referred to the General 
Affairs Committee the proposal made to it on 
organising a public colloquy, bringing together 
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eminent persons who have demonstrated in the 
recent past their competence, authority and per-
sonal commitment to the cause of Europe. 
Several names have been mentioned. Your 
Rapporteur feels he should not reveal them until 
they have given their agreement. 
32. The colloquy would therefore be of a new 
type, different from those already organised by 
the other Assembly committees. The list of 
persons to be invited should not exceed twenty. 
All WEU member countries should be repre-
sented, as should any countries which have 
applied for membership and which have the 
Assembly's backing. A European capital will cer-
tainly wish to host such a colloquy, which might 
be held in autumn 1987 and, in one day, allow 
each participant to say what should be the 
content of a European security charter. A simple 
agenda will set out the chapters, ensuring that 
institutional matters are raised but not given 
priority over the questions facing a European 
security organisation: development of new 
defence systems, disarmament, cohesion of the 
Atlantic Alliance, security in the Mediterranean, 
joint production of armaments. 
33. This is the purpose ofthe draft order in the 
present report. The General Affairs Committee 
agreed on 29th April to meet as soon as this draft 
order has been adopted by the Assembly to fix 
the place, date and duration of the colloquy and 
the topics to be discussed, to draw up a list of 
those to be invited and countries to be repre-
sented and to decide what measures should be 
taken to inform the media and public opinion of 
the aim of the colloquy. 
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Letter from Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly, 
on the mandates of the agencies 
London, 24th March 1987 
14th April 1987 
The purpose of my letter of 17th March 1986 (see Document 1061, Appendix Ill) was to inform 
you about the staff and activities of the agencies for security questions. During the second half of 1986, 
the Council reconsidered the agencies' mandates and instructed me to give you the following details: 
- Agency I will focus its work on two main areas: 
- the first relates to the proposals concerning verification put forward in the context of current 
arms control negotiations; 
- the second relates to Soviet tactics towards Western European countries concerning arms 
control and disarmament issues. 
The Permanent Council has also requested that the agency follow changes in the Soviet positions 
on disarmament and arms control. 
- Agency // has been tasked to continue its reflections on resource management - by analysing 
national defence budgets - and on the non-military aspects of the threat, as well as to examine how 
public opinion in the member countries of WEU perceives the strategic balance. 
With particular regard to resource management, the agency is studying methods of achieving 
genuine comparability of criteria between the western countries, and the rational management of 
defence budgets. The analysis of these budgets is under way. 
- Agency Ill has been tasked to study defence technology from specific viewpoints such as the 
impact of SDI and the influence of various factors on transfers of technology involving the Seven. 
Furthermore, Agency Ill will draw up inventories of the various policies on co-operative 
equipment programmes and defence technology. 
A process of reflection is also under way on the role and future tasks of the Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
The mandates given to the agencies may be revised once the governments have reached an 
agreement on their final structure. 
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Action by the Presidential Committee 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee by 
Mr. van der Werf/, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction 
11. Political activities of the Presidential Committee between sessions 
Ill. Budgetary activities of the Presidential Committee 
I. Introduction 
1. During the first half of this year, the Presi-
dential Committee carried out two specific tasks, 
i.e. the organisation of an extraordinary session 
and budgetary negotiations with the Council, 
which had been assigned tq it by the President of 
the Assembly and the Assembly respectively. 
Furthermore, in the framework of its terms of 
reference, it took the action it considered 
necessary, such as taking up the invitation from 
the Supreme Soviet to visit Moscow for talks 
with leading Soviet authorities. 
2. By organising an extraordinary session of 
the Assembly in Luxembourg and arranging a 
visit by the Bureau to Moscow, the Presidential 
Committee endeavoured to solve specific 
political problems and, through its budgetary 
reorganisation, it sought to provide the Assembly 
with means of working commensurate with its 
task. 
II. Political activities 
of the Presidential Committee 
between sessions 
3. At its session in December 1986, the Presi-
dential Committee was set the task of organising 
an extraordinary session in Luxembourg. This 
mandate originated in a decision by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly to convene the Assembly 
again before the June ordinary session to allow it 
capital of the country having the chairmanship-
in-office of the Council, i.e. Luxembourg, on a 
date as close as possible to that of the ministerial 
meeting. 
4. Because of the reductions made by the 
Council in the budget of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1987, very strict economy mea-
sures were adopted to keep expenditure relating 
to this session to a minimum. 
5. However, an entirely new event arose 
before the extraordinary session could be held. 
This was the invitation from the Supreme Soviet 
to a delegation from the Presidential Committee 
to visit the Soviet Union in order to discuss, 
inter alia, East-West relations, disarmament and 
peace. 
6. The Presidential Committee first noted 
that this invitation departed from the traditional 
line of the Soviet Union which strongly criticises 
WEU and is against establishing relations with a 
European forum in which the conditions for 
security and maintaining peace in Europe are 
examined with a view to better harmonisation. 
After a vote, it was decided by a very large 
majority to accept the principle of this invi-
tation. 
7. The Presidential Committee then con-
sidered that only the Bureau would constitute an 
appropriate delegation, with the addition of one 
other member to ensure that all the political 
groups were represented. 
to give its views, before the meeting of the 8. As the Presidential Committee wished the 
Council of Ministers, on disarmament matters Assembly to be fully informed at its extraor-
that had been referred back to committee, on the dinary session, the conditions in which this visit 
reactivation of WEU and on the promotion of took place were described in a memorandum by 
the European security charter proposed by the the President of the Assembly. Your Rapporteur 
Prime Minister of France at the last session. This will not therefore dwell on the way the Bureau 
extraordinary session was to be held in the was received during its visit or on the interest of 
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its talks. He will merely recall that the Bureau 
had no intention of embarking upon negotiations 
for which it was not responsible or adopting 
positions of a technical nature. Its aim, in 
accordance with the position always upheld by 
the Assembly, was to assert Western Europe's 
right to define and express its own interests in 
security matters. This message seems to have 
been heard since the speech by Mr. Gorbachev, 
General Secretary of the Communist Party, in 
Prague on 9th April, i.e. the day before the 
Bureau returned to Paris, responded to remarks 
during the Moscow talks on the too limited 
nature of the zero option for medium-range mis-
siles, which could be evaded by developing 
shorter-range missiles. 
9. Still in order to allow the Assembly to 
remain faithful to its vocation of ensuring that 
Europe has a say in matters which concern it, the 
Presidential Committee wished the Assembly at 
its extraordinary session to examine a motion for 
a recommendation under urgent procedure to 
ask the Council to give its collegiate view on 
Mr. Gorbachev's proposals and to ask the 
Chairman-in-Office to present the Council's 
views on this matter at the meetings to be held 
by the North Atlantic Council on 11th and 12th 
June. 
10. The adoption of this recommendation by 
the Assembly marks its support for the Council 
in its reactivation work which must be com-
pleted. 
11. For the Assembly to carry out its task, 
which is to stimulate rather than supervise, it 
must have the wherewithal to conduct a dialogue 
with the Council. The Presidential Committee 
therefore attached great importance to the 
success of the budgetary negotiations it had been 
instructed to conduct with the Council. 
Ill. Budgetary activities 
of the Presidential Committee 
12. In the budgetary negotiations last autumn, 
the Council asked the Assembly to make a 
number of reductions in the budget it had sub-
mitted in accordance with traditional pro-
cedure. 
13. However, the Council specified that it was 
continuing to study in detail the problem of the 
place of pensions in the budget of the 
organisation and would study in detail the 
restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as soon as 
possible. 
14. The position adopted by the Council did 
not therefore seem final. There was a possibility 
of improvement. At the second part of its thirty-
second ordinary session, the Assembly therefore 
addressed an order to the Presidential Corn-
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mittee instructing it to negotiate with the 
Council to obtain a favourable opinion on a sup-
plementary budget taking into consideration the 
requirements of the Assembly as set out in the 
memorandum on the structure of the Office of 
the Clerk and the initial draft budget for 1987 
which applied most of the provisions of that 
memorandum. 
15. The President of the Assembly met the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Poos, in 
Luxembourg on 1Oth March. During these very 
cordial talks, the Deputy Prime Minister of 
Luxembourg repeated the proposals he had made 
to the Assembly last December, i.e. to separate 
the pensions budget from the operational budget 
of the WEU organs, to apply for WEU a growth 
rate identical to the one applied in the European 
Communities and, finally, to recognise the 
Assembly's budgetary independence, it being 
understood that it would be entitled to manage 
its budget freely within the limits of agreed 
appropriations. 
16. It should be recalled that a separate budget 
for pensions and the Assembly's budgetary inde-
pendence had been called for in many recom-
mendations. 
17. The President of the Assembly therefore 
expressed his agreement with these proposals 
and trusted that they might be applied as from 
the current financial year in order to allow him 
to meet the wish expressed by the Assembly in 
Order 65. 
18. The application of the three principles 
defined by Mr. Poos allowed the Assembly to 
play its part in the reactivation process, to recruit 
staff considered essential for the efficient pursuit 
of the Assembly's work and to regrade certain 
posts to improve the structure of the Office of 
the Clerk. 
19. The Presidential Committee met the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council in Paris on 
31st March. It unanimously endorsed the three 
principles defined by Mr. Poos relating to the 
budget ofWEU and its Assembly. At the extraor-
dinary session, the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration was therefore able, in 
agreement with the Presidential Committee, to 
adopt unanimously a draft recommendation 
asking the Council to implement without delay 
the three principles of an identical growth rate 
for WEU and the Communities, a separate pen-
sions budget and the Assembly's budgetary inde-
pendence. 
20. This draft recommendation was adopted, 
also unanimously, by the Assembly and trans-
mitted immediately to the Council which was 
meeting at the same time. 
21. A few hours later, Mr. Poos, reporting to 
the Assembly on the results of the Council's 
work, said the Council had just agreed to 
improve the situation of the Assembly " by 
accepting a separate budget from the ordinary 
budget to meet the growing financial implica-
tions of pensions". It had also agreed "to inde-
pendent budgetary management, within the 
limits of agreed appropriations". 
22. Finally, the Council was to examine in 
greater detail the method of calculating inflation 
rates applicable to the ordinary budget. 
23. The Presidential Committee is gratified 
that the Council, thanks to the efforts of the 
presidency, has recognised the validity of the 
Assembly's requests, and thus allowed it to carry 
out the mandate set out in Order 65. 
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24. The Assembly's steering body is now 
endeavouring to implement Order 67, also 
adopted unanimously by the Assembly at its 
extraordinary session in Luxembourg. In this 
text, the Assembly invites the Presidential Com-
mittee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration " to take the necessary steps 
to implement, during the present financial year, 
the provisions decided upon for improving the 
structure of the Office of the Clerk ". 
25. The Presidential Committee in no way 
intends to depart from its habitual policy of 
budgetary rigour, but in implementing these pro-
visions it is endeavouring to adapt the Assembly 
to the new situation so that it may improve is 
contribution to the reactivation of WEU. 
Document 1103 29th May 1987 
Written Questions 273 and 274 and reply of the Council 
to Written Question 273 
QUESTION 273 
put by Mr. Close 
on 26th November 1986 
In the discussions between President 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik, con-
sideration was given to eliminating intermediate-
range missiles (cruise and Pershing 11 missiles on 
one side, SS-20s on the other), with the exception 
of a hundred SS-20s based in the Asian part of 
the Soviet Union and a hundred missiles of an 
equivalent type based in the United States. 
This preagreement said nothing about the 
SS-21 s, SS-22s and SS-23s deployed by the 
Soviet Union in the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia. 
Can the Council answer the following 
questions: 
1. Since the SS-2ls, SS-22s and SS-23s 
remain in place and the hundred SS-20s 
deployed in Asia are mobile and can be brought 
back to Europe at very short notice, what is left 
of deterrence at European level and the coupling 
between the United States and Europe so widely 
evoked to justify undeniably the deployment of 
Euromissiles in five European countries? 
2. Even if these agreements take no tangible 
form in view of the impossibility of agreeing on 
the question of the strategic defence initiative, it 
can be seen that the Soviet Union is conducting a 
vast psychological offensive to bring European 
and American points of view into conflict, which 
is their major strategic goal. 
What is Europe's answer to this point in 
NATO and above all in Western European 
Union? 
3. Why did the Council not define a joint 
European position taking account of the require-
ments of a strategy based on nuclear deterrence 
and the security of Europe before the Reykjavik 
talks started? 
4. In what I consider to be the unlikely event 
of a five- and ten-year timetable leading to the 
total elimination of nuclear weapons, can it rea-
sonably be expected that the United States space 
system would be set up and operational in such a 
short lapse of time? If not, does the Council not 
consider that Europe would be in the position of 
a hostage in view of the considerable Soviet 
superiority in conventional forces and chemical 
weapons? 
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5. In view of the lessons to be learned from 
the "truncated summit meeting", does the 
Council not consider that the strengthening of 
the European pillar of the alliance in WEU 
should be effected urgently in a spirit of political 
and military co-operation which is lacking at 
present? What steps does it intend to take to 
bring about this strengthening? 
6. Is it not therefore essential to conduct a 
vast information campaign among public 
opinion and to make it aware of the conditions 
necessary for guaranteeing Europe's security and 
warding off the risks of a third world war? Is the 
Council prepared to grant the Assembly the 
means necessary for taking part in this infor-
mation campaign? Is it determined to take part 
in the campaign itself and by what means? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 21st May 1987 
1. Deterrence and the coupling of the United 
States and Europe are assured through the 
alliance and the commitment of the United 
States to Europe. Accordingly, the communique 
of the ministerial meeting of WEU, held on 28th 
April 1987 in Luxembourg, recalled the indi-
visible nature of security in the North Atlantic 
Treaty area, and re-emphasised the essential 
commitment of the United States and Canada to 
the defence of Europe. The presence of United 
States nuclear forces and the presence of United 
States troops in Europe remain indispensable for 
the security of the whole alliance. 
At this same meeting, ministers examined 
with interest the growing possibility of an 
agreement aimed at the total elimination of 
American and Soviet longer-range intermediate 
land-based nuclear missiles, which should be 
effectively verifiable. They fully support the 
United States efforts for its conclusion. 
Ministers recalled their serious concern at 
the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range 
intermediate nuclear missiles and the 
requirement not to neglect this in any INF 
agreement. In this context, they noted that the 
Soviet Union had, in response to earlier pro-
posals tabled by the United States, recently made 
statements on these missiles, the content of 
which should be carefully studied as soon as they 
are clarified in writing. They underlined the 
importance of ongoing consultations within the 
alliance. 
2. WEU member states welcomed on dif-
ferent occasions the fact that Mr. Gorbachev has 
dropped the artificial linkage between an INF 
agreement and SDI. 
3. WEU ministers also stated that their over-
riding objective remains to strengthen peace in 
freedom and to prevent any kind of war or 
intimidation by military means. They reaffirmed 
that there is, for the foreseeable future, no alter-
native to the western concept for the prevention 
of war, which must continue to be based on an 
appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear 
forces which together provide a credible 
deterrent against all forms of aggression. 
4. In the same Luxembourg communique, 
ministers underlined the great importance which 
they attach to progress also being made in the 
field of strategic weapons and reiterated their 
support for United States proposals for a 50% 
reduction of Soviet and American strategic 
offensive forces as a matter of priority. As for 
negotiations on space and defence systems, every 
effort must be made in Geneva to arrive at 
agreement on the relationship between United 
States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons 
and defensive systems with the aim of strength-
ening strategic stability. 
Ministers reiterated that reductions in 
nuclear weapons would increase the importance 
of removing the conventional superiority of the 
Warsaw Pact and eliminating chemical weapons, 
given the need for a stable balance at all 
times. 
Ministers stressed their determination to 
intensify their efforts to strengthen stability and 
security in the whole of Europe, through 
increased openness and establishment of a veri-
fiable, comprehensive and stable balance of con-
ventional forces at lower levels. They recalled the 
Brussels declaration of 11th December 1986. 
They expressed their hope that the informal dis-
cussions taking place in Vienna in a constructive 
atmosphere would, within a reasonable time, 
lead to an agreement allowing the opening of 
new negotiations on conventional arms control 
in Europe aimed at eliminating existing dispar-
ities. 
They recalled at the same time their deter-
mination to strive for the continuation of the 
conference on confidence and security-building 
measures in Europe. 
Only a stable East-West balance of forces 
at each stage of the arms control process can 
ensure security in Western Europe. 
Ministers also underlined their com-
mitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive 
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and effectively verifiable, global ban on chemical 
weapons. 
5. The reactivation of WEU, decided at the 
ministerial meeting in Rome in October 1984, 
has been actively pursued and is now a reality. 
The practice of holding regular meetings of 
political directors will significantly strengthen 
the process of consultation within WEU, as will 
the participation of representatives of defence 
ministries. In Luxembourg, in April 1987, 
ministers took note of an interim report on 
European security interests in the present stra-
tegic context which had been drawn up by a 
special working group, consisting of representa-
tives of both foreign affairs and defence minis-
tries. This report was prepared in accordance 
with the mandate set out at the informal minis-
terial meeting of the WEU Council in Luxem-
bourg on 13th and 14th November 1986. 
6. The Council shares the view of the 
honourable member that public awareness on 
defence issues is important. The Council and the 
Assembly both have an important role to play in 
this respect, making best use of the resources 
available to the organisation. 
QUESTION 274 
put by Mr. Fourre 
on 8th April 1987 
At the end of 1986, the group of wise men 
which the IEPG asked to give an opinion on the 
competitivity of the European industrial network 
in the armaments sector published its report. 
Inter alia, it concluded that it was necessary to 
make a permanent administrative structure 
available to the IEPG ministers of defence. 
Considering that: 
1. paragraphs 4 and 10 of the 1955 deci-
sions setting up a Standing Armaments 
Committee make it possible to asso-
ciate any member country of the 
Atlantic Alliance with the work of and 
agreements and arrangements drawn up 
in that body. The economic and 
juridical study of the armaments sector 
of WEU member countries' industry 
benefited at the start from co-operation 
between the IEPG and the SAC, as did 
the study on the armaments industry in 
Japan by the former international secre-
tariat, thus showing the possibility of 
conducting such studies in this 
framework where NATO observers can 
follow the operation directly; 
2. such co-operation might give Spain, 
which now has the chairmanship-in-
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office of the IEPG, an opportunity of 
co-operation leading towards accession 
to WEU; 
3. it would be for the Council to make the 
necessary arrangements for the partici-
pation of interested non-WEU member 
countries in such activities; 
4. the Assembly, through the intermediary 
of its liaison subcommittee on the joint 
production of armaments, would 
thereby have a means of making a 
direct contribution to a debate to which 
the growing need to develop conven-
tional weapons and the breakthrough of 
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emerging technology should give a new 
dimension, 
would the Council be prepared to propose that 
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
save setting up a new European administrative 
structure by making the SAC, which has a secre-
tariat in Agency Ill, responsible for co-ordinating 
and conducting studies which would be useful 
for the work of the IEPG? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
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The Assembly, 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 438 to 441; 
extraordinary session Recommendations 442 to 445 
RECOMMENDATION 438 1 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 2 
29th May 1987 
(i) Emphasising that the explanatory memorandum to the present report is an essential factor that 
cannot be separated from the recommendation; 
(ii) Noting that the Council's replies to Recommendations 432, 433 and 435 reached the Assembly in 
time to allow a true dialogue with the Council; 
(iii) Welcoming the intention expressed by the Council henceforth to report on its activities twice a 
year; 
(iv) Noting that the thirty-first annual report of the Council reports on the definition of a European 
position towards the United States strategic defence initiative; 
(v) Regretting however that the report makes no mention of decisions on other important matters; 
(vi) Considering that the harmonisation of European positions on disarmament and the limitation of 
armaments has assumed new importance since the Reykjavik meeting; 
(vii) Recalling that, if Europe is to speak with one voice, it is essential for all member countries of 
WEU to take part on an equal footing in defining a European position on disarmament and the limi-
tation of armaments; 
(viii) Recalling the importance of official procedure in regard to the Council's own activities and also 
exchanges between the Council and the Assembly; 
(ix) Still unaware of the action the Council has taken on its document on WEU and public awareness; 
(x) Noting that the Council has not yet followed up its promise to communicate to the Assembly, 
insofar as the needs of secrecy allow, the reports the new agencies submit to it; 
(xi) Considering that the Council gives no information about the role it assigns to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee or the activities of that body; 
(xii) Noting that the Council makes no mention of any action taken on studies by the SAC, its interna-
tional secretariat or the three agencies set up in 1985; 
(xiii) Noting that the Council recognises that the WEU agencies as well as other bodies" must also take 
account of terrorism when analysing the different threats facing Europe " but that the Council itself has 
not followed up this recognition; 
(xiv) Emphasising that these failings are making the press, public opinion and the WEU countries' 
partners in the Atlantic Alliance express ever stronger doubts about the governments' will to follow up 
the Rome declaration; 
(xv) Recalling that any lapse by WEU in areas for which it is responsible will jeopardise the present 
and future of Western Europe as a whole and that no institution is able to take over the place the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty reserves for WEU; 
(xvi) Considering that the principle of zero growth as interpreted and practised is progressively pre-
venting the Assembly from taking part in the reactivation of WEU, 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 during the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (IIth sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
1078). 
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Confirm its intention to apply in full the decisions in the Rome declaration; 
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be 
held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, the joint views of the Council on the implications of the 
Reykjavik meeting; 
3. Say whether the composition of the Permanent Council allows it to apply these decisions and 
indicate what steps it intends to take to this end; 
4. Make official all the information it transmits to the Assembly, even if such information has previ-
ously been given in informal communications to some of its organs; 
5. Inform the Assembly about the purpose and methods of ministers of defence attending its 
meetings at ministerial level and the results thus obtained; 
6. Inform the Assembly about its activities at its meetings at the level of political directors; 
7. Communicate to the Assembly the conclusions it has drawn from its work on disarmament, 
account being taken of the studies submitted to it by Agency I; 
8. Integrate in WEU the working group on security in Europe set up by France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United Kingdom, in order to ensure the participation of all member countries; 
9. Explain the action it intends to take on the observation in its reply to Recommendation 435 that 
the terrorist threat forms part of the matters for which it is responsible and whose study can be assigned 
to the agencies; 
10. Ensure that the WEU agencies receive the information they need to carry out their mandates 
effectively; 
11. Inform the Assembly in detail of the tasks assigned to the SAC on the one hand and the IEPG on 
the other in the light of each group's specific characteristics; 
12. Specify in particular what conclusions the IEPG reached on the economic inquiry into the 
European armaments industries which, according to the note from the Council transmitted to the 
Assembly on 23rd February 1978 (Document 769), it was asked to prepare in 1977; 
13. Tell the Assembly how it intends to follow up the studies on the European armaments industries 
carried out by the SAC; 
14. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on the steps it has taken to strengthen "co-
operation between existing European institutes for security studies "; 
15. Explain to the Assembly how it intends to keep the press informed of each of its activities; 
16. Give a positive answer without further delay to Portugal's application to join WEU; 
17. Stop depriving the Assembly of the material means essential for the exercise and development of 
its work. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 438 
1. At its meeting at ministeria1level in November 19861n Luxembourg, the Council confirmed its 
firm intention to pursue actively the implementation of the Rome declaration and to accomplish 
successfully the reactivation of WEU. 
2. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, reported to the North 
Atlantic Council in Brussels on 11th December last on the results of the ministerial meeting in Luxem-
bourg. 
3. The reactivation ofWEU also involves the strengthening of its structures and the improvement of 
its working methods. The Permanent Council will continue to co-ordinate all the organisation's activ-
ities. The practice of holding regular meetings of political directors will significantly strengthen the 
process of consultation within WEU, as will the participation ofrepresentatives of defence ministries. A 
special working group, consisting of representatives of both foreign affairs and defence ministries, is in 
the process of studying questions relating to European security interests. 
4. The Council will, in its report, continue to keep the Assembly informed about its activities. With 
the aim of improving the dialogue with the Assembly, the Council now presents this report in two six-
monthly parts. 
5. Information on the participation of defence ministers in the ministerial meetings is given to the 
Assembly when the presidency meets the latter after the ministerial meetings, addresses it during its 
sessions and in the Council's reports. 
6. The political directors make an important contribution to the new activities of WEU, in par-
ticular to the preparation of ministerial meetings. The Assembly is informed of the results of these 
meetings, as indicated in the foregoing paragraph. 
7. The Permanent Council has discussed the reports prepared by Agency I and, as the Assembly has 
already been informed, has drawn up new guidelines for the further work of this agency. 
8. There is no working group set up by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom on security in Europe. 
9. The Council would again underline that many collective efforts are being made to combat 
terrorism by WEU member countries in other international, and in particular European, bodies. As 
stated in its reply to Recommendation 435, WEU does not wish to duplicate the work of these other 
bodies. 
10. The Permanent Council is aware of the importance of the agencies having adequate technical data 
for carrying out their work and has made a number of demarches to this end; in particular, the national 
administrations have now been asked to assist the agencies in this respect. 
11. As indicated in its reply to Written Question 271, the Council has decided to undertake a process 
of reflection on the role ofthe SAC. Final conclusions could be drawn only at the end of the transitional 
period. 
12. As stated in the reply to Recommendation 437, the Council cannot provide detailed information 
on current or planned activities of the IEPG as this information involves a number of non-WEU 
member countries. Accordingly, the honourable members wishing to receive more detailed information 
should approach their national administrations directly. 
The Council can, however, inform the Assembly that the IEPG did not draw specific conclusions 
from the economic survey of the European armaments industry and that it tasked the European defence 
industries studies team to formulate recommendations. 
13. When the review of the role and future tasks of the SAC has been completed, as referred to in 
paragraph 11 above, the Council will be better placed to indicate further action to the Assembly. 
14. It was agreed at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg last November that European seminars 
on defence should be organised with the aid of European educational institutes. For their part, research 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 31st March 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th April 1987. 
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institutes of the member countries are examining the possibility of strengthening their co-operation in 
those areas coming within the purview of WEU. 
15. The Chairman-in-Office informs the press about WEU activities after each ministerial meeting. 
The Secretary-General has given numerous public talks about WEU in both Europe and the United 
States, which are often attended by media representatives. He has also published articles about WEU in 
a number of different journals. The Secretariat-General has arranged press briefing sessions and media 
discussions between ministerial meetings and maintains regular contact with the press to provide it with 
appropriate information. 
16. At their meeting in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986, ministers confirmed the 
position on the question of enlargement which has already been set out in the Council's reply to Written 
Question 265 and in the first part of its thirty-second annual report. 
17. The Council is aware of the fact that the Assembly should have adequate resources in order to 
carry out its work. 
The Council must also take account of the budgetary constraints existing in the seven member 
states. 
It is in this context that the Council will examine the Assembly's concern. 
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RECOMMENDATION 439 1 
on European security and the Mediterranean 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Convinced that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union toward~ the Middle East 
region and the Mediterranean area has not changed; 
(ii) Believing however that the military threat from Warsaw Pact forces in the Medi,erranean area has 
not increased since the committee's last report; · 
(iii) Condemning the continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the perpetration of 
atrocities against the Afghan resistance forces and population; 
(iv) Concerned at the latent dangers arising from conflicts and crises particularly in the eastern and 
southern parts of the Mediterranean area which exert direct or indirect influence upon the interests and 
positions of allied countries; 
(v) Drawing particular attention to the political and military instability in the Middle East region 
caused by the unsolved Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab disunity, Libyan and Syrian involvement in world 
terrorism and, last but not least, by Islamic belligerent fundamentalism in some countries of the region; 
(vi) Welcoming Spain's decision to remain a member of NATO; 
(vii) Believing that European security and security in the Mediterranean area depend also on appro-
priate diplomatic efforts to reach agreed and verifiable arms control measures, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Establish common adequate and convincing policies, which it should implement and publicise, 
when and where appropriate, and which should be defined and intended: 
1. To demonstrate more publicly the collective responsibility of the western alliances for defence in 
the Mediterranean area: 
(i) by supporting joint NATO forces and their exercises in the region and co-ordinating mari-
time surveillance under COMMARAIRMED; 
(ii) by recommending that peacetime actions of forces of NATO countries in the areas covered 
by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be oriented towards NATO policies; 
(iii) by making all efforts to secure and maintain the operational freedom of forces pf NATO 
countries in the Mediterranean area, in full accordance with international law and the prin-
ciple of the freedom of the seas; 
(iv) by emphasising the need for the continued presence of United States forces in the area thus 
helping to improve European defence capability in this particular part of the continent. 
2. To stress the absolute need to maintain proper military stability in the region, particularly by pro-
viding military aid for the modernisation of the equipment of the Portuguese, Greek and Turkish armed 
forces; 
3. To persuade Spain to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with ACE mobile force, the naval 
on-call force Mediterranean, Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, and by contributing a 
mobile force for reinforcement of allied contingents in the Mediterranean, as well as by reporting 
defence data to NATO as customary with all other NATO members; 
4. To pay proper attention and give due consideration to Turkey's key political and strategic 
position on the Middle East land bridge and to its important defence assignments in NA TO's south-
eastern flank; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 during the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalfofthe Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 1073). 
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5. To persuade Greece and Turkey to resume bilateral negotiations to solve their Aegean issues, 
inter alia with a view to permitting normal co-operation of Greek forces with NATO plans and to com-
pleting the NATO command structure in the area; 
6. To persuade all relevant parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially in the disturbing 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to find a final and lasting solution, thereby removing the inspiration and 
causes of terrorism, and reducing one peripheral threat to the region; 
7. To continue to support the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and Cyprus; 
8. To encourage the two communities in Cyprus to resume direct contacts to discuss all issues which 
will assist in finding an agreed solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United 
Nations Secretary-General; 
9. To recall Egypt's commitment to pursue the search for a peace settlement between the Arab world 
and Israel and, by political support, economic assistance and due consideration for its security 
problems, to encourage that country to continue relevant efforts in that direction; 
10. To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situation of the peoples 
of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region. 
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1. The Council is aware of the great importance of the Mediterranean region for European security. 
It can assure the Assembly that the governments of the western countries consult one another regularly 
on developments in the region. However, it would remind the Assembly that the operational responsi-
bility for NATO forces lies with the Atlantic Alliance. At their meeting in Venice in April 1986, the 
ministers of the WEU Council exchanged views on the risks of destabilisation in the Mediterranean 
region and underlined the role which the countries of Western Europe can continue to play to reduce 
tension in that area. As announced at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in November 1986, 
France and Italy are to submit to the Council a preliminary study on questions raised by security in this 
region. 
WEU member states emphasise the importance of maintaining the presence of American forces in 
this region as part of the defence effort of the alliance. 
2. Ministers of the alliance have frequently emphasised the need to contribute towards the strength-
ening of the defences of Greece, Portugal and Turkey to enable them to play their part even more effec-
tively in the collective defence of the alliance. 
3. WEU member states welcome the decision of the Spanish people in favour of the Atlantic 
Alliance and consider that this should make it possible to work out arrangements for Spanish partici-
pation which would be satisfactory to Spain and the other allies. 
4. The member countries ofWEU are aware of the crucial geopolitical position of Turkey and of the 
other Mediterranean countries of the Atlantic Alliance and fully appreciate the contribution which these 
countries make to the common defence. 
5. The Seven share the Assembly's hope that Greece and Turkey may, through bilateral negotiations, 
resolve their differences, including the Aegean issue. This would have beneficial effects on the situation 
of the alliance on the southern flank. 
6. As underlined in the declaration on the Middle East adopted by ministers of the Twelve in 
Luxembourg on 23rd February 1987, the member countries ofWEU reaffirm their willingness to help 
find a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In order to bring an end to this situation which has 
for long posed a serious threat to both regional and global stability, concerted political action is required 
on the part of all those seeking a peaceful settlement. In this context, the Twelve stated that they are in 
favour of, and would endeavour to make an active contribution to, an international peace conference to 
be held under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of the parties concerned and of 
any party able to make a direct and positive contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace. 
They also stated that this conference should provide a suitable framework for the n~essary negotiations 
between the parties directly concerned. 
7. WEU member states have reaffirmed their support for the mandate of the United Nations interim 
force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). They have expressed the hope that UNIFIL's mandate, as laid down in 
relevant Security Council resolutions, can be carried out to the full. They deplore the recent attacks 
against this force and the resulting loss of life. 
WEU member states wish to reiterate their support for the United Nations peace-keeping force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP). They are convinced that this force is still playing an important role. 
8. The member states ofWEU have also expressed their support for the establishment of direct con-
tacts between the two communities in Cyprus with a view to finding a solution to the political problem 
through the good offices ofthe United Nations Secretary-General. They believe that this approach offers 
the best prospects for a peaceful, fair and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. 
9. As already stated in paragraph 6, the member states ofWEU support all efforts made to promote 
peace between the Arab states and Israel. They are following with interest the efforts made by Egypt and 
Israel to consolidate their relations. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1987. 
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They note the endeavours being made by Egypt to overcome its current economic difficulties and 
support the government's efforts to reach an agreement with the IMF on a realistic recovery pro-
gramme. They would draw the Assembly's attention to the financial assistance which WEU member 
states are giving to Egypt bilaterally or through international organisations. 
10. WEU member states encourage all appropriate measures, notably those of an economic and social 
nature, which may help to create greater stability in the Mediterranean region. 
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RECOMMENDATION 440 1 
on European helicopters for the 1990s 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising the failure of West European armies to exploit fully the military potential of the heli-
copter, especially compared to the emphasis placed upon helicopter operations by the armies of the 
United States and the Soviet Union; 
(ii) Aware of the need to harmonise more closely operational doctrines for the utilisation of heli-
copters in Western Europe and to meet more effectively the challenge posed by the helicopter prepon-
derance of the Warsaw Pact forces; 
(iii) Stressing the need for harmonising the requirements and re-equipment timescales for helicopters 
by NATO; 
(iv) Conscious of the commercial difficulties of helicopter manufacturers in Western Europe and the 
negligible market for civil helicopters in Europe compared to the United States; 
(v) Concerned at the relative industrial and technical advantages enjoyed by the United States heli-
copter industry owing to the economies of scale of the large military market for helicopters within the 
United States; 
(vi) Regretting that European co-operation in the helicopter field has not been more successful, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Concert a strategy for the future of the helicopter industry in the member states ofWEU based on 
transnational co-operation; 
2. Impress forcefully upon the western alliance the benefits of firepower against armour, mobility, 
surprise and flexibility of operation inherent in the helicopter; 
3. Tackle vigorously the problems of overcapacity, short production runs for military helicopters 
and poor profitability which characterise the West European helicopter industry; 
4. Secure a co-ordinated programme through the IEPG, but reporting progress to this Assembly, to 
harmonise helicopter doctrines and operational requirements with a view to ensuring the joint pro-
curement within the alliance of more helicopters, but of fewer types; 
5. Meet the industrial and technical challenge to European helicopter manufacturers posed by the 
United States, not by a policy of exclusion of American rotorcraft or investment, but by encouraging the 
governments of WEU member countries to give the European helicopter industry adequate support in 
terms of orders; 
6. Work with the Assembly to create a political will within the member states favourable to interna-
tional and especially European collaboration and against the protectionist and parochial nationalistic 
pressures in the helicopter field as in other key areas of high technology and industry of strategic impor-
tance. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1986 during the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (12th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 1077). 
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1. The Council shares the Assembly's convtctwn that helicopters have considerable military 
potential. The armed forces of the member countries ofWEU are aware ofthe advantages referred to by 
the Assembly. Any decision about the size of future military helicopter procurement programmes will be 
taken by defence ministers in accordance with the missions to be accomplished by their forces and the 
resources available. 
2. Through their participation in bodies such as the IEPG the member countries of WEU are 
actively pursuing a policy of co-operation in the field of armaments procurement. This policy offers mil-
itary benefits in that it leads to greater standardisation and/or greater interoperability. From the indus-
trial angle it allows longer production runs. 
The Council would like to draw attention to their positive experience in Europe in connection 
with joint helicopter procurement which has led to programmes such as the Lynx/Puma/Gazelle 
package and to joint projects designed to meet European requirements well into the next century in all 
categories of helicopter, including both transport and attack versions, but at present with the exception 
of the heavy-lift type. This applies in particular to the EH-101, between Italy and the United Kingdom, 
the Tonal light attack helicopter- derived from the A129-LAH- between Italy, the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Spain, as well as the PAH2-HAC/PAC between France and Germany. Fur-
thermore, the European countries are engaged in engine development for these projects. 
European helicopter co-operation between France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom 
(Netherlands and Spain are considering accession) provides a forum for harmonisation of European 
helicopter programmes and collaboration in development and production. Participants in this forum 
launched successful collaborative work on the definition of the NATO helicopter programme (NH-90) 
in which these countries have tried to fulfil the requirements of their armed forces for the nineties. It is 
expected that 600 NH-90 helicopters will be produced. 
Part of the work undertaken by the IEPG in its aeronautical sector study concerns the identifi-
cation of key technologies required for future generations of aircraft. This identification should make it 
possible to maintain and strengthen Europe's position by improving its capability to co-operate and 
compete on an equal footing with NATO's transatlantic members. 
3. It is clear from the collaborative helicopter programmes in which WEU member states are already 
involved that they have the necessary political will to co-operate in this field. Ministers in Luxembourg 
restated their resolve to continue their efforts towards the establishment in Europe of the technological 
and industrial base necessary to ensure the development of a strong and competitive European arma-
ments industry, this being an important aspect of Europe's contribution to defence. In this connection, 
they reaffirmed the importance they attach to the generation of more, and more systematic, collabo-
ration in the field of conventional armaments. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th May 1987. 
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RECOMMENDATION 441 1 
on developments in the Soviet Union and East- West relations 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that for forty years the Soviet Union has constantly pursued a degree of military 
deployment not justified by the requirements of its security; 
(ii) Considering that, in spite ofthe Helsinki final act, the measures taken in the name of detente have 
led to no true alleviation of the internal dictatorship in the USSR nor to an improvement in the situ-
ation in the peoples' democracies; 
(iii) Noting that the size of the amounts the Soviet Union allocates to defence is one of the funda-
mental reasons for the persistence of economic difficulties and that any true transformation in the 
Soviet Union requires a reduction in its military effort; 
(iv) Considering that the new Soviet authorities seem aware of the need to make this reduction; 
(v) Considering in particular that the progress the latter have made in informing the Soviet and 
foreign public in 1986 may be the start of an important new turn in Soviet internal policy and in that 
country's external relations; 
(vi) Considering that the determination shown by the Soviet Government to improve the standard of 
living of the population should lead it to seek agreements allowing it to reduce its military expenditure; 
(vii) Noting in fact that since 15th January 1986 the highest Soviet authorities have presented many 
proposals which could allow meaningful negotiations to be started on the limitation of armaments; 
(viii) Welcoming in particular the results obtained at the Stockholm conference on the verification of 
confidence-building measures; 
(ix) Regretting however that the speeches of Soviet leaders have not always resulted in effective con-
cessions in international negotiations; 
(x) Regretting that the Reykjavik meeting did not allow the bases for these negotiations to be fixed, 
but trusting that it nevertheless allowed a substantial rapprochement of views likely to lead, in the near 
future, to agreement between the United States and Soviet Union on the goal oftrue negotiations which 
would take account of the strategy now in force and of which deterrence is the keystone at every level; 
(xi) Recalling that western security is ensured by a relative balance in forces - which should be 
brought to the lowest possible level - in all areas and that at the present time this balance has not been 
achieved in Europe in the conventional field and particularly in that of chemical weapons where the 
Soviet Union has a near monopoly in Europe; 
(xii) Considering it is essential for the countries of Western Europe to harmonise the~r views on ques-
tions concerning the limitation of armaments and to make them known to their American partners; 
(xiii) Considering that the WEU Council has a decisive role to play in this matter and gratified that it 
has instructed one of the new agencies to study Soviet proposals; 
(xiv) Considering that the requirements of European security must also guide rela~ions of all kinds 
between the West and the Soviet Union, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Develop as a matter of urgency its consultations and work with a view to defining European posi-
tions on armaments and the limitation of armaments as it has done for the strategic defence initiative; 
2. Convey these positions to the United States before negotiations on the limitation of armaments 
are started; 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (14th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Close on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1 079). 
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3. Proceed in like manner to study the Soviet Union's attempts to transfer to the countries of the 
third world the struggle it calls " anti-imperialist " ; 
4. Seek an agreement between all the western countries to avoid undue competition continuing to 
allow the Soviet Union to have the West contribute, even indirectly, to the development of its military 
effort; 
5. Ask the member countries to increase their effort to ensure a balance of conventional forces in 
Europe in order to facilitate an agreement on the reduction of the number of Euromissiles without jeo-
pardising the security of Europe as it now is by the deployment of Soviet short-range Euromissiles, 
including SS-21s, SS-23s and SS-24s; 
6. Make every effort to ensure that the current negotiations in Geneva result without delay in an 
agreement on a verified worldwide ban on chemical weapons. 
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1. The Council devoted the major part of its November ministerial session in Luxembourg to eva-
luating East-West relations in the light of the Reykjavik meeting. There was convergence of views on 
many aspects of its implications for European security interests. Further consideration of these matters 
is now taking place with the participation of the political directors and senior representatives of defence 
ministries. A major contribution to these reflections will also be made by the special working group. 
2. The WEU member states consult closely with the United States on arms control and other 
security questions both bilaterally and within the alliance. These consultations form part of the fabric of 
the alliance and help to ensure the maintenance of its cohesion. 
3. The Council and agencies examine problems which directly affect European security interests. 
They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. 
4. All WEU member states have emphasised - notably during the CSCE negotiations - their support 
for an improvement in the economic links between the countries of East and West. The Council would 
emphasise that appropriate procedures exist among western countries to ensure that no contribution is 
made - even indirectly - to the development of the Soviet Union's military effort. 
5. The Council recalls the North Atlantic Council communique of 12th December 1986 which stated 
that reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the importance of removing conventional disparities 
between East and West, and of eliminating chemical weapons, and that an effective resolution of these 
issues is an essential requirement for real and enduring stability and security in Europe. The WEU 
Council continues to follow closely developments in this field. 
6. The member countries of WEU have on many occasions stated their desire for a general, com-
plete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles. On 
12th December 1986 in Brussels, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Atlantic Alliance again expressed 
their willingness to seek at the Geneva conference on disarmament a convention which meets this 
objective. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1987. 
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RECOMMENDATION 442 1 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part I: The reactivation of WEU 2 
(i) Considering that the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a 
European security charter, provide an opportunity for a fundamental re-examination of the require-
ments of that security; 
(ii) Considering that the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance remains the guarantee 
of that security; 
(iii) Considering that the main threats to international peace now arise in areas not covered by the 
alliance; 
(iv) Considering that European co-operation in armaments matters has become essential for the 
security of Europe; 
(v) Considering that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the 
maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority but that this search must not jeopardise 
the security of Europe; 
(vi) Considering that the recent development of chemical weapons constitutes a particularly serious 
threat for all mankind; 
(vii) Welco'ming recent measures taken by the Council to increase its activities in order to meet the 
requirements of European security but regretting that information on these activities communicated to 
the public and to the Assembly is still far from adequate; 
(viii) Considering that it is still essential to bring the requirements of European security to the attention 
of the public; 
(ix) Deeply regretting the continuous failure of the Council of Ministers to inform the Assembly in a 
proper way; 
(x) Considering that new governmental activities in WEU must allow the Assembly to exercise to the 
full its responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty; 
(xi) Noting in particular that the replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions relating 
to the Council's activities, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group seriously distort the Council's commitments to the Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Study closely the proposals made by the French Government for drawing up a European security 
charter with a view to: 
(a) defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and 
ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons lead 
to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security based on a policy of deter-
rence; 
(b) reaffirming member countries' continuing concern not to compromise the cohesion of the 
alliance and to include the strengthening ofthe European pillar in the context of the alliance; 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (1st sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
1089). 
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(c) averting a chemical arms race by calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to seek 
an agreement ensuring the complete elimination of such arms and promoting the extension of 
this agreement to all countries; 
(d) including in the charter a commitment to ensure reciprocal exchanges of information and con-
sultations in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to any 
threat to international peace; 
(e) also including an expression of the joint will to remove obstacles still obstructing the devel-
opment of European co-operation in armaments matters; 
2. To this end, direct the measures taken to give new work to WEU so as to ensure that the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty contributes to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the con-
solidation of peace by: 
(a) keeping the political committee on European security in the framework of WEU; 
(b) considering how the treaty should be applied to ensure that it meets present European security 
requirements and allows WEU to be enlarged to include Western European countries wishing 
and able to take part; 
(c) ensuring that these countries are kept informed of the activities of WEU and allowing the 
countries concerned to take part henceforth in some of these activities, particularly in 
co-operation in armaments matters; 
(d) giving the necessary impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters, inter alia by 
adapting its decision of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee to present 
facts of such co-operation; 
(e) acting without delay on its document" WEU and public awareness" so as to inform public 
opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration, 
including the issue of communiques at the close of meetings of the political committee on 
European security; 
(f) ensuring co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the 
French Institut des hautes etudes de defense nationale in 1988 and of the development of sub-
sequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all 
member countries; (1) for this purpose by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active 
part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former 
participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to 
invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course; 
(g) developing exchanges of views with the United States authorities so as to enhance the 
cohesion of the alliance; 
(h) applying in full Article IX of the treaty under which it has an obligation to report to the 
Assembly on its activities and on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when 
pursued in frameworks other than WEU. 
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RECOMMENDATION 443 1 
on the ministerial meeting of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the diplomatic/press offensive of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is multiplying pro-
posals for nuclear disarmament, calls for a co-ordinated response from the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Aware that these proposals, which affect first and foremost European security, should lead to 
European interests being defined in WEU, the only European organisation with responsibilities in this 
area; 
(iii) Encouraged by the call to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by George Shultz, 
United States Secretary of State, following his recent visit to Moscow, requesting their opinion on these 
proposals, 
URGES THE CouNCIL 
1. To make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary 
of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 
1987; 
2. To instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at 
the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (2nd sitting). 
2. Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure tabled by Mr. Goerens and others (Document 1094). 
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replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report in 1986, the 
omission of information concerning one important meeting, and considering that the absence of 
agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting the rest of its report on 
time; 
(ii) Welcoming, however, the communication in October 1986 of the first part of the report for that 
year, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before 
the end of February of the following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by 
the Council; 
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement 
ofWEU. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 1 090). 
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RECOMMENDATION 445 1 
on principles applicable in preparing the budgets 
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly 2 
Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office: 
- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of 
the growth rate defined in the European Communities; 
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions; 
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropria-
tions thus calculated. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (3rd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 1095). 
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OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS 
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1986 (REVISED) 
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submitted on behalf of the 
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2. Members of the committee: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Beysen (Alternate: 
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The Assembly, 
Revised Draft Recommendation 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 
1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing 
the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expend-
iture on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from 
extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433; 
(b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these 
budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero 
growth criterion; 
(c) furthermore, the evolution ofbudgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate 
since the requirements of reactivating WEU - including the restructuring of the ministerial 
organs - have been taken into account in this budget; 
(d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in 
the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs; 
(e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a 
more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets; 
{f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expend-
iture; 
(g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I " Permanent 
staff" could be used for other operating expenditure ifthe two seats in London and Paris were 
combined to allow their now separate services to be merged; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the 
Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly; 
(b) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores 
the wishes ofthe staff to achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, 
Chairman-in-Office ofthe Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to 
agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly's budgetary independence within 
the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Apply the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in establishing its 
budget; 
2. Apply to the operating budget ofthe Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of2.79% agreed upon for 
its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase ofF 379 983; 
3. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of esta-
blishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats; 
(b) establishing dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staff's career possi-
bilities. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur) 
1. The report gtvmg an opinion on the 
budgets of the ministerial organs of Western 
European Union for the financial years 1986 
(revised) and 1987 and the relevant draft recom-
mendation were agreed to by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration at its 
meeting on 27th February 1987. They are on the 
agenda of the first part of the thirty-third 
ordinary session. 
2. In these texts, your Rapporteur stressed 
the following three fundamental problems, i.e.: 
(a) abandoning the zero growth criterion 
appl~ed to all WEU budgets, including 
penswns; 
(b) adopting instead a more realistic cri-
terion allowing a maximum growth 
rate equal to that calculated each year 
by the Commission of the European 
Communities to be applied to the 
operating budgets alone; 
(c) recognising the Assembly's full inde-
pendence in the management of its 
operating budget within the limits of 
appropriations agreed by the Council 
in application of the abovementioned 
criterion. 
3. Since 27th February 1987, the committee 
has met twice (in Paris on 22nd April and in 
Luxembourg on 27th April) to examine further 
the Assembly's budgetary problems. Having 
noted that the negotiations with the Council con-
ducted by the Presidential Committee on the 
basis of Assembly Order 65 had still not pro-
duced results although Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, had made proposals which 
could put an end to WED's budgetary diffi-
culties, the committee agreed unanimously to 
submit to the Assembly at its extraordinary 
session in Luxembourg on 27th and 28th April 
1987 a proposal that the Council be recom-
mended to implement without delay the prin-
ciples set out in the proposals by the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council. 
4. During the morning sitting on 28th April 
1987, the Assembly adopted this draft recom-
mendation unanimously (see Recommendation 
445 at Appendix I). 
During the afternoon sitting on the same 
day, at the close of the Council meeting, Mr. 
Poos told the Assembly that: 
financial requirements in respect of pen-
sions. It has also agreed to meet your 
views in regard to independent budgetary 
management within the limits of agreed 
appropriations. On increases in the 
ordinary budget, it wishes to have more 
time to consider how this might be imple-
mented on the basis of specific data. " 
5. After his statement, Mr. Poos added in 
answer to a question put by Sir Dudley Smith, 
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration, that the Council's 
decisions were applicable immediately. 
6. Your Rapporteur can but express his 
greatest satisfaction that two of the most 
important problems of principle for which the 
Assembly has been fighting with conviction, 
steadfastness and firmness in recent years, have 
finally been settled in a suitable manner. 
The third problem is still outstanding, i.e. 
the annual growth rate of operating budgets, but 
there is reason to believe that a solution will 
soon be found since the Council is aware of the 
need to give the various WEU bodies the means 
which are essential for exercising their activities 
in the context of reactivation, allowing WEU to 
play a part in matters vital for the defence of 
Europe. 
7. The budgetary decisions taken by the 
Council are so important that it has proved 
necessary to revise the report already adopted by 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration. 
In regard to the Assembly's budgetary 
independence, your Rapporteur can but refer to 
the analysis of this problem made by Mr. Sinesio 
in his report dated 28th April 1986 (Document 
1054, paragraphs 36, 37 and 38) and the defi-
nition given by the Assembly itself in Recom-
mendation 429: 
" Guarantee the Assembly full indepen-
dence in all areas, in particular by allowing 
it to divide its overall budget between the 
various heads while respecting the regula-
tions governing the staff of the 
co-ordinated organisations. " 
8. As to separating the pensions budget from 
the operating budget with immediate effect, your 
Rapporteur considers that, pending the Council's 
decisions on the growth rate applicable to WEU 
" The Council of Ministers has just agreed operating budgets, it should here and now apply 
to improve the situation by allowing a the growth rate of 2. 79% fixed by the Council for 
separate budget - in relation to the the net total budget of the Assembly for 1987 
ordinary budget - to meet the growing (including pensions) to the operating budget 
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alone, which would immediately make available 
to the Assembly a further sum ofF 379 983, thus 
bringing the operating budget for 1987 up to 
F 17 034 358. 
9. Your Rapporteur believes that in 
accordance with the budgetary independence 
granted to the Assembly and within the limits of 
this new total operating budget the Presidential 
Committee and the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration will be able, in 
implementation of Order 67 ofthe Assembly (see 
Appendix II), to start applying the provisions 
agreed upon for improving the structure of the 
Office of the Clerk. 
10. On another section of the report relating to 
the refusal to allow a telex to be installed in the 
Office of the Clerk, your Rapporter has noted 
that the Office of the Clerk has recently been 
authorised to use the telefax installed for the 
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Paris agencies. This equipment can be used 
within the limits of a still relatively small 
network of subscribers and first experience indi-
cates that it is very expensive to use. However, it 
is certainly an improvement in means of com-
munication and the Office of the Clerk has 
recently used it to good effect. Your Rapporteur 
therefore considers that a longer period of use (at 
least one year) is needed before valid conclusions 
can be drawn from the experiment. In the 
meantime, the Assembly must study its need for 
a telex next year in the context of its budgetary 
independence. 
11. For the reasons set out above, your 
Rapporteur proposes that the draft recommen-
dation in Document 1088 be amended accord-
ingly. All the proposed amendments are given at 
Appendix Ill. The new text of the draft recom-
mendation incorporating these amendments is 
given at the beginning of the present report. 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX I 
RECOMMENDATION 445 
on principles applicable in preparing the budgets 
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly 
DOCUMENT 1105 
Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CouNCIL 
Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office: 
- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of 
the growth rate defined in the European Communities; 
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions; 
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropria-
tions thus calculated. 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX 11 
ORDER 67 
on the budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
APPENDIX 11 
1. APPROVES the action taken by the Presidential Committee in application of Order 65 and the terms 
of the memorandum of the President of the Assembly dated 12th March 1987; 
2. INVITES the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
to take the necessary steps to implement, during the present financial year, the provisions decided upon 
for improving the structure of the Office of the Clerk. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Proposed amendments to the draft recommendation 
in Document 1088 of 27th February 1987 
DOCUMENT 1105 
1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out sub-paragraph (a). 
2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out sub-paragraph (d). 
3. At the end of the preamble, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had 
decided to agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly's budgetary inde-
pendence within the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect imme-
diately," 
4. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
" Apply as soon as possible the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the 
EEC in establishing its budget; " 
5. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Apply to the operating budget ofthe Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of2.79% agreed upon 
for its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase ofF 379 983;" 
6. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (a). 
7. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b). 
8. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (d). 
9. In sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " studying the 
problem of" and insert "establishing". 
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